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Abstract 
Leadership in Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in turbulent times has been under-
theorised. A qualitative case study based on document analysis of 70 documents, 39 
interviews and 2 focus groups was the vehicle for examining the role of the leadership at 
the Islamic University of Gaza (IUG). IUG has operated under complex conditions of 
occupation and ongoing turbulence from its inception in 1978 to the present. This study 
examines the period 1978-2012. In this time the university grew from 25 men studying 
Sharia in a tent to 20,000 students  (63.7% female) studying across 11 faculties and 112 
different specialisations. The study documents and labels four phases of development of 
the university. The patterns of leadership uncovered in the study include transformational, 
transactional, heroic, post-heroic and on some specific occasions authoritarian styles, with 
transformational being the most important. The way in which the leadership resolved short 
term crises, as well as their long-term and big-picture focus, shaped the development of the 
university. 
 
 Resilience theory was applied alongside leadership theory to analyse the responses of IUG 
leadership. Resilience was taken beyond surviving to capitalising on disruption. Twenty 
three markers of resilience were found which worked independently and interactively to 
support resilient responses to the challenges IUG faced. These factors were initially 
developed from the literature, and new factors were added based on this research. The 
relationship between leadership styles and the promotion of resilience was examined.          
                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                 
The thesis describes a mutual shaping and supporting role between university and society 
in Gaza, and discusses some of the paradoxes of help and harm coming from players and 
belief systems external to the university.  The paradox of faith which can provide a 
cohesive, binding set of beliefs to support staff and students, as well as being the source of 
conflict and harm, is also discussed. 
 
A definition of a university as an educational community functioning beyond place, 
buildings, external recognition,  or physical destruction was developed. 
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Chapter One 
 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and Context of the Research  
Higher Education in countries openly at war, or which are in conflict or post-conflict zones, 
faces an environment which is turbulent, changing and challenging (Muthanna and 
Karaman, 2014; Dobre, 2015).  These conflicts have created major obstacles for Higher 
Education Institutions  (HEIs) such as the Islamic University of Gaza (IUG), in Palestine. 
 
Figure 1: Palestine 1946-2010 
 
 
Source: United Nations (2011). 
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Palestine is located in the centre of the Middle East region at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, 
and Europe, and links African Arab with Asian Arab countries. The Gaza Strip where IUG 
is located is one of the most densely populated regions of the world. More than 1.6 million 
people live in the Gaza Strip which occupies a small thin area that does not exceed 365 km2 
(less than 0.014% of the total area of Palestine which is 27 000 km2) in the southern coastal 
lands of historical Palestine (Assaf, 2001; Enshassi, 2000). The pictures in Figure 1 reveal 
the changes that have occurred throughout the years and the current realities of the Gaza 
strip. 
 
Giacaman, Abo-Rmeileh, Husseini, Saab, and Boyce (2007) describe the range of violent 
and traumatic experiences to which the Palestinian nation in the West Bank, the lands of 
1948 and the Gaza Strip have been subjected due to six decades of the Israeli occupation, 
including the destruction of the social world, manipulation of history, decline of education, 
theft of identity and culture, and destruction of values. 
 
The occupation forces withdrew from  the Gaza Strip after signing the Oslo accord in 1993, 
and relocated themselves around the cities of Gaza which created some calm and stability 
(Ramahi and Davies, 2002). Later in 2005, the occupation forces withdrew to the borders 
of the Strip. Consequently, the people of Gaza have some space to manage and improve 
their lives. Therefore, although some of the literature makes a clear distinction between 
conflict and post-conflict areas, the Gaza Strip exhibits characteristics of both. 
 
The varied economic, social, political, cultural and educational challenges confronting the 
Palestinian community have shaped their life, and are seriously damaging their chances for 
peaceful, inclusive and independent development in the future. Within the last five years 
alone, three wars have been waged against the Gaza Strip in December 2008, November 
2012 and July 2014. This is in addition to the tightening of the siege and closure of the 
borders over the Gaza Strip.  
 
The effects of the occupation have been both general for the population, and specific to 
universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Heleta (2015) states that universities are 
always damaged and affected when a country experiences war conditions. As conflict 
deepens, academic freedom is threatened or curtailed.  
 3  
This thesis argues that during the past 34 years, the leadership of IUG, the case under 
investigation, has been able to defy difficulties and obstacles to ensure the survival of  the 
university. These difficulties include: the Israeli and UNRWA non-recognition of the 
university since its inception until 1993; lack of resources; restrictions on movement; the 
shutdown of the university several times (Sullivan, 1994); internal political division; 
financial crises; and the bombing and destruction of all the engineering and science 
buildings during the aggression of December 2008 against the Gaza Strip. Each one of 
these problems put the survival and growth of the university at stake. 
 
An understanding of the particular challenges facing HEIs under hazardous conditions 
might provide a foundation for understanding how tertiary institutions in conflict and post-
conflict societies can survive and continue to provide the critical services that they do at 
operational, political and economic levels. 
 
Lengnick-Hall, Beck, and Lengnick-Hall (2011:243) argue that in adverse circumstances,  
"Only resilient, agile and relentlessly dynamic organisations will thrive in these turbulent, 
surprising, continuously evolving environments". In such turbulence and ongoing conflict, 
resilience is an imperative. Resilience gives the leadership the ability to deploy different 
factors and options that help them to act in a rational and timely manner to absorb shocks 
and overcome difficulties.  
 
The case of IUG represents a pattern of the difficulties and challenges that face the 
Palestinian universities under occupation and might face any HEI  in turbulent times. It 
also sheds light on the responses of organisational leadership in coping with these 
hardships. Working under the spears of the Israeli occupation since its inception in 1978 
created severe obstacles and challenges. The particular Islamic character of the university 
offered both hardships and resources. Camillzts and Datta (1991) maintain that if 
organisations cannot absorb shocks and respond in a resilient manner, they might 
jeopardise their very existence. 
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1.2 Research Problem 
The problem here is the environment of conflict and wars, post-conflict and ongoing 
turbulence within which IUG must exist and the leadership must operate. As a result of 64 
years of occupation, it is extremely difficult to uncover any aspect of  Palestinian life that 
has not been shaped by the prolonged Israeli occupation (Smith, 2011). Such hardships 
threaten the morale of the staff, undermine the effectiveness of governance and 
management, and put the survival and growth of IUG at stake.  
 
HEIs have to operate and survive within the social, political and economic environment in 
which they are located. Bryman and Bell (2007) argue that many researchers view the 
context and environment of HE as  changing. This issue encourages scholars to determine 
the best delivery of education amid conflict  (Bernardo and Baranovich, 2014).  
The researcher noted that most research on leadership and resilience has been conducted in 
Western contexts and culture, especially the United States. Yet,  as Wang, Waldman and 
Zhang (2012) suggest, it is not clear if there might be different results across different 
cultures and contexts.Therefore, it is important to research the role of leadership and 
resilience within the Islamic settings of IUG.  
 
The researcher found no comprehensive study that dealt with the role of organisational 
resilience in the survival and thriving of higher education institutions in general, and in 
particular, universities that operate under conditions of occupation, war and serious 
conflict. The managerial strategies and tactics of organisational leadership to stabilize 
things that underpin the running of any university in a resilient and timely manner, located 
in politically fraught countries under prolonged occupation and conflict zones, such as the 
case of IUG, are also under-studied. 
  
Therefore, the researcher believes that this study may help to address the need for  research 
to fill the gap in theories on the role of the leadership in HE during prolonged violence and 
instability by categorising the strategies and the factors leadership deployed. This will 
contribute to insights regarding the survival and growth of a university located in an 
extreme conflict and occupation zone.  
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1.3 Purpose of the Study 
The main purpose of this research is to examine the role of the leadership and the sources 
and manifestations of organisational resilience at the Islamic University of Gaza between 
its inception in 1978 and the end of 2012. To accomplish this goal, the study explores the 
challenges and difficulties IUG experienced through the past 34 years, and the responses of 
the leadership to these challenges.  
The study also explores the styles of leadership at IUG and examines whether these are the 
appropriate styles to be utilised in HEIs in turbulent times. Further, the study unpacks the 
factors and strategies used by the leadership to overcome hardships, and the interaction 
between these factors and its contributions in achieving the survival and thriving of the 
university. Finally the role of the university in the production and transfer of knowledge, to 
students, staff and the wider society and in nation-building is examined in both conflict and 
post-conflict situations. 
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1.4 Research Questions 
The overall question of this study is:  
How does leadership foster resilience in a Higher Education Institution in situations of 
conflict, post-conflict and ongoing turbulence? 
Two subsidiary questions are designed to answer the overall question: 
1. How did the leadership at IUG respond to the challenges 1978-2012? 
2. How did leadership and culture interact in building resilience? 
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1.5 Managing HEIs in Turbulent Times: Beyond Knowledge Production 
In both developed and developing countries, the business of HEIs is not only the 
production and transfer of knowledge. According to Stephens and Graham (2010), in post 
conflict societies, HEIs play a critical role in supporting nation-building. Stephens and 
Graham contend that universities play a central role in the reconstruction process of 
societies. They can impact the public mind-set and act as a major contributor to the re-
establishment of the civil society. Universities educate the teachers and qualified graduates 
of which most post-conflict societies are in dire need. However, conflict and wars 
undermine this foundation and can destroy education infrastructure (Novelli and Lopes 
Cardozo, 2008). 
The approaches of Novelli and Lopes Cardozo (2008) and Stephens and Graham (2010) to 
the additional business of HE are aligned with the approach of Altbach (1987) who argues 
that in developing countries, HE constitutes a very important institution, not only because it 
trains elites and provides the basis for a technological society, but because it is the 
intellectual institution with the most widespread impact on culture, politics and ideology. 
Generally, in both developed and developing countries, HEIs face a variety of challenges. 
Some of these are: developing quality criteria and enhancing quality assurance; meeting the 
demands of stakeholders such as the government, labour market and funding agencies; and 
engaging students with the real world (Muller-Christ, Sterling, van Dam-Mieras, 
Adombent, Fisher and Rieckmann, 2014).	   In the case of IUG, the major stakeholder, the 
Israeli Occupying Authority, was hostile to the existence of the university. 
Sporn (2010) believes that managing HEIs is a complex task, and concerns a set of actors 
and processes in order to succeed, particularly in turbulent environments. HEIs are 
considered by Sporn (2010) and Enders (2015) as critical because they represent one of the 
important sectors which enable communities to function and actively contribute to the 
development and progress of societies.    
Establishing and maintaining the smooth functioning of universities in the Palestinian 
territories under occupation was a problematic and challenging issue. It remained a high 
priority for the Palestinian community in order to stand against the Israeli Occupying 
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Authority and to contribute to nation building. Baramki (2010:35) states that “Having a 
university was crucial if we were to resist the occupation. We would produce well–
educated, confident graduates, proud of their Palestinian identity and eager to contribute to 
the development of their homeland”.  
 
According to Sullivan (1994), Palestinian universities played an important role in the 
political activities and the efforts to create an independent Palestinian state. 
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1.6 IUG: Focusing the Study on a Specific Institution 
The Islamic University of Gaza (IUG) emerged in 1978 as a strong example of a 
Palestinian university actively engaged with the process of coping with challenges and 
overcoming barriers imposed by the Israeli occupation forces in the Palestinian land. In the 
early years, IUG was nothing more than some scattered and sporadic tents (see Picture 1) 
amid the sand dunes which were not suitable for any kind of HE. Within a short period of 
time, IUG was able to shift to a modern university that housed more than 20 000 students 
studying in modern buildings as shown in Picture 2, and offering them a diversity of 
faculties, degrees and specialisations. 
  
Picture 1: IUG Tents Used as Classrooms in Early 1980s 
 
Source: Public Relation Office of IUG 
 
Picture 2: Some of IUG Buildings, December 2012 
 
Source: Public Relation Office of IUG 
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Impeding the establishment and the progress of the Palestinian universities has been a 
consistent policy of the occupation authorities (Mahshi, 1978). In this study, IUG 
represents a symbol of the suffering of Palestinian universities under the Israeli occupation. 
IUG, the only university in Gaza until 1991, was chosen as a platform to shed adequate 
light on the sanctions and obstacles imposed by the Israeli occupation against Palestinian 
universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Many Palestinian universities were 
subject to Israeli oppressive measures such as long closure of universities, humiliation 
against students and staff members and financial constraints. IUG was, also, subjected to 
additional Israeli targeting  such as the bombing of IUG many times in the wars of 2009, 
2012 and 2014. This is in addition to the assassination of many leaders and members of the 
staff.  
 
Soon after the inception of IUG in 1978, the occupation forces tried to impose their 
dominance over the university. Some of these attempts were: the intervention in the 
number of registered students each year; the intervention in the curriculum; restrictions on 
fund raising and freedom of movement; the prevention of opening new faculties/ 
departments; and rejecting the construction of new buildings (Al-Ajez, 1996; AL-Sinwar, 
and Mouteer, 2009). 
 
Although the occupation cast long shadows on the Palestinian community and its 
institutions, it was not the only obstacle to hinder academic excellence. There are also 
different side-effects of the occupation, one of which was the political and ideological 
disagreement, mainly between secular and religious nationalists in the early 1980s. This led 
to some occasionally violent clashes between students and caused damage to some offices 
and equipment. Thus, the educational process was disrupted many times. This political 
conflict also has its own impacts on the Palestinian community as it increased the tension 
and instability between the PNA (Palestinian National Authority) and Hamas, and caused 
tightening the siege over the Gaza Strip. It also played a major role in creating internal and 
external supporters/opponents for the case of IUG, particularly in financial support.   
 
Farranah (1985) argues that Palestinian universities are a fundamental pillar in maintaining 
the unity of the community, which the occupation is keen to shred. Despite the fact that 
Palestinian universities played a crucial role in opposing the occupation,  political and 
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religious divisions  appeared strongly in universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
seriously threatening the unity of the community.  
 
The story of IUG is a story of the struggle and sacrifice of a Palestinian university against 
the Israeli occupation assaults and invasion to keep the university surviving and able to 
move forward with the educational process. This thesis is about the achievements of IUG 
against the background of Israeli oppression. The IUG story reveals points of both 
convergence and divergence within the Palestinian community. Successful and positive 
stories have been achieved at IUG. Nevertheless, negative stories have arisen. Therefore, a 
detailed and documented story of the university is presented and analysed in chapter 2 in 
order to give insight into IUG realities and their implications. 
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1.7 The Role of Resilience in Surviving Turbulence 
There have been many approaches to organisational resilience and the associated factors or 
attributes. For example, Hollnagel (2007, 2009) defines resilience as the intrinsic ability of 
an organisation to adjust its functioning prior to or following shocks and turbulent events. 
By doing so, organisations can sustain the required operations even after major events or in 
the presence of difficulties and challenges. This definition was developed by Hollnagel, 
Woods and Wreathall (2011) and adopted by Steen and Aven (2011).  
Another approach to resilience proposed by Lengnick-Hall and Beck (2005) and Lengnick-
Hall, et al. (2011) is aligned with Hollnagel’s definition of resilience. They define and 
perceive resilience as thriving because of the ability to capitalise on disturbances and 
unexpected events and create opportunities from threats. Both perspectives seek to absorb 
the initial damage, recover and exploit any opportunities to move forward and thrive.  
In a similar way, Dinh, Pasman and Mannan (2012) define resilience as the ability to 
minimize damages and get operations rapidly back to normal after adverse events. In the 
context of serious conflict and wars, Ungar (2011) describes resilience as a dynamic 
process that can lead to positive results despite war and adverse circumstances. This thesis 
primarily understands resilience as the ability of an organisation to absorb shocks or initial 
damages and recover, which  is crucial for the organisation to return to normal operations 
and  move beyond surviving to thriving. 
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1.8 The Role of Transformational Leadership in Turbulent Environments 
Because IUG operates in a turbulent and challenging environment, the focus on leadership 
styles will be on transformational style of leadership with some insight on transactional 
style as elaborated in the literature discussed in chapter 3. This is based on the assertion of 
several key authors in the field (Burns, 1978; Bass and Avolio, 1990; Yukl, 2008, 2010; 
Warrilow, 2010; Craig, 2011; Siewiorek, Saarinen, Lainema, and Lehtinen, 2012; 
Manktelow and Carlson, 2013) that these two styles are more appropriate than other styles, 
particularly in changing and challenging environments with priority to transformational 
leadership over transactional style.  
The study investigates whether a transformational style of leadership was deployed at IUG 
and whether it is appropriate in turbulence and ongoing conflict. It investigates the three 
characteristics of transformational leadership presented by Bass and Avolio (1990) which 
are: importance of outcomes; transcending self-interest; and activating higher-order needs. 
Also, the study explores if there were other styles implemented throughout the different 
stages of IUG history and its major role within the context of the university. 
The researcher adopted the definition of transformational leadership introduced by Yukl 
(2010), who was inspired and strongly influenced by the work of two key authors in the 
field of leadership, Burns (1978) and Bass (1990).Transformational leadership is about the 
ability of leaders’ behaviours to influence followers and motivate them to comply with 
instructions (Yukl, 2010).  
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1.9 The Role of Culture and Ideology in Shaping the University 
Aktas, Cicek and Kiyak (2011), define culture as a set of norms, values, beliefs and 
attitudes that affect behaviour.  
The Middle East region reflects particular historical, religious, social and cultural 
characteristics. The diversity in this region is related to language, religion, traditions, habits 
and interests. The Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO) 
declared in the Fourth Islamic Conference in Algeria in 2004 that the diversity of culture 
among Muslim countries has many advantages: it is one of the important factors of 
sustainable development; it contributes to globalisation and interaction of civilizations; and 
it helps in creativity and delivering best services to the community (ISESCO, 2004).  
 
Islam as the prevalent religion in the region can act, in spite of the diversity of 
understanding and implementation of its concepts, as a unifying force by creating a 
common culture in the Middle-Eastern cluster (Kabasakal and Dastmalchian, 2001; 
Kabasakal and Bodur, 2002). Even within the same Islamic countries there is diversity in 
understanding Islamic concepts. The Islamic culture is a set of thoughts, values and beliefs 
that stems from the Quran and from the Sunnah of the Prophet Mohamed which guide the 
behaviours of leaders and followers (Beekun and Badawi, 1999; Faris and Parry, 2011). 
 
Although the beliefs of followers are based on the same sacred texts, nevertheless, the 
interpretation by many groups of these concepts are extremely diverse and often in conflict 
with one another. Within the Muslim community there are two big Islamic sects, Sunnis 
and Shiites. The majority of Muslims are Sunnis. There are Shiites in Iran and parts of Iraq, 
Syria, Lebanon and Pakistan. Both sects have the same faith and beliefs (Sullivan, 2001), 
nevertheless, disagreements appear in the way they explain some Islamic concepts (Awaa, 
2006). These different interpretations create conflict and different extreme ideological 
organisations some of which adopt violence and have led to bloodshed and oppression. The 
conflict between these groups resulted  in violent clashes and wars such as what happened 
between Iraq and Iran in mid 1980s and the current conflict in Yemen, Iraq and Syria. This 
is in addition to some individual criminal attacks against civilians in different regions of the 
world. 
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In the Palestinian context, although the majority of Palestinians are Muslim Sunni, the 
general culture is diverse. Differences are both religious and ideological. In the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, many different political/ ideological factions exist and adopt different 
ideologies ranging from Islamic to secular and leftist ideologies. These ideologies are 
implemented in organisations and institutions, including universities. Some of them are, 
generally, affected by Islamic culture such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Salafist among 
some other smaller groups. Other  factions adopt secular or leftist ideology such as Fatah, 
The Popular Front, The Democratic Front among other smaller groups. This diversity 
offers a challenge to the exchange of ideas and beliefs in a rational manner with respect to 
democracy, equality and diversity (Marriot, Hooley and Weller, 2011). All these 
organisations tried to promote their ideology and culture to attract the largest number of 
people, employees and students. This created not only intense competition but also 
sometimes violent conflicts.  
 
This diversity of ideologies and political affiliation exists strongly in most of the 
Palestinian universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. While Birzeit, An-Najah and 
Bethlehem in the West Bank and Al-Azhar in Gaza Strip have affiliation with Fatah, the 
IUG in Gaza has affiliation with Hamas. There is still conflict and disagreement between 
Fatah and Hamas about  dominance over Al-Aqsa university in Gaza. This diversity of 
political and ideological views turned sometimes to conflict and caused violent clashes 
between these groups in many universities such as An-Najah, Birzeit and IUG in the early 
1980s and in 2007, as will be discussed in chapter two. 
 
The concentration of this thesis on Islamic culture is because it is the adopted culture at the 
university. IUG provides for its students an academic environment that adheres to Sunni 
Islamic principles as well as Palestinian traditions and customs, and aims to	  contribute in 
building future generations and developing the society in a framework of these Islamic 
values (IUG website, 2012). Therefore, it has been created with Islamic cultural Sunni 
roots and sets out to adopt and instill Islamic principles in the hearts and minds of students, 
staff and the community as a whole. These principles are based on  tolerance, justice, peace 
and cooperation with others. This Islamic ideological culture comprises a cornerstone 
which cannot be ignored when discussing or analysing the past, the present and the current 
reality of IUG.  
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The political affiliation and the dominance of the Islamic Trend (which was absorbed by 
Hamas after 1987) over IUG played a role in shaping the general culture of the university. 
The leadership and many of the staff members embrace these Islamic cultures as they form 
an important part of their beliefs and practices within and outside the university. Generally, 
there are certain differences between culture and organisational culture, yet there is also 
overlap and mutual influence between the two concepts, particularly in the case of IUG as 
will be clarified in chapter 3. This study examines whether Islamic culture can be a 
unifying factor despite differences. 
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1.10 The Interaction between Leadership and Culture in Building Resilience 
Teixeirra and Werther (2013) argue that leadership and culture are key dimensions to 
create resilience. They believe that leadership is the organising force that creates a resilient 
organisation. In a study of schools that operate successfully in South Africa, Christie, 
Butler, and Potterton (2007:27) argue that "the key features of resilient schools are: Sense 
of responsibility and agency; Leadership; Centrality of teaching and learning; Safety and 
organisation; Authority and discipline and Culture of concern". These features which 
constitute leadership and culture, if adopted and implemented properly, might enable 
educational institutions, not only schools but also universities, to be more resilient in the 
face of challenges. Thus, they could enhance their ability to absorb shocks and overcome 
hardships.  
Pianta and Walsh (1998) argue that resilience is a process that needs the interface of all the 
functions and efforts to work together in integrity toward the same goals of the 
organisation. In terms of the mutual influence of culture and leadership, Teixeirra and 
Werther (2013) state that leaders can reshape the culture, and this can lead to a more 
resilient organisation.  
Devanna, Fombrum, Tichy, and Warren, (1982) consider Strategic Human Resource 
Management (SHRM) a key process in strategy implementation of an organisation. The 
decisions and actions of organisational leadership shape the central tenet of that strategy. 
The challenges and changes of the environment needs SHRM goals and objectives to work 
with synergy and integrity toward the same strategy of the organisation (Demirbag, 
Tatoglu, Glaister and Zaim, 2010; Lengnick-Hall, et al., 2011). 
In this regard, Lengnick-Hall, et al. (2011) believe that building capacities for 
organisational resilience can be achieved  through SHRM by developing capacities of 
leaders and employees to enable them to absorb events, and ultimately engage in 
transformational activities to capitalise on events and even thrive. This study examines 
whether SHRM played any role in the survival of IUG or contributed to building capacity 
for organisational resilience.   
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1.11 Structure of the Research: A Road Map 
This research is composed of seven chapters. Following chapter 1 of the introduction, 
chapter 2 presents and analyses the story of IUG. It provides a full perspective of what has 
happened at IUG during the last three decades. It gives insight into the context in which 
IUG was established and operated. The chapter also relates the progress IUG was able to 
achieve in spite of difficulties and hardships. The chapter documents the history of the 
university through its different stages. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the literature review and the conceptual framework by which leadership 
and resilience are defined and theorised. This chapter conceptualises the role of universities 
in societies and the challenges that face HEIs in general, and universities in particular, 
especially in areas of turbulence and conflict. In addition, this chapter summarises the 
concepts, styles and the role of leadership in different contexts and cultures. Further 
important factors such as culture and ideology, and strategic human resource management 
in turbulent times are discussed. The study examines how these concepts are inter-related 
and how they interact to promote organisational resilience in order to achieve the 
objectives and goals of the organisation. Organisational resilience theories are then 
discussed with specific focus on the qualities and markers of resilience and how to build 
capacity for organisational resilience strategy.  
.  
Chapter 4 presents the methodology used in this study. It provides the justification for the 
methodological approach and the procedures employed in the study. Because the researcher 
has been employed at IUG from 1983 as an administrator in different departments, a 
process of self-reflexivity added to the richness of the data, and served as a bulwark against 
bias.  
 
Chapter 5 presents an initial analysis and discussion of the challenges IUG experienced and 
the responses of the leadership. 
 
 Chapter 6 provides a full analysis and discussion of the role of resilience at IUG. Further it 
provides the strategies and the styles of leadership deployed at IUG. Further it presents the 
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markers of resilience. Finally, the chapter introduces the role of culture and ideology at 
IUG.  
 
Chapter 7 presents the findings and the conclusions of the study. It summarises the main 
contributions of the study, followed by recommendations for IUG and for HEIs. Some 
suggestions for further research are then presented. The appendices include the semi-
structured interview questions and a list of the documents used in the study.  
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Chapter Two 
 
2. The University of Tents: A Story of a Successful Palestinian University under 
Israeli Occupation 
Recording the history of IUG in this chapter is the first outcome of this research. The story 
of the university presented in this chapter has been derived from document analysis, 
interviews, focus groups discussion and personal observation.  
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2.1 The Context of the Israeli Occupation: Shaping the Life of Palestinians 
Smith (2011:316) states that “the Israeli Palestinian conflict is not as a war between two 
equal sovereigns, but between a hostile state and a captive population”. Due to the 
profound effects of the prolonged occupation on the Palestinian community as a whole, it is 
crucial to understand the context of the Palestinian dilemma in general, and its potential 
impacts on the functioning of IUG in particular.  
Describing the Palestinian context, particularly in the Gaza Strip, the Commissioner-
General of UNRWA, Filippo Grandi (2011) stated in his speech, introducing the UN 
annual report in front of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, that Palestine refugees suffered  negative effects of ongoing conflict. In Gaza, 
unless the blockade is lifted and the economy restarted, it would cease to be a liveable 
place by 2020 and their survival would be at stake (Grandi, 2011).  
2.1.1 Historical Background   
In 1948 the catastrophe (Al-Nakbah) uprooted and dispossessed an entire nation from its 
own land in order to establish the Israeli State (Hadawi, 1968; Brand, 1991). Palestinians at 
that time not only lost all of their own land, but some were ethnically cleansed. Others 
became refugees in surrounding countries and in their own home space (Kevorkian and 
Khsheiboun, 2009). Relevant international law, although not officially abrogated, has 
become meaningless in the solution of this acute and prolonged conflict (de Santisteban, 
2002) with no real opportunities to solve this dilemma based on justice and fairness in the 
near future. Recent war has left the Gaza Strip devastated (Jabareen and Camron, 2010), 
and therefore, Palestinians require aid support and policy advice (Collier and Hoeffer, 
2004) to attain their freedom and dignity. 
The Israeli occupation has been able through a colonial, deliberate and well-planned policy 
to control and usurp the Palestinian territories. In the 1920s, as shown in Figure 1a on p1 
the territories inhabited by Jewish settlers were few and fragmented. After the wars in 1948 
and in 1967 and beyond, they controlled all of the Palestinian territories (Reuventy, 2003) 
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and imposed their policies and rules on the Palestinian territories. Consequently, the 
Palestinian territories became as small and scattered pieces without any meaningful 
territorial contiguity between them. 
 
 
2.1.2 Quality of Palestinians’ Life under Occupation 
All communities in wars and conflicts suffer disastrous and long-lasting effects that 
undermine their reintegration and overall safety (UNICEF, 2007). Wars and conflicts 
adversely affect basic services for citizens under conflict and thus make them suffer, 
sometimes for many years.  
 
The Israeli military measures against the Palestinian community were multi-faceted. These 
include: displacement of civilians from their homes and land; demolition of thousands of 
homes; razing and destruction of agricultural land; arresting; injuring and killing thousands 
of civilians; imposing closures and siege; a checkpoints regime; construction of the 
separation wall; and the isolation of cities and areas from each other (Hamdan and Defever, 
2002). These sanctions also include deportation of citizens abroad and imposing 
restrictions on the movement of citizens and goods.  
 
Drawing from Giacaman, Mataria, et al. (2007), The diagram in Figure 2 summarises the 
major external and internal impacts of the Israeli occupation on different aspects of 
Palestinian life. They conclude that the quality of Palestinians’ lives has dramatically 
deteriorated since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1948. This acute and prolonged 
occupation reflects a loss of national dignity, loss of freedom and mobility of movement, 
feeling of incapacitation, economic decline and poverty and stressful circumstances.  
 
Figure 2: Quality of Life Determinants in the Palestinian Context 
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Source: Giacaman, Mataria, Nguyen-Gillham, Abu Safieh, Stefanini and Chatterji, 2007:73. 
 
With regard to economic and financial crises, Hilal (2012:386) believes that “Palestine is 
an extreme case given the extent to which marginalisation is present for the majority of 
Palestinians and the very severe limitations that are placed on economic opportunities in 
the current political environment". The Israeli occupation, combined with their restrictions 
led to financial and economic crises. The occupation authorities tried to impede and 
prevent any economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Nofal (2006) 
concludes that, in addition to the extensive destruction of various aspects of community, 
economic and social life, which led to a decline in the rates of growth, output and trade, 
high unemployment rates appeared and led to increasing rates of poverty (Batniji, Rabaia, 
Nguyen–Gillham, Giacaman, Sarraj, Punamaki, Saab, and Boyce, 2009). Poverty has 
become a part of the Palestinian ascribed identity and increased the complexity of their 
social and educational life.  
 
 24  
In terms of the health status, there were imminent risks and continuous suffering. The 
Israeli measures and restrictions caused serious damage to the basic health services of the 
Palestinian population. The report of the World Bank (2004) on the situation in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip stated that Israeli attacks during Intifadt Al-Aqsa in 2000, 
intentionally targeted civilians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The report added 
that the closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have imposed extreme difficulties upon 
the health system. 
 
B’Tselem (2010) states that many old men and women died while waiting on the roads, and 
pregnant women were forced to give birth while waiting at the checkpoints. Kevorkian 
(2003) and B’Tselem (2010) declare that Palestinians suffer from lack of adequate health 
services because of the Israeli restrictions on importing medicine and equipment. This is in 
addition to the inability to receive medical care on time because of the checkpoints regime. 
Continuing the occupation for more than six decades has caused deep psychological and 
mental health problems. Symptoms of depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
and somatic conditions were found to be elevated within Palestinian society (Kevorkian, 
2003).  
 
Kevorkian and Khsheiboun (2009) say that the Palestinian people have yet to attain their 
inalienable rights as defined by the United Nations General Assembly, namely, the right to 
self-determination without external interference, the right to national independence and 
sovereignty, and the right to return to their homes. This study examines the role of IUG in 
opposing the occupation and in nation-building. Over time, this conflict also created 
political divisions among Palestinian political groups (Secular, Islamic and leftist). These 
differences appeared most notably among students in some universities (Birzeit, An-Najah 
and IUG) and led sometimes to clashes in the 1980s between these groups. 
  
The tension and the political conflict escalated after the signing of the Oslo agreement in 
September 1993 between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Israeli 
government. The agreement led to the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA) led by Fatah movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to the ceding of some 
power and territory by Israel to PNA (Chenoweth, Wehrmeyer, Lipchin, Smith, Gazit, 
2007). After the Israeli withdrawal from inside the cities of the Gaza Strip in 2005, free 
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elections under international supervision were held in 2006 in the West Bank, Gaza Strip 
and East Jerusalem to choose members of the Palestinian Legislative Council. Hamas won 
an overwhelming majority of these elections. This, in turn escalated the violence and 
internal divisions. 
 
 
2.1.3 Effects of Occupation on HE Sector in Gaza Strip: Academic Exclusion 
 
Since the early years of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the Israeli 
colonial procedures and restrictions against the HE sector aimed to impede any efforts of 
Palestinians to establish or develop HEIs (Mahshi, 1978; Alzaroo, 1989) particularly in the 
Gaza Strip. Alzaroo (1989) argues that the Israeli occupation forces tried to hinder the 
efforts of universities in the Gaza Strip towards progress and development. 
  
One of the real challenges for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, West Bank and East 
Jerusalem was to establish and maintain universities under the continuous restrictions of 
Israeli occupation. Notwithstanding these limitations and difficulties against the education 
sector, the Palestinian people have demonstrated that education is of great importance to 
them (Baramki, 2010). Due to the dire need, there was insistence and determination of the 
Palestinian people to establish their own universities. Under the pressure of the community, 
the occupation has turned a blind eye to the establishment of universities in the West Bank. 
Sullivan (1994) believes that the occupation allowed the opening of universities in order to 
keep an eye on and supervise students and their political activities.  
 
During the period 1973-1977, five universities were established in the West Bank (Awad, 
1983) while none were established in the Gaza Strip. The pressure and the intensive efforts 
continued until the Palestinian community and their leaders in the Gaza Strip succeeded in 
establishing IUG as the first university in Gaza in November 1978. Thirteen years later, Al-
Azhar University was established in Gaza city in close proximity to IUG.  
Table 1: Palestinian HE Institutions 
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No Name Supervision 
Year of 
Establishment 
Location 
1 Palestine Technical University Government 1930 West Bank 
2. Hebron University Public 1971 West Bank 
3. Birzeit University Public 1972 West Bank 
4. Bethlehem University Public 1973 West Bank 
5. An-Najah National University Public 1977 West Bank 
6. Islamic University of Gaza Public 1978 Gaza Strip 
7. Palestine Polytechnic University Public 1978 West Bank 
8. Al Quds University Public 1984 West Bank 
9. Al -Azhar University Public 1991 Gaza Strip 
10. Al- Aqsa University Government 1991 Gaza Strip 
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11 The Arab American University Public 1997 West Bank 
12. Gaza University Private 2007 Gaza Strip 
13. University College of Applied Sciences Private 2007 Gaza Strip 
14. University Of Palestine Private 2008 Gaza Strip 
15. Ummah University for Open Learning Private 2008 Gaza Strip 
 
Source: Dean of planning and development at IUG 2012 
 
As shown in Table 1, the Palestinian society and its leaders were able to create fifteen 
universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to serve the national objectives of the 
community, between 1972 and 208. Some of these are government universities which, 
financially, are fully supported by the PNA, while public universities are partially 
supported.  
 
The occupation was not able to prevent the establishment of the Palestinian universities. 
Nevertheless, they were able to impose restrictive measures to disrupt the smooth 
functioning of the educational process. According to de Santisteban (2002) the Palestinian 
universities and institutes were always a target of the Israeli occupation ( including such 
oppresive actions as shutting down, intrusive inspection, besieging, vandalising property 
and humiliation measures). 
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2.2 IUG- Leading through Adverse Circumstances 
de Santisteban (2002) describes the Palestinian case under occupation as distinctive due to 
its inherent uncertainty in the pace of transition, educational disruptions and  the shortage 
of adequate resources. The lives of Palestinians have been shaped by conflict, rampant 
unemployment and instability (Alzaroo and Hunt, 2003). Despite this uncertainty and 
disruptive measures of the occupation, Palestinians have repeatedly turned to education as 
a primary means of survival (Nicolai, 2007). 
IUG was established in 1978 as the first university in the Gaza Strip. It started with only 25 
students (all male) and by 2012 had increased to 20 168. The 25 initial students studied in 
make-shift tents under two faculties: Sharia (Islamic Legislation) and Law, and Arabic 
Language. By 2012, IUG students studied in eleven faculties. These faculties were: Sharia 
and Law; Art, Religion Foundation; Education, Science, Commerce; Engineering; Nursing; 
Information Technology; Medicine; and Health Sciences. The faculties offered Bachelor, 
General Diploma, Master, and  new PhD programmes (Appendix E).  
IUG adopted the philosophy of teaching male and female students on two separated 
campuses (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009) with no differences of the subjects the men 
students and women students study. This decision was accepted and supported by the 
leadership which consisted of members from different political parties. In 1979, only 40 
women were registered. By the academic year 1981-1982, the number of enrolled women 
had grown to 269 while the number of men enrolled was 898. Before the shutting down of 
IUG in 1987-1988, the number grew to 1 656 female and 2 848 male as shown in Table 2 
(P. 26) and Table 3 (P. 40). 
The increase in student enrolment is not linear. Between 1978-1987, enrolment increased 
from 25 to 4505 students. After the outbreak of the first Intifada (uprising) and the forced 
shutdown of the university, student enrolment decreased sharply in 1989 to only 358 
students.  
 29  
 
Table 2: Total Number of Students Enrolled at IUG from 1978-2012 
Academic Year 
 Bachelor 
Degree  
  Master  
 General 
Diploma   
Total 
 78/79  25  -    -    25  
 79/80  161  -    -    161  
 80/81  345  -    -    345  
 81/82  1,167  -    -    1,167  
 82/83  1,719  -    -    1,719  
 83/84  2,906  -    -    2,906  
 84/85  3,805  -    -    3,805  
 85/86  3,752  -    -    3,752  
 86/87  4,051  -    -    4,051  
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Academic Year 
 Bachelor 
Degree  
  Master  
 General 
Diploma   
Total 
 87/88  4,504  -    -    4,504  
 88/89  358  -    -    358  
 89/90  1,034  -    -    1,034  
 90/91  1,100  -    -    1,100  
 91/92  2,061  -    -    2,061  
 92/93  2,684  -    -    2,684  
 93/94  3,573  -    -    3,573  
 94/95  4,192  14 -    4,206  
 95/96  5,040  36 -    5,076  
 96/97  4,849  36 -    4,885  
 97/98  7,412  81 93  7,586  
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Academic Year 
 Bachelor 
Degree  
  Master  
 General 
Diploma   
Total 
 98/99  8,615  132 145  8,892  
 99/00  9,647  123 163  9,933  
 00/01  10,069  160 190  10,419  
 01/02  11,615  261 257  12,133  
 02/03  12,975  293 327  13,595  
 03/04  12,995  376 519  13,890  
 04/05  15,661  545 631  16,837  
 05/06  16,995  712 476  18,183  
 06/07  19,108  806 463  20,377  
 07/08  19,355  953 488  20,796  
 08/09  18,946  1,117 332  20,395  
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Academic Year 
 Bachelor 
Degree  
  Master  
 General 
Diploma   
Total 
09/10 18,859 1025 294 20,178 
10/11 18,799 1142 327 20,268 
11/12 18,747 1119 302           20,168 
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Figure 3: Increase in the Number of Students Enrolled at IUG 1978-2012 
 
                             Stage1             Stage 2        Stage3                          Stage 4 
 
 
 
The university has not experienced the same challenges, or applied the same solutions to 
problems it faced at different stages of development. To enable a better understanding of 
various difficulties, and challenges, and solutions, the researcher has divided the phases of 
the university into four stages. The next section presents and analyses these four stages in 
detail. 
 
 
Challenges of the Four Stages: 
  
Stage 1: 1978-1987 - Establishment and Recognition 
• Lack of resources, human and material (staff and equipment) 
• Working under stress and risk (the non-recognition of IUG for fifteen years, raids 
and inspection, arrests and departure of staff and Chancellors of IUG) 
• Lack of infrastructure (buildings, facilities and communication networks) 
• Financial crises (salaries and other needs 
• Restrictions on the development of IUG (preventing the launch of  new programs, 
limitation of numbers of registered students)  
• Disruption and impeding research and development programs 
• Loss of control and authority (restriction of free movement of staff, visa and 
accommodation issues, and expulsion of staff) 
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• Disruption of decision making process (interference in decisions, curricula, number 
of students and opening new departments or Faculties) 
 
Stage 2: 1987-1993 - Threatening the Existence 
• Destruction of the educational process (closing IUG for four years, arrest of 
hundreds of students and staff, storming the university, inspecting and tampering 
with its furniture and equipment several times) 
• Financial crises (significant restrictions on fund-raising and transfer, student fees) 
• Full disruption of research and development programs 
• Endangered the retention of students and staff of the university 
• Significant weakness in communication with the outside world because of the 
closure of the university 
• Threatened commitment of employees (dropping out of the university for more than 
four years and unavailability of salaries for long months) 
• Decline of performance (absenteeism of staff) 
 
Stage 3: 1993-2000 - Reconstruction and Development 
• Recognition of IUG (local, regional and international institutions, governments and 
associations, hiring of IUG graduates). 
• Launch of training, research and development programs. 
• Launch of  a major reconstruction process (new permanent buildings). 
• Strengthen the local, national and international network and relationships 
(leadership and employees, partnership and twinning agreements with many 
universities and institutions. 
• Vertical and Horizontal expansion of IUG (new Faculties, units and departments, 
programs, increase the number of) 
• Decision-making effectiveness (partnership and between the University Council 
and the Board of Trustees, staff participation in decision-making process) 
• Development of laws and regulations and systems of the university 
• Social cohesion (serving the community and community support) 
• Expanding of IUG (the opening of the University College, diploma programs, 
Bachelor programs 
 
Stage 4: 2000-2012 - Siege, Closure & Wars 
• Performance decline (absenteeism and late access of employees to the university). 
• Commitment challenges (significant disturbances on academic programs, lectures, 
examinations and graduation time of students). 
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• Working under check-point regime (measures of humiliation, arrests, beatings and 
shootings) 
• Working under social and psychological pressure conditions (employees and their 
families, students, serious shortage and daily cut of power supply for periods 
ranging from 8-16 hours every day and huge shortage of fuel).  
• Impeding of training, research and development programs. 
• Restrictions on free movement of staff (traveling, participation in  conferences and 
research programs). 
• Lack of resources, devices and building materials 
• Disruption of communication network with the outside world. 
• Destruction and huge damage to the construction processes 
• Financial crisis (destruction of buildings, equipment and 72laboratories). 
• Managing crises (student registration, changing lectures and examinations, funds 
difficulties). 
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2.2.1 First Stage: Creating IUG among the Rubble: Challenges, Ambitions and  
Dreams, 1978-1987 
Neither the West Bank nor the Gaza Strip had any universities before 1967. Secondary 
students in the West Bank studied the Jordanian curriculum, while students in the Gaza 
Strip followed the Egyptian curriculum (Alzaroo, 1989). Egyptian universities accepted 
around 1000 students from Gaza per year (Al-Ajez, 1996; AL-Sinwar, and Mouteer, 2009). 
Admittance was determined by both high academic achievement and access to the 
necessary financial means. The high numbers of matriculate students with no prospect of 
tertiary education raised unemployment levels and forced many to look for alternative 
opportunities in other countries. 
 
Socio-political conditions in the Gaza Strip in the 1970s worsened due to escalations in 
Israeli harassments and restrictions. Many families lived in poverty and could not afford 
the high costs associated with studying abroad (Sullivan, 1994). In addition to this, the high 
numbers of matriculating high school students decreased the chances of being accepted at 
the Egyptian universities. 
 
After the assassination of the Egyptian editor Dr. Yousef Al-Sibaee in February 1978, 
diplomatic relations between Egypt and the Palestinians collapsed. As a result of this, 
Egypt significantly reduced the intake of students from Gaza and imposed restrictions 
which mean that Gazan students were only able to study specific Human Sciences. They 
were no longer able to study in the Medicine or Engineering Faculties (Al-Ajez, 1996; AL-
Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009).  
 
A respondent clarified the mission and the purpose of IUG: 
“Needless to say that IUG was founded to fill a gap, meaning that there was 
no HEI to facilitate and serve Gazan students at that time” (Focus group 1, 
Jan. 2014). 
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2.2.1.1 The Inception of IUG (1978) and Occupation Authorities Reaction 
 
The Al-Azhar Institute for Religious Studies had been established in Gaza in 1954 as a part 
of the Al-Azhar Egyptian Institution. It started as a primary school and developed into a 
high school. The idea of establishing an institute for HE seemed a natural progression (AL-
Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009).  
 
The idea of creating a university was rejected by the occupation authorities who issued a 
warning against any step taken toward implementing the idea (Al-Ajez, 1996). The dire 
need of the Palestinian people to have their own first university in Gaza to serve the local 
population was the main reason behind establishing the IUG. Document 1 shows that the 
Islamic University of Gaza was formally established in 6/11/1978 as an extension of Al-
Azhar Institute for Religious Studies in Gaza which follows Al-Azhar University in Egypt 
(Sullivan, 1994; AL-Sinwar, and Mouteer, 2009). The regulations and the rules of teaching 
many Islamic subjects and separating women and men in classes characterised these 
institutions.  
 
The leadership of the institution worked hard to override the Israeli objections and finally, 
in 1979, were awarded permission to issue a one-year Diploma in Sharia and Arabic 
Language. The Israeli authorities did not recognize the institution as a university and 
instead called it the Department of HE/Al-Azhar as shown in many messages sent to the 
university (documents, 5, 7, 8, 22, 25, 33, 34, 41, 42, and 47 in Appendix E). The 
Palestinian community identified this higher institute as the Islamic University of Gaza as 
shown in document 1. 
 
Each year, thereafter, the leadership fought to have recognition of subsequent years of 
study (as shown in document 5) with the fourth year (document 8) added to the academic 
programmes. The occupation conceded year by year- so that by 1982 IUG was offering a 4 
year degree, but the occupation did not formally recognise qualifications or hire IUG 
graduates until 1993. In the meantime, United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) 
rejected recognizing IUG degrees or graduates as long as the occupation authorities 
rejected this. 
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According to Mahshi (1978), Israeli colonialism procedures and restrictions against the HE 
sector aimed to prevent any growth or development in the Palestinian HE sector. The 
Israeli fear was that this would lead to an increased sense of national affiliation and identity 
and in standing against the occupation (Alzaroo, 1989). The prolonged years of the 
occupation caused a serious collapse in education standards and created many problems 
(Ramahi and Davies, 2002). Amongst the difficulties experienced by IUG were financial 
constraints, measures preventing buildings, restrictions on movement and access to 
resources (Sullivan, 1994), and political intimidation. 
 
 
2.2.1.2 Financial Constraints 
 
Universities all over the world face financial challenges (Robertson, 2010; Sevier, 2014). 
IUG, and other Palestinian universities, are no different (World Bank, 2004). The financial 
support was very limited in the beginning; there was minimal support from Saudi Arabia 
and the PLO (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). The Israeli authorities never gave any kind 
of financial support to Palestinian universities, rather, Palestinian universities, including 
IUG, had to pay value-added and other taxes (Sullivan, 1994). When the IUG leadership 
managed to secure funds from Palestinian donors abroad and some Saudi businessmen, the 
Israeli occupation confiscated the money for months at a time. In 1980s IUG sent a series 
of letters (documents 18, 19, 23, 24, 27 and 28) to various Israeli authorities urging the 
release of the funds. These letters reflected the inability to pay salaries for staff for months 
and lack of resources which negatively affected day to day operations and development 
programmes.  
 
The effects of these financial limitations were far- reaching. The university was not always 
able to provide salaries for employees or import necessary equipment. Occasionally, Israeli 
authorities granted permission for delegates to travel abroad for fund -raising and released 
some of the confiscated money (documents 41 and 42). These allowances provided a little 
relief to IUG in those hard times. 
 
It is important to clarify that the financial support to IUG from the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) and later, after 1993, from the Palestinian National authority (PNA)  
has passed through several stages characterised by continuity sometimes and by stopping 
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some other times. The political dispute has played a key role in this issue. In 1980s the 
PLO gave financial support to Palestinian universities including IUG. But in 1991, after the 
creation of Al-Azhar university and the shift of more than 60 staff members from IUG to 
the new university, the PLO stopped funding IUG. Three years after the establishment of 
the PNA in 1993, it created the Palestinian Higher Education Council (HEC), the body 
responsible for universities. In spite of financial difficulties facing the PNA, the  HEC 
started to give financial support to Palestinian universities in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip including IUG. However, after the political division between Hamas and Fatah in 
2007 the PNA suspended support to IUG until 2014 when they resumed giving support to 
IUG once again. 
 
The siege and closure of the  the Gaza Strip increased the unemployment and poverty 
among the population and affected their ability to pay student fees. As a consequence, IUG 
was unable to raise the tuition fees for more than 13 years and therefore was unable to pay 
more than 60% of salaries to the staff since 2012 until the time of writing (2017). 
 
 
2.2.1.3 Israeli Authority and Control 
 
The occupation has deprived many Palestinians of adequate resources (Batniji, et al., 
2009). The occupation authorities imposed additional restrictions upon IUG in order to 
keep it under control and Israeli authority. One of the attempts of the occupation to control 
IUG was implementing the Egyptian decision 380 for 1955 (Sullivan, 1994) claiming that 
IUG is not recognised as a university and should be managed under the control of the 
occupation Department of Higher Education. Sullivan (1994:176) states that "In August 
1985, Israel demanded that the university accede to three conditions for the grant or 
renewal of work permits. These were: acknowledgment of Order 380 which, as amended, 
would authorize Israeli supervision of university affairs: dissolution of the nursing program 
which had been established at the university in the previous year; and acceptance of 
supervision of the university's finances by Israel".  
 
In response, IUG did not commit to this decision arguing that it was against international 
law and the right of education, and that IUG was the only university serving students in the 
Gaza Strip. They sent a series of messages to the occupation authorities and international 
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groups (documents no. 16, 17, 20, 28 and 36) explaining the reason behind rejecting this 
decision. In a letter sent to the occupation authorities as shown in document 17 the 
leadership set out the reasons why the decision 380 should not apply to IUG.  
 
In the early years, IUG lacked qualified staff as the Gaza Strip did not have sufficient 
academics to teach in the faculties of Sharia and Arabic language. Therefore, the leadership 
requested permission to hire academics from the West Bank and Jordan. The authorities 
had to grant permission for those academics to stay in Gaza (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 
2009). Professor Riad Al-khodary stated that:  
“The occupation authorities used to threaten those academics by cancelling 
their permissions and deporting them” (AL-Khodary, R. individual 
interview, Feb. 2014).   
 
On certain occasions, the occupation authorities refused to allow IUG to acquire books, 
scientific journals, or any academic tools from abroad without prior approval (Al-Ajez, 
1996; AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). In the academic year 1984/1985, the military Israeli 
director of Arab Affairs sent a message to IUG (document 34) rejecting the admission of 
700 students accepted by IUG , and limited the number to 300 students. But the leadership 
challenged the military order and  accepted 899 students as shown in Table 7 (P. 100). 
 
Sanctions increased after the appointment of Dr. Mohammed Saqer as IUG Chancellor in 
November 1982. In the three years leading up to his final deportation, Dr Saqer was often 
harassed. He was regularly summoned to the Israeli civil investigation offices for 
questioning. He also faced difficulties whenever renewing his residents’ permit (AL-
Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). The leadership held intensive meetings with the military 
authorities in order to prevent Dr. Saqer’s departure. These meetings failed and in response, 
the university formed a tri-presidential council to take over the role of the Chancellor, 
when Dr. Saqer was deported in1984.  
Professor Awad-Allah argued that:  
“The harassment and the fiscal expulsion of Saqer were mostly related to 
his excellent leadership characteristics such as knowledge efficiency, and 
high capacities” (Awad-Allah, individual interview, Nov. 2013).  
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In September 1983, seven teachers from the West Bank and Jordan were prevented from 
continuing their work at IUG (document 13). The leadership strongly condemned the 
expulsion of the teachers (document 14). Oppressive measures escalated when authorities 
targeted local teachers. As shown in document 29 a military order issued to IUG preventing 
six teachers from entering the university, authorities cited security reasons, accusing them 
of political activism against the occupation. 
 
In August 1984, the leadership sent a message to the military governor of the Gaza Strip 
requesting permission to open a much-needed faculty of Nursing (document 31). This 
request was flatly denied (document 34). University leadership challenged the refusal by 
continuing to make preparations for opening the faculty. In response, Israeli authorities 
refused to renew the residence permits of 36 members of the academic staff with PhDs, 
(Sullivan, 1994). IUG leadership stopped all preparations for the new faculty. 36 academics 
were expelled nonetheless.  
“At some point in 1985, the occupation had stopped 36 foreign professors 
who were members of IUG staff from working there by confiscating their 
permits. To overcome this challenge, the university depended mainly on the 
local staff and sent students abroad to get higher degrees and then come 
back to work at the university” (Samour, individual interview, Jan. 2014). 
The previous Chancellor confirmed this: 
 “This expulsion of those academics was very dangerous and risky since 
they were the main core of the university and represented the majority of 
academic staff” (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013). 
 
During 1978-1987, on religious and national occasions, IUG was exposed to many 
intrusions and inspections and besieged by Israeli soldiers. The leadership tried to prevent 
the occupation from storming the university, but to no avail. Also, at military check-points, 
cars and buses were stopped to inspect students and teachers and to arrest some of them. As 
a result, many clashes erupted between Israeli soldiers and students. As a consequence of 
these intrusions, the educational process would be suspended for a few days by a military 
order, and sometimes by IUG leadership to avoid clashes, and prevent  a long duration shut 
down of the university by the occupation (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). 
 
 42  
2.2.1.4 Restrictions on Constructing New Buildings 
  
During the 1980s, as a result of growing student numbers, the leadership of the university 
decided it was necessary to add more classrooms. In February 1982, a letter was sent to the 
occupation authorities requesting permission to construct a new building (as shown in 
document 6). In response to these requests, the authorities warned that any construction 
would result in military action and immediate shut down of the university (document 7). 
 
To provide additional lecture space without new buildings, the buildings of the Al-Azhar 
Institute high school were used for lectures in the afternoon. The IUG continued to use the 
current buildings and the Mosque as classrooms. However, both of these were not in good 
condition. The occupation issued an order which prevented even small repairs. Despite 
these limitations, IUG used these buildings while covering the windows with plastic and 
separating lecture rooms with wooden walls (Al-Hindi, individual interview, Nov. 2013).  
 
The university leadership decided to continue to offer classes even in tents (Al-Ajez, 1996; 
AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). It was as if the university was a camp for the army with 
tents everywhere as classrooms and offices for the teachers. It was referred to, by many of 
staff members, students and the community, as the University of Tents (       
      ) as a symbol of challenge, patience and sacrifice in spite of all the hard 
conditions (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). 
 
In late 1982, the university tried to obtain approval from the military authorities to build a 
second floor on the eastern side of the university. The occupation rejected the idea in a 
letter issued to IUG in October 1982 (document 8:). The university leadership challenged 
the occupation decision and built stalls (Baraksat) to replace tents. These were small rooms 
about 100 square meters covered with asbestos. The Israeli forces issued a violation note 
over the buildings to be presented to the military court against the trustees of the university 
as shown in document 33. The manager of the engineering office was arrested with another 
two students who participated in constructing these buildings. But the leadership decided to 
continue the construction process in spite of risk, and therefore many temporary buildings 
were established. The leadership did not stop challenging the Israeli procrastination in 
approving the construction of new buildings until they got permission as clarified in 
document 34: sent to IUG in September 1984. The building process continued until it 
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became sufficient for the students and staff. In 16/2/1985, the university leadership decided 
to remove all the tents. They removed most of the tents, but left a few until the mid-1990s 
as a symbol of their struggle (Al-Hindi, individual interview, Nov. 2013). 
 
Picture 3: Buildings of Asbestos Replaced Tents, (Female Campus 1983-
1995)
 
Source: Public relation office of IUG 
In late 1982, IUG created two campuses, one for males and the other for females as shown 
in Picture 3. The same staff members taught both male and female students. In addition, 
some buildings and facilities were scheduled and used by men and women at different 
times such as the laboratories, the library and the conference centre.  
Teaching female and male students on segregated campuses occurs in some Muslim 
countries. For example, Al-Azhar university in Egypt teaches women on separate 
campuses. The two biggest and highest-ranked universities in Saudi Arabia, King Saud 
University, the first university in Saudi (KSU website, 2015) and the King Abdul Aziz 
University (KAU website, 2014)  teach students on two segregated campuses, one for 
males and the other for females. The Islamic International University Islamabad (IIUI) also 
teaches on gender-segregated campuses. There is even a debate among some UK 
universities about segregation of students because of demands of some Muslim students 
(Redden, 2014; Patel, 2013). In Palestine, although the majority of universities teach on 
mixed campuses, some of them, particularly in the Gaza Strip offer separate classes for 
male and female students. This  will be discussed in  chapter 7 in section 7.1.4 . 
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2.2.1.5 Conflict Round the Cultural Identity of IUG 
There is a diversity of  ideologies and political affiliation among the Palestinian political 
organisations and this diversity, competition and sometimes conflict is clearly 
demonstrated in most of the Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
including IUG.  
 
Since the very early stage of its inception, and in the first declaration as shown in document 
1, the Board of Trustees named  this new institution the Islamic University of Gaza. Since 
then, indirect conflict started between rival Palestinian political groups about the identity of 
the university. The deep roots of the Palestinian political conflict and ideological 
disagreements started in early 1970s between secular and leftist supporters. Then in the 
early 1980s, this political conflict also took place between these parties and the Islamic 
Trend (a body representing the Muslim Brotherhood, which  later became Hamas) 
supporters who decided to create an Islamic bloc to represent students’ political affiliation 
in IUG, Birziet and An-Najah universities.   
 
At IUG, particularly at the inception stage, the main conflict was about the Islamic identity 
and the ideology of the university which was strongly supported by the Islamic Trend and 
strongly rejected by secular and leftist trends. This conflict started to escalate gradually in 
1980s until it turned to occasional violent clashes between students with support of 
different political groups among the staff and the community.  
 
The most dangerous consequence of these confrontations was the assassination of the Dean 
of Student Affairs, Doctor Ismael EL-Khateeb in 1985. This cast a long shadow with deep 
effects on staff, students and the community. Violent clashes took place and disrupted the 
educational process as a result of closing the university from time to time during the first 
stage. The first Palestinian president Yasser Arafat who acted as the Chairman of the PLO 
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sent a message (document 39) to the rival parties asking them to calm down the situation 
and to keep the IUG identity in order to serve the community.  
 
 
2.2.1.6 Palestinian Support for IUG during the First Stage  
Due to the good academic reputation of the university among the Palestinian community, 
student enrolment increased dramatically. In 1987 IUG became  the biggest university in 
Palestine (Alzaroo, 1989) with a total number of 4504 students (Table 3).  
Table 3: The Total Number of Males and Females Enrolled at IUG, 1978-2012 
	  Academic Year	       Male   Female       Total 
 78/79 25               --                                                                                          25 
79/80 121 40 161 
80/81 295 50 345 
81/82 898 269 1,167 
82/83 1,168 551 1,719 
83/84 1,766 1,140 2,906 
84/85 2,253 1,552 3,805 
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85/86 2,361 1,391 3,752 
86/87 2,534 1,517 4,051 
87/88 2,848               1,656 4,504 
88/89 275 83 358 
89/90 690 344 1,034 
90/91 817 283 1,100 
91/92 1,547 514 2,061 
92/93 2,016 668 2,684 
93/94 2,685 888 3,573 
94/95 2,739 1,453 4,192 
95/96 3,232 1,808 5,040 
 47  
96/97 4,279 2,370 6,649 
97/98 4,395 3,017 7,412 
98/99 4,802 3,813 8,615 
99/00 4,970 4,677 9,647 
00/01 4,834 5,235 10,069 
01/02 5,391 6,224 11,615 
02/03 5,877 7,098 12,975 
03/04 5,495 7,500 12,995 
04/05 6,383 9,278 15,661 
05/06 6,797 10,198 16,995 
06/07 7,555 11,553 19,108 
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07/08 7,367 11,988 19,355 
08/09 7,242 11,704 18,946 
09/10 6,963 11,896 18,859 
10/11 7,074 11,725 18,799 
11/12 6,953 11,794 18,747 
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Figure 4: The Total Number of Males and Females at IUG from 1978-
2012
 
                            Stage 1                Stage 2        Stage3                          Stage4 
 
  
In September 1980, the faculty of Education was opened. Shortly after, the faculty of Usoul 
Eldeen (Religious Foundation) and then a year later, the faculties of Commerce and 
Science were established. In October 1981, the faculty of Arts absorbed the faculty of 
Arabic Language. (Al-Ajez, 1996; AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009).  
Al-Hindi believes that:  
“Despite threats, opening these faculties was a strategic decision, where it transfer 
the confrontation to be not only between the occupation and the leadership of the 
university, but also with hundreds of students and their families and the entire 
community” (Al-Hindi, individual interview, Nov.2013). 
   
One key respondent confirmed this saying that: 
“In the establishment stage, most of the Palestinian nation supported the 
university as they realized that it was the hope for the youth in Gaza to get 
the opportunity of HE since it was the only university in the Gaza Strip” 
(Al-Hindi, individual interview, Nov.2013) .  
Most of the individual and the focus group interviews confirmed the positive role of the 
community in supporting the creation of IUG. 
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IUG leadership tried to find solutions to the dilemma of non-recognition by obtaining 
recognition from the Association of Arab Universities (document 3). This opened 
opportunities for IUG graduates to conduct their postgraduate studies at the Egyptian 
universities (document 10). To solve the problem of the lack of qualified staff, the 
leadership implemented two simultaneous strategies: the first was to pressure the 
authorities to give permission for academics from the West Bank and abroad to stay and 
teach at IUG (documents 4, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 28, 29 and 44).  
 
The second strategy was to rely on IUG graduates by sending them abroad to improve their 
qualifications. The leadership gave full support to those teachers from IUG, paid half 
salaries despite the financial crisis and provided them with scholarships. In this way, the 
leadership would be able to overcome the Israeli restrictions on permits for academics from 
outside the Gaza Strip. 
 
Summary of the First Stage 
 
Based on the preceding discussion, despite severe obstacles, the leadership was able to 
launch IUG as the first HEI in the Gaza Strip. The first stage was characterised by the 
ability of the leadership to open new faculties and departments and thus, attract more 
students, particularly female students. The leadership also challenged and defied many 
decisions of the occupation such as constructing new buildings and registering more new 
students than agreed upon. The leadership exerted great efforts to overcome the dilemma of 
lack of resources by recruiting qualified staff from abroad and by sending local staff abroad 
to conduct their postgraduate studies.  
 
The Israeli restrictions disrupted and eliminated the quality of education. The first stage 
was also characterised by internal political conflict to impose authority and control over the 
university. The leadership kept IUG surviving and social cohesion played an important role 
in the process. Garcia-Martinez and Vega-Redondo, (2015) suggest that social cohesion 
raises the altruism of followers. The leadership emphasised that sacrifices needed to be 
made for the sake of the organisation, and for graduates. 
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2.2.2 The Second Stage: Threatening the Survival of IUG during the First Uprising 
(1987-1993) 
During the first Intifada (1987-1988) many students actively participated in  
demonstrations. Military orders were issued to many universities in the West Bank (Birzeit 
and An-Najah) and IUG in Gaza Strip (Sullivan, 1994). 
“As students, we were participating in different activities and demonstrate 
against the occupation who was besieging the university. Many students 
have been beaten or arrested” (Samour, individual interview, Jan. 2014).  
In the years leading up to this Intifada, Israeli intimidation was ever-present. Alzaroo  
(1989) describes  the closure of IUG many times in last four years before the Intifada, for 
short periods adding up to a total of 156 days. 
 
Picture 4: The Israeli Decision to Shutting Down IUG in June 1988 (Document 47)  
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Translation of Document 47 
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               Military Order Regarding Security System for the Year 1970 
 
According to my authorities as a military leader, and based on the subject (91) A (2) on 
the security system for the year 1970. 
I see that the issue I referred to is necessary to restore security and order and to maintain 
the security of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), I ordered the following: 
Shutting down the Islamic University (Al-Azhar /Gaza) from the date of my signature 
on this order, and it remain closed until a new decision signed by me to cancel this 
order. 
Reasoning: 
The university referred to has became a place of activities, incitement and violence, and 
included elements participated in the riots, and formed the base of the incitement of riots 
and chaos, it has been found inside the university leaflets and enticing materials. 
The decision includes the staff and students who have been involved in the riots and 
demonstrations against the security forces. 
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   7.6.1988                                                                                 Jacob Orr 
                                                             General military commander of the Gaza Strip 
 
 
After escalating demonstrations by students of universities in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, the occupation issued a military order in 6th June 1988 as shown in document 47 to 
shut down the IUG and prevented the staff and students from entering the campus. The 
university was officially closed until late 1992. 
 
A few months after this order, the occupation authorities expelled Dr. Mohamed Siam the 
second president of IUG. This is in addition to arresting many staff members and hundreds 
of students (Al-Ajez, 1996; AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). The registration of new 
students stopped completely. Many students tried to travel abroad to continue their 
education, while others abandoned their education because of the closure, imprisonment, or 
injury (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). 
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2.2.2.1 Working Underground 
IUG leadership realised that the shutting down of the university in the first Intifada might 
be continued for a long time, and that hundreds of students were abandoning their studies. 
During this stage, the survival of the university was in doubt.   
“It was a matter of to be or not to be; the strategic goal was whether the 
university could survive or not” (Awad-Allah, individual interview, Nov. 
2013). 
In order to make it possible for students to continue their studies, the leadership decided to 
hold classes in houses, Mosques and sports clubs. IUG leadership was inspired by the 
experience of Birziet university which was the first university in Palestine to offer off-
campus classes to their students (Baramki, 2010). Lecturers at IUG continued in their posts, 
despite non-payment of salaries for several months at a time. Although the university was 
officially closed, an office was opened to enable students to register, particularly those who 
were close to graduation. Off-campus classes were started at homes, and public places such 
as Mosques and sport clubs. This pattern of decentralised classes was supported by many 
individuals, institutions and the community. However, this model of working underground 
has not been without problems. Some of the staff members were scared to teach at their 
homes. Others took the risks and were ready to sacrifice and cope with the consequences of 
defying the occupation orders.  
 
After the sharp decrease of enrolled students from 4504 to 358 in the academic year 1988-
1989, the number started gradually to increase (Table 7, p. 100) until it reached 1034 after 
one year, and became 2648 in the academic year 1992-1993. IUG graduated 969 students 
during the closure of the university from 1988-1992 (Table 4, p. 46). 
 
Prof. Zourob, who was one of the pioneer workers at IUG and left IUG to work at Al-
Azhar University in 1991, contends that: 
“The ability of IUG leadership to teach and to graduate students under the 
most difficult circumstances was a symbol of the determination of the 
leadership to survive despite the risks and disturbances” (Zourob, individual 
interview, Jan. 2014). 
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Table 4: Number of Graduate Students from 1978-2012 
Academic Year Male Female Total 
81/82 3 - 3 
82/83 68 - 68 
83/84 66 28 94 
84/85 204 131 335 
85/86 329 171 500 
86/87 347 228 575 
87/88 107 36 143 
88/89 127 128 255 
89/90 95 98 193 
90/91 105 76 181 
91/92 124 73 197 
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Academic Year Male Female Total 
92/93 211 69 280 
93/94 238 85 323 
94/95 259 104 363 
95/96 282 147 429 
96/97 580 242 822 
97/98 655 395 1,050 
98/99 868 493 1,361 
99/00 844 558 1,402 
00/01 807 663 1,470 
01/02 774 835 1,609 
02/03 762 931 1,693 
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Academic Year Male Female Total 
03/04 734 1,008 1,742 
04/05 800 1,254 2,054 
05/06 950 1,554 2,504 
06/07 1,002 1,800 2,802 
07/08 1,068 2,158 3,226 
08/09 1,273 2,309 3,582 
09/10 1,193 2,226 3,419 
10/11 1,389 2,393 3,782 
11/12 1,288 2,401 3,689 
Figure 5: Development of Graduate Students at IUG from 1981- 2012 
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UNRWA, although offering job opportunities to graduates from other universities, 
confirmed in November 1990 that it would not recognise IUG degrees (document 49). The 
recognition of the UNRWA is of particular importance because it is the responsible body 
for relief and works agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA, 2009) who constitute 65% 
of the population in the Gaza Strip (Enshassi, 2000). The UNRWA managed hundreds of 
schools and health care centres which serves, particularly, those refugees.  
 
 
2.2.2.2 Al-Azhar University 
The conflict of interests and political programmes appeared in many universities, which 
were managed under the authority of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), in the 
West Bank in the mid 1980s (Sullivan, 1994). Due to the fact that IUG was the only 
university in the Gaza Strip in the 1980s and was, generally, dominated by the Islamic 
trend in the late 1980s, the PLO decided to create a neighboring new university (Al-Azhar) 
dominated and supported by Fatah. As a consequence, one of the serious problems IUG 
faced during this stage was a number of the staff members leaving to join the new 
university (Al-Azhar) in 1991. In addition to economic sanctions imposed by the PLO such 
as withholding its fund aid and obstructing salaries of IUG employees for 8 months, Al-
Azhar University appeared to be an alternative to IUG. 
One administrator stressed that: 
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“Although a big number of the staff left IUG to join Al-Azhar university, we 
demonstrated the commitment to work extra loads” (Anaan, individual 
interview, Feb. 2014). 
Although some of the focus group members believed that Al-Azhar was created as an 
alternative to IUG, other interviews added that the creation of the new university increased 
the sense of affiliation and commitment among the staff. 
 
Many Fatah affiliated staff members shifted to the new university. The new university tried 
to impose more pressure on the rest of IUG staff, threatening them with losing their salaries 
if they did not shift to the new university. The offer was very tempting. Al-Azhar was 
financially stable and secure since the occupation did not impose tough restriction in its 
financial funds and transfer of money compared to those restrictions imposed on IUG. The 
IUG found itself in a very difficult situation as 60 members of the staff (academics and 
administrators) transferred to Al-Azhar, leaving  a serious vacuum.  
 
Table 5: Development of IUG Academic Staff Members with Masters and PhD 
Qualifications from 1978-2012 
 
Academic 
year 
Doctorate Master Total 
The proportion of 
PhD 
The proportion 
of Masters 
78 / 79 1 4 5 20% 80% 
79 / 80 2 5 7 29% 71% 
80 / 81 7 10 17 41% 59% 
81 / 82 17 22 39 44% 56% 
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Academic 
year 
Doctorate Master Total 
The proportion of 
PhD 
The proportion 
of Masters 
82 / 83 28 29 57 49% 51% 
83 / 84 39 49 88 44% 56% 
84 / 85 39 46 85 46% 54% 
85 / 86 41 65 106 39% 61% 
86 / 87 38 65 103 37% 63% 
87/ 88 52 72 124 42% 58% 
88 / 89 58 77 135 43% 57% 
89 / 90 69 81 150 46% 54% 
90 / 91 70 85 155 45% 55% 
91 / 92 73 85 158 46% 54% 
92 / 93 63 63 126 50% 50% 
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Academic 
year 
Doctorate Master Total 
The proportion of 
PhD 
The proportion 
of Masters 
93 / 94 49 56 105 46% 54% 
94 / 95 70 52 122 57% 43% 
95 / 96 79 47 126 63% 37% 
96 / 97 113 72 185 61% 39% 
97 / 98 123 90 213 58% 42% 
98 / 99 143 102 245 58% 42% 
99 / 00 144 81 225 46% 36% 
00 / 01 159 78 237 67% 33% 
01 / 02 163 79 242 67% 33% 
02 / 03 170 91 261 65% 35% 
03 / 04 178 109 287 62% 38% 
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Academic 
year 
Doctorate Master Total 
The proportion of 
PhD 
The proportion 
of Masters 
04 / 05 195 93 288 68% 32% 
05 / 06 203 80 283 72% 28% 
06 / 07 204 93 297 69% 31% 
07 / 08 221 118 339 65% 35% 
08 / 09 225 130 355 63% 37% 
09 / 10 232 127	   359 65% 35% 
10 / 11 246 118 364 68% 32% 
11 / 12 292 99 391 72% 28% 
 
Figure 6: Development of IUG Staff Members during 1978-2012 
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Table 5 and Figure 8 show the sharp decrease in numbers of staff members with Masters 
and PhD degrees at IUG at the early 1990s. However, the number started to go up 
gradually as IUG recruited new academics. In addition, numbers of the staff came back to 
Gaza after obtaining their degrees elsewhere (AL-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009).  
 
Members from the focus group stressed that: 
 “It was easier said than done to find a way to transfer money; PLO stopped 
its support and salary was not permitted to be transferred to IUG from any 
source, so whenever an employee wants to get his or her salary, s/he has to 
travel to Jordan, since there was no banks in Gaza except Israeli Banks 
which imposed additional restrictions” (Focus group1, Jan. 2014). 
 
Summary of the Second Stage 
This stage was characterised by two main challenges which seriously threatened the 
survival of the university. The one was the shutting down of IUG for more than four years 
and arresting many of its staff members, and the other was shifting a large number of IUG 
staff to the neighbour university Al-Azhar. IUG leadership dealt with the consequences of 
these problems which disrupted the manner and the quality of education delivered to 
students. They were creative when they started teaching underground in decentralised 
classes with the support of the staff and the community.  
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2.2.3 The Third Stage: Launching a Consolidation Process (1993- 2000) 
In September 1993, the Oslo agreement was signed between the PLO and Israel. This 
agreement allowed the creation of The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) as the 
responsible body of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Alawda-Magazine, 
2013). This political agreement played a dual role in the life of the Palestinians. The 
Palestinian people split into supporters and opponents of this convention.  
On the one hand, the convention created a serious political conflict among Palestinian 
political parties. But on the other hand, the occupation withdrew from inside the Gaza Strip 
and Jericho in the West Bank giving space to the PNA to manage the situation in these 
areas. Members of the leadership agreed that this agreement opened an opportunity to 
launch a consolidating stage of progress. 
“After the Oslo agreement we didn’t need the Israeli permissions to 
construct new buildings or opening new Faculties. We were able to move 
forward faster and easier” (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013). 
But members of the focus groups concentrate on the negative political side-effects of the 
agreement on IUG: 
“Oslo Agreement in 1993 has deepened the divergence and affected the 
Palestinian society negatively, but again the university and its guiding 
principles have reconciled the issues between students themselves and 
between the university and the society” (Focus group 2, Mar. 2014).   
  
The researcher did not find documents referring to this agreement, but based on his own 
observation he concluded that the signing of the Oslo agreement created a deep rift among 
the Palestinian community and the academics and students. 
 
Politics played an important role in the fate of the university. In spite of the political effects 
and factionalistion caused by the Oslo Accord, it gave IUG the opportunity to move toward 
stability and progress. IUG launched a consolidation stage of recognition, constructing new 
buildings, opening new faculties and departments, developing the capacities of the staff and 
strengthening the networks of communication and partnership with universities abroad and 
the national community.  
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2.2.3.1 Alternatives to the Israeli Non-Recognition  
The issue of not recognizing IUG and hiring its graduates from the two responsible bodies 
in the Gaza Strip, the occupation authorities and the UNRWA, posed additional problems 
for the leadership. According to the statistics presented in Table 5 (p. 48), the number of 
graduated students, until the end of the academic year 1993-1994, reached 3147 with very 
limited job opportunities abroad or in the private sector in the Gaza Strip.  
 
The leadership held intensive meetings with the occupation authorities to obtain the 
recognition of IUG and to grant chances to hire its graduates. For this purpose, a series of 
messages were sent to the occupation (documents 4, 15 18, 28, 30, 35 and 43). Similar 
efforts were made over the years with the UNRWA, but to no avail. A few months after the 
signing of the Oslo agreement, the UNRWA accredited the university degrees in October 
1993 (document 51). Eight months later, the PNA sent a letter recognising IUG degrees 
(document 52). This recognition from the two bodies marked a very important stage in the 
development of IUG. It made it possible for IUG graduates to compete with Gazan 
colleagues who graduated from other universities in the Gaza Strip, West Bank and abroad 
for job opportunities offered by both the PNA and the UNRWA.  
 
The IUG was also regionally and internationally recognized (documents 3, 9, 26, 50, 51, 52 
and 69) allowing its graduates to compete for job vacancies, scholarships and to join 
various universities in the world for pursuing their postgraduate studies. 
 
The recognition of IUG from local and international bodies was a real breakthrough in 
different disciplines. It gave new hope to students and staff. For example, the number of 
enrolled students in the 1990s increased dramatically. Also, it encouraged donors to 
contribute to construct new buildings.
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Picture 5: The UNRWA Recognition of IUG Certificates (Document No. 51) 
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2.2.3.2 Constructing Permanent Modern Buildings 
The recognition from the PNA granted permission for IUG to start the construction of 
permanent buildings. Temporary buildings of asbestos were replaced by new permanent 
and modern buildings. The individual interviews with leadership members confirmed this. 
The previous Chancellor of IUG contended that: 
 “Since the coming of the Palestinian authority, it was the real starting 
development point of the university. As you know, the occupation was 
preventing the construction. However, when we turned to the Palestinian 
authority, we easily took license for permanent buildings” (Shoubair, 
individual interview, Dec. 2013).   
This process was confirmed by members of the focus group: 
“After the coming of the PLO, the university had witnessed a great 
alteration. For the first time, after been recognized, IUG was able to build 
fixed buildings” (Focus group 1, Jan. 2014). 
  
The HE Council of the PNA was established in 1996. The council supervised the 
Palestinian universities in terms of accrediting programmes and fund allocation. IUG 
became a member of the council and received financial support from the PNA.  
“The university returned it financial rights from the council of high 
education, new faculties and majors were opened” (Shoubair, individual 
interview, Dec. 2013).  
 
 
2.2.3.3 Developing Qualifications and Capacities of the Staff 
Ever since the IUG was established, the leadership provided scholarships to staff members 
to conduct their postgraduate studies on different continents. The International Institution 
for Helping Arab Students, and the Government of Qatar, granted the IUG three permanent 
scholarships. Fulbright, DAD, AMIDEAST, the British Council and other institutions 
provided scholarships for IUG students. After the war of December 2008, some 
scholarships were guaranteed by the Turkish government and Malaysian NGOs (AL-
Sinwar, and Mouteer, 2009).	  The current Chancellor stated that: 
 70  
“To motivate and encourage the staff, beside the full scholarship offered 
from donors, the leadership paid half salary for academic to conduct their 
post graduate studies” (Shaath, individual interview, March 2014). 
To improve research skills, the university encouraged the staff, particularly in summer 
vacations, by providing research scholarships and academic exchange to spend a few 
months abroad. In addition, intensive training programmes targeting academics and 
administrators were offered on campus. 
“Developing the human resources is an essential part of the management 
and the policy of the Islamic University, either by scholarship, the 
encouragement to attend conferences and courses, perhaps the Islamic 
University spend a lot of its budget to encourage the faculty members to 
attend conferences, and this is also considered a human development, also 
the administrative staff” (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).   
One academic expert in the field of HR stressed that: 
“Since mid-1990s and beyond, the IUG offered the staff with diversity of 
scholarships and research programmes” (Abo AL-Roos, individual 
interviews, Feb. 2014). 
While the PNA was in charge of the Gaza Strip, the IUG had more stability and 
consistency.  
 
Summary of the Third Stage 
 
The consolidation stage was characterised by achieving important long term objectives 
allowing IUG to thrive despite difficulties and different political and economic challenges. 
Some of these achievements were: obtaining the recognition of IUG degrees; raising the 
capacities and qualifications of the staff; opening the faculty of Engineering; constructing 
many buildings and increasing the number of students from 2061 by the end of 1992 until it 
reached 9933 by the end of 1999. Many cooperation and partnership agreements were 
signed with foreign universities in the consolidation stage (documents 51, 56, 57, 59). 
However, this stage also had its own problems and deficiencies, particularly the tension 
among students between Fatah and Hamas supporters as a result of the Oslo agreement. 
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2.2.4 The Fourth Stage: Thriving despite Siege and Wars (2000 – 2012) 
IUG developed rapidly in the third stage until the outbreak of the second uprising (Intifadat 
AL-Aqsa) on Sep 30th 2000. This Intifada inaugurated a new stage of IUG history. For the 
first time, in the academic year 2000-2001 the number of women grew to 5235 and 
exceeded the number of males at 4834. Thereafter, the number of undergraduate females 
increased sharply year after year, and by the end of the academic year 2011-2012, it had 
swelled to 11 794 female (62.9 %) while the number of males was 6953 (37.1%) as shown 
in Table 3 (p. 40). 
 
 
2.2.4.1 Working under Siege and Check-Points Regime 
Demonstrations and clashes took place again in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the 
breakout of the second uprising in 2000, with even more violent action, between the Israeli 
soldiers and the Palestinian people. A few weeks later, the military authorities imposed 
additional sanctions against the whole community. They divided the Gaza Strip into three 
separated areas controlled by a tight check point regime.  
In normal circumstances, it does not take more than 40 minutes driving to get from the far 
North to the far South of the Gaza strip. But with this security regime, it might take six 
hours or more if people or vans have a chance to pass through (AL-Sinwar, and Mouteer, 
2009). 
This created problems for all citizens, and also for students and teachers. Sometimes, they 
would be confined to university campus, not allowed to go home. Other times, they would 
not be able to reach the campus. They might have to spend the night on campus, or find 
other shelter close to the university, staying away from their homes for several days in 
order to keep up with their classes. The United Nation Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA) asserted that the siege 
around Gaza restricted the movement of people and goods in and out of Gaza (OCHA, 
2011a). 
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Despite the blockade, incursions, detentions and humiliating measures against the staff and 
students, the leadership found ways to keep the educational process moving. For example, 
IUG provided staff members with housing near the campus. Also, it helped students from 
the isolated areas to find houses close to the campus and sometimes subsidized prices 
although IUG was suffering a financial crisis. 
“In times of closure combined with the restrictions of the check-points 
regime the university turn into renting some apartments near IUG.  Frankly, 
the university gave the teachers and students half of the rental fees or more 
sometimes to help them overcoming those difficulties” (Focus group 2, Mar. 
2014).  
To ease the process, the leadership also rescheduled classes and examinations in order to 
adapt to the new situation. Offices were opened in the remote and isolated areas in the 
South of Gaza Strip to facilitate communication with the main campus and between 
students and their teachers.   
“Teachers were relocated based on where they needed and where they 
lived” (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013).  
In addition, in the isolated areas, students could attend many lectures at houses, Mosques, 
sport clubs and schools. Lectures were also circulated via video and email. In a step 
forward, IUG started to construct a new campus in the south of Gaza Strip to serve students 
from the isolated areas. 
 “It was clear that these tough conditions will continue for long time. We 
decided to create a new campus to serve thousands of students in the 
southern of Gaza Strip” (AL-Khodary, J., individual interview, Feb. 2014).   
Despite these adverse circumstances, IUG inaugurated the faculty of Informational 
Technology in September 2004. 
 
Some of the staff members refused, for security reasons, to teach in the isolated areas. In 
the meantime numbers of students would cancel their registration of some courses so as not 
to be subjected to humiliation measures at the Israeli check points. But the facilities offered 
by the leadership such as compensations and accommodation motivated many lecturers to 
open decentralised classes and teach students in the isolated areas. 
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IUG was not able to import any devices, equipment or building materials. This hindered the 
practical lectures and thus affected the quality of teaching. 
 “The leadership did its best to provide the staff with the required facilities 
even if it had to buy them for expensive prices. The purchasing process 
would be done in a flexible and non-conventional way to make sure they 
were available fast enough” (Al-Hindi, individual interview, Nov. 2013). 
The purchasing process was accomplished by direct orders to overcome bureaucratic 
procedures. By doing so, the leadership was able to manage the situation and partially 
overcome the restraints. 
 
 
2.2.4.2 Impacts of the Palestinian Political Division 
The victory of Hamas in the free elections of 2006 was sweeping. Fatah was not satisfied 
with the results. Severe political violence took place between the two rivals. This fight 
caused the current political division which led to serious changes, one of which was Hamas 
taking over the Gaza Strip while Fatah took over the West Bank. In addition, siege and 
closure was tightened, imposing additional restriction on travelling and importing 
materials. 
 
Security forces supported by Fatah stormed IUG in June 2007, partially burning some 
buildings such as the first floor of the administration building and some parts of the main 
library. This caused disruption of the educational process for several days. But soon after 
the clashes had ceased, the leadership started to repair the damage by securing sufficient 
funds from the Islamic Bank for Development in order to rebuild the damaged places (AL-
Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009).  
 
The leadership inaugurated the School of Medicine in late 2006 which the population of 
Gaza Strip was in dire need of. By 2008, and in spite of political division, the situation was 
stable enough to allow IUG to accomplish the construction of most of the planned 
buildings, laboratories, gardens and other facilities. Two large buildings were built, one to 
house the faculty of Medicine, and the other for the faculties of Engineering and Science. 
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The science and engineering building housed 74 different laboratories to serve the students 
of these faculties. This building served thousands of students from the faculties of Science, 
Engineering and Information Technology. These facilities also provided important services 
available to the community such as laboratories for blood analysis and food analysis. This 
is in addition to laboratories for testing soil and building materials. 
 
 
2.2.4.3 IUG under Attack 
In late December, 2008, the occupation forces waged aggressive attacks against the Gaza 
Strip. Israeli air craft launched brutal raids causing severe damage to the infrastructure and 
governmental institutions. The IUG was targeted during this war and the buildings of 
Science and Engineering Faculties, along with the all 74 laboratories which contained 
hundreds of pieces of expensive scientific equipment, computers, medical equipment and 
engineering equipment were completely destroyed as shown in Picture 6. 
 
Picture 6: Science and Engineering Labs after Bombing during 2008 War 
  
Source: Public relations office of IUG 
The destruction of IUG buildings was a real shock for the Palestinian community as a 
whole since IUG was an institution for HE and served more than 20,000 students. 
"In Jan. 2009, the university’s laboratories were gone down to the earth” 
(Focus group1, Jan 2014). 
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The war started in the morning of 27 December 2008 while about 20 000 students were 
attending their classes. There was panic and shouting, but the leadership and many of the 
staff members were able to evacuate students safely. The war continued for 27 days. On the 
day the war ended, members of IUG leadership held an urgent meeting. During the first 
moments, following the ceasefire, the  people of Gaza went out to check for damage to  
their houses and property. Likewise, IUG leaders and many employees, students and a lot 
of people went out to check IUG campus. Nobody instructed them to do so, but to them, 
the university was like their second house. They were overwhelmed and shocked by what 
they saw.  
 
 “IUG was a great place that meant a lot to them. It was very painful for 
them to see their university destroyed in such aggressive way and was very 
hard for them to discuss the severity of the destruction” (Al-Hindi, 
individual interview, Nov. 2013). 
 
That resulted in a meeting that was spontaneous and not planned in advance; it was held in 
order to discuss how they could get out of this crisis. This required changing strategy 
(Rochet, Keramidas, and Bout, 2008) and finding alternative classrooms, securing urgent 
requirements such as purchasing the needed equipment. Also, they searched for alternative 
places to compensate the insufficiencies in halls and laboratories.  
 
 “The first decision made was to stop the suspension of classes as soon as 
possible (two weeks maximum) and to work out a plan to reschedule classes. 
The truth is that the staff’s affiliation have eased all difficulties. To be 
honest, there was real belonging” (Alkhodary, a, individual interview, Feb. 
2014).   
A committee was established to determine what courses could not be taught due to the lack 
of critical resources such as practical classes of science and engineering. 
  
Al-Hasanat (2013) states that  study began again a week after the war which destroyed the 
practical facilities, but students were able to finish the school year. After overcoming the 
initial aftermath of the war, and in spite of the financial crisis IUG faced, the leadership 
engaged in intensive communications with the Islamic Bank of Development who agreed 
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to fund rebuilding the engineering and science laboratories and offices in a better way and  
even larger than before. 
 
After the war and the targeting of its buildings, IUG gained more sympathy and support. 
For example, international delegations from Arab, African, Asian and European countries 
visited IUG Many agreements of cooperation and partnership were signed with 
international universities and institutions (document 66, 67, 68 and 69). IUG was keen to 
establish good relationships with local community dignitaries and institutions by inviting 
them to visit IUG and sharing with them the difficulties as well as the ambitions of the 
university.  
The Chairman of the Board of Trustees declared that:  
"IUG policy is to continue the educational process under all difficult 
circumstances and that IUG will keep teaching students in spite of siege, 
wars and destruction" (AL-Khodary, J. individual interview, Feb. 2014).  
 
In this regard, IUG students and staff reactions  to the oppressive practices of the 
occupation on the university campus changed gradually. These practices included 
incursions, inspections, closure, and bombardment of the university campus. At the 
beginning, the students would be frightened and run to their houses and suspend their study 
for a day or so. Later, they would remain on campus and stay in the yards. Eventually, staff 
and students would remain inside their classrooms and pursue their lessons as these 
practices became part of their daily lives. With regard to the risky conditions under which 
the leadership and the staff worked, unfortunately, there are no accurate statistics of the 
numbers of staff who have been murdered, injured and/or imprisoned. Based on 
discussions with administration departments at IUG, informal statistics show that, the 
number of murdered is 63,  the number of injures exceed 85, and  the number of prisoners 
is approximately 274. 
 
 
2.2.4.4 Thriving of IUG: Moving towards Academic Excellence 
In 2010, a new phase of construction and development commenced. The IUG leadership 
launched the Medical City project which consisted of  a big hospital, offices, classrooms 
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and laboratories among many other facilities. This project was fully supported by the 
Turkish government and expected to be opened in September 2017. In July 2014, IUG 
celebrated the first 38 medical graduates. Launching this big project under conditions of 
siege and closure can be taken as  a good sign of thriving IUG. 
 
The leadership  continued with their strategy of improving the qualifications of the staff by 
offering many scholarships to the academic staff to conduct their PhDs' in the UK, USA, 
Turkey, Malaysia, Germany, South Africa and Egypt among many other countries. 
According to the statistics of the Dean of Foreign Affairs, and Table 5 (p. 48), IUG	  has 292 
full-time academics who hold PhD degrees. More than 130 graduated from American, 
British and other European universities. More than 40 graduated from Turkish, Malaysian, 
Indian, Japanese, Korean and Chinese universities. The others graduated from universities 
in different Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Jordan. This diversity gave more space 
to additional valuable knowledge and experience that transferred to students and the 
community.    
 
The leadership tried to give more attention to research and development programmes by 
inaugurating a deanship for scientific research and another for planning and development. 
Creating the Total Quality Management unit (TQM) in 2006 has helped the leadership to 
improve the quality of education and management, in addition to improving the university 
environment. TQM also aims to improve the skills of the staff by offering a diversity of 
training programmes for both academic and administrative staff. Some of these courses 
concentrate on managing crises, managing stress and time, and team work among many 
others. 
  
In June 2012, IUG received the UNESCO Chair in Astronomy and Astrophysics and Space 
Sciences (UNESCO, 2012). IUG was the first university in space science in the Arab 
region to receive this chair (IUG website news, 2012).   
 
 IUG has created different centers and units for serving the society such as the Community 
Service and Continuing Education Deanship (CSCED) which offers specialised 
programmes and courses that serve all categories of society, as well as engineering and 
scientific laboratories offering their services and research to companies and individuals. In 
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1998, the University College for Applied Sciences (UCAS), was opened, offering a 
Diploma and a B.Sc. This college has attracted more than 10 000 students so far, in 
addition to employing hundreds of workers.  
 
In 2012, the Irada project opened at IUG with full donation from the Turkish charity 
foundation, TIKA, serving and employing more than 400 people who have war injuries. 
Those injured became professionals in the furniture industry, ceramic industry and the 
software design industry. These units consolidate the social solidarity and cohesion of the 
Palestinian community with the university. 
 
By the end of the fourth stage, challenges still exist, yet struggle, determination and 
ambitions of the university are still great. 
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Chapter Three 
 
3. Resilience through Turbulent Times: The role of Leadership and Culture 
This chapter presents the literature review and background to IUG. The following pages 
discuss the concept of organisational resilience as a theoretical base for the study. To 
conceptualise the framework of the literature: first, the chapter discusses the role of HE 
institutions, particularly universities in conflict areas and ongoing turbulence with specific 
focus on the main challenges that face HEIs in turbulent environments.  
Second, the study presents some related concepts and styles of leadership in different 
contexts and leadership in an Islamic context. The role of leadership in HE in turbulent 
times with specific focus on the transformational style is then discussed. The importance 
and the value of leadership human capital are then presented with specific focus on the 
contribution of HE leadership particularly in turbulent times. 
Third, the concepts of culture and ideology are then presented and discussed in detail, with 
more concentration on potential impact on the university and the society. This is in addition 
to clarifying the interaction between leadership, culture and ideology in fostering resilience 
and in coping with shocks and hardships and in the survival and growth of IUG.  
Fourth, the chapter clarifies the importance of Strategic Human Resource Management 
(SHRM), particularly in turbulent times.  
Fifth, the value of the leadership with special capacities (human capital) in turbulent times 
and its contribution in achieving the survival and growth of organisations are discussed. 
Sixth, the literature review presents different concepts and theories of organisational 
resilience. The discussion focuses on the role of resilience in organisations that operate in 
turbulent environments and how to build capacity for organisational resilience strategies. 
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3.1 General Overview and Theoretical Components 
Higher Education Institutions  (HEIs) play a crucial role in the development and the social 
reconstruction of communities (Zamini, et al., 2011; Bernardo and Branovich, 2014; 
Heleta, 2015). The threats, shocks and ongoing conflict in different regions of the world are 
"too ubiquitous to be isolated and too nimble to be contained" (Auerswald and van Opstal, 
2009:1). The Palestinian environment has been, and is still characterised by conflict and 
instability (Alzaroo and Hunt, 2003), uncertainty, and an inability to predict the future 
(EPACBI, 2015). Because conflict and turbulence have devastating consequences on HEIs 
in different regions of the world, the reconstruction and development of HE must be a high 
priority (Maclure and Denov, 2009) if these institutions seek to be the drivers for 
development and progress of societies. 
Although traditionally a clear distinction between literature review and theoretical 
framework is drawn, because of the nature of thematic issues embedded, the literature 
review of this chapter is inclusive of the theoretical framework. The next few pages include 
the theoretical components of the study which comprise the foundation of the theoretical 
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framework. The theoretical base of this study is in the domain of organisational resilience 
theory. Organisational resilience provides a specific moment-in-time lens to comprehend 
the much broader question of the role of leadership in HE in a situation of conflict, post- 
conflict and ongoing turbulence.	   
 
The management of HEIs, particularly in conflict and turbulent times, is a complicated 
mission, and therefore it requires a set of actors and processes (Sporn, 2010) such as 
leadership with repertoire of human capital and culture in order to promote and foster 
resilience to ensure the survival and best delivery of education under adverse 
circumstances. It should integrate concepts such as strategies and processes in order to cope 
properly with hardships (Kahveci and Taskin, 2013). The success of an organisation relies 
mainly on its leadership (Mowday, Steers, and Porter, 1979; Koo and Choi, 2000; Kim, 
Kim, and Kim, 2011).   
 
Some scholars (Yukl, 2008, 2010; Warrilow, 2010) believe that transformational leadership 
is an appropriate style in situations of turbulence, conflict and war conditions. Burns (1978) 
views transformational style as a process whereby leaders take control of the situation by 
conveying a clear vision of followers' goals, building their awareness and enabling them to 
reach high levels of motivation and aspiration. Then extraordinary results are expected 
from those leaders and their followers (Bass and Avolio, 1990; Siewiorek, et al., 2012; 
Senior, Martin, Thomas, Topakas, West and Yeats, 2012; Vega-Vazques, Cossio and 
Martin-Ruiz, 2012).  
 
Lepak and Snell (1999) and Huang, Lai and Lin (2011) believe that human capital is 
essential for organisational success and consider it as a strategic asset of the organisation. 
They place particular emphasis on the skills and experience of the leadership and 
employees. Skilled and competent leadership has the ability to cope with difficult 
challenges and achieve the objectives of the organisation (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, and 
Kochhar, 2001; Senior, et al., 2012). In contrast, incompetent and poorly skilled leadership 
is a crucial factor that might lead to failure (Douglas and Shaniely, 2000) and catastrophic 
consequences. 
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Ouyang, et al. (2012) define resilience as the joint ability of infrastructure systems to resist 
any possible threats, absorb the initial damage, recover and return to normal operations. In 
other words, resilience is a set of behaviours and processes that improve the ability of an 
organisation to cope with both expected and unexpected events (Auerswald and van Opstal, 
2009), survive, adapt and thrive in the face of disturbances (Martin-Breen and Andries, 
2011). By doing so, they can sustain performance under pressure or after calamities 
(Hollnagel, 2007, Hollnagel, et al., 2011; Steen and Aven, 2011). To cope with, and even 
capitalize on, hardships, the leadership deploys a proactive strategy to prevent some event 
and/or reactive strategy to deal properly with other events after their occurrence (Reason, 
1997).  
Another important factor that plays a role in the development and progress of HEIs is 
culture (Zamini, et al., 2011). In the broader meaning, culture can be defined as a set of 
beliefs and values that affect the member’s thoughts and behaviours (Kilmann, 1985; 
Aktas, et al., 2011; Zamini, et al., 2011). Culture contributes to achieving the objectives of 
the organisation (Aktas, et al., 2011).  
 
 
3.2 HEIs in the Heart of Conflict Environments  
3.2.1 Introduction 
Seitz (2004) stresses that wars and military conflict not only damage the education 
infrastructure, but also impair education systems. The negative effects of wars on education 
and the infrastructure have been discussed by many other scholars (de Santisteban, 2002; 
Novelli and Lobes Cardozo, 2008; Afana, 2009; Smith, 2011).  
 
The study of Kwiek and Maassen (2012) concentrates on the challenges that HEIs might be 
exposed to such as the changing structure of HE; autonomy and funding; the changing 
dynamics of public/private HE; policies and demographics. They regard these as 
turbulences facing the HE sector. Teixeira and Amaral (2007) refer to turbulent times 
facing HE such as financial crises, competition and lack of resources. They shed light on 
the strategies used to survive and overcome these challenges. None of these studies 
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discussed the additional challenges resulting from serious conflict, occupation and war 
conditions. The management of HE in turbulent times is still under-theorised and lacks 
coherence.  
 
Muthanna and Karaman (2014) note that many Arab countries are associated with protests 
and conflict. They added that HEIs have also been subjected to violent incidents and 
measures considered to maintain inequity. Bernardo and Baranovich (2014:84) found that 
HEIs in conflict situations “operate in an eclectic mix of facilitator of peace, an inadvertent 
instigator of conflict as well as a victim of the war itself”. These potential multiple roles of 
education are also discussed by Bush and Saltarelli (2000), who see education as an 
important factor to increase and/or decrease conflict. 
 
 
  
3.2.2 The Importance and the Role of HEIs in Societies 
Regardless of the contexts, Bernardo and Baranovich (2014) argue that HEIs are assumed 
to play a crucial role in the social construction of societies alongside teaching and research. 
This is aligned with the view of McClellan (2006) who believes that HEIs are responsible 
for educating and training employees in order to improve their capacities in responding to 
challenges and difficulties.	  Nelson Mandela, the former president of South Africa, stated 
that "education is the most powerful weapon which can be used to change the world" 
(Aguilar, 2013:1). Therefore, HEIs can play an important role in the progress of societies. 
 
The history of HE demonstrates an evolution of university structure and purpose that 
directly reflects the dynamic of societies (Stephens and Graham, 2010). Douglass (2010) 
suggests that the size and quality of HEIs and systems are crucial for the social and 
economic future of nations and countries. Therefore, beside teaching and research, HEIs 
can play an important role in the social and economic change of both developed and 
developing countries. 
 
 In line with Douglass’ suggestion, Massyrova, Tautenbaeva, Tussupova, Zhalalova, and 
Bissenbayeva (2015) believe that education is one of the main factors for developing 
societies and therefore, the management of HE needs to be reformed to meet the need for 
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progress of communities. Meeting the needs of new generations and creating the basis for 
progress and prosperity must be a high priority of HE management. 
 
According to Kahveci and Taskin (2013) the management of HEIs should integrate 
concepts such as strategy, quality and process in order to cope with hardship. These 
concepts enable universities to respond properly and in a timely manner in the face of 
difficulties. Kahveci and Taskin (2013) argue that Strategic Management (SM) can adapt to 
rapidly changing and challenging circumstances, as it provides universities with long term 
direction, and therefore the process works in line with operational goals and strategic 
approach for the future of HEIs.  
 
Due to the evolving systems of HE, flexibility is important to meet and to anticipate 
societal demands (Douglass, 2010). Katharakis and Katharakis (2010:115) assert that 
“Universities are knowledge organisations; their core objectives are to generate, acquire 
and transfer knowledge, but also to develop and transfer technology innovation, support 
and challenge current political establishments, as well as support the economy by 
becoming the providers of appropriate knowledge and skills”. This means that besides the 
production and transfer of knowledge, universities can play an important role in growth and 
political change.  
 
According to Bramwell and Wolfe (2008) HEIs in general, and universities in particular, 
are not only generators of knowledge or qualified graduates, but also contribute to 
knowledge transfer. First, they generate and attract talent and qualified staff who are 
builders of society (Florida, 2002; Betts and Lee, 2005). Second, beside the main mission 
of basic research, universities provide expert staff who can contribute to research and 
development (R&D) activities of the society (Grossman, Reid, and Morgan, 2001; 
Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedonis, 2004). Third, universities play an important role in 
co-operation in international academic research and networks (OECD, 1999; Bathelt, 
Malmberg, and Maskell, 2004). Finally, universities can act as good community players 
that support organisations with innovation and knowledge exchange and train and retain 
talented people (Wolfe, 2005; Gertler and Vinodrai, 2005; Betts and Lee, 2005).  
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In a study of the history of universities in Europe (1500-1800), Ruegg (1996) argues that 
the great three purposes of universities are: learning; virtue; and utility. This means the 
advancement of knowledge, preparation for the observance of a code of social, moral and 
religious conduct, and training for high office or the professions. For centuries, universities 
have been at the forefront of creating and breaking paradigms, and educating the future 
decision-makers, entrepreneurs, and leaders (Cortese, 2003; Lozano, 2006). In line with 
this approach, Waas, Verbruggen, and Wright (2010) state that universities have played a 
historic role in social change and in serving the greater public good, and therefore can be 
considered as great motivators to achieve the society’s future goals of progress and 
prosperity. 
 
The objectives of universities may also include the promotion of cultural diversity, political 
democracy and trade (Marginson, 2010). In some universities in the Middle East region 
there is diversity of cultures but with less democracy combined with some violent clashes.  
Because the Palestinian community has lived under occupation for more than six decades, 
politics play an important role in their daily life. Therefore, Palestinian universities, 
generally, are pillars of diversity of political affiliation as well as pillars of religious 
thoughts, yet there is often a tense atmosphere, particularly among students from different 
political parties. 
 
In postmodern economies, and increasingly in developing countries, there is growing 
dependency on the expansion of knowledge accumulation that will be vital for greater 
national and global productivity and competitiveness (Douglass, 2010).  
 
The main objective of universities is teaching and research alongside the production and 
transfer of knowledge. The importance of universities increases in contexts of turbulence 
and conflict, such as the context of the Gaza Strip where the IUG operates. This is because, 
in spite of uncertainty and instability, university objectives extend to serve social and 
political needs (Marginson, 2010). The question to be addressed: which key competencies 
are most relevant for survival and growth and hence should be developed in future-oriented 
HE? 
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3.2.3 Universities in Different Contexts: Challenges and Ambitions 
In developed, and increasingly in developing, countries, universities seek to play a central 
role in nation-building and to contribute to the growth of societies through teaching and 
research and in educating tomorrow’s decision makers (Stephens and Graham, 2010). But 
challenges and difficulties might undermine the smooth functioning of universities toward 
achieving these objectives. 
Robertson (2010:2) outlines "five key challenges at the heart of the contemporary 
university which have an impact on quality. These are: access and HE as a positional good; 
pedagogy and the industrialisation of learning; new sectoral and institutional geographies 
of universities; the rise of for-profit firms engaged in all aspects of HE governance; and the 
commercialisation of ideas, knowledge and education”.  
 
Sevier (2014) expands the challenges facing HEIs by confirming some challenges 
presented by Robertson (2010) and by adding, through interviews with many academics, 
another series of challenges. Some of these key challenges are: financial issues (fees, 
salaries, costs, and revenues); lack of quality; partnership between colleges and area 
business; changing demography and pedagogy; pressure to pursue a college completion; 
responding to changes; reactive rather than a proactive approach to change; leadership 
management; the role of women in leadership; building strong networks of 
communications; the value of the degrees in the marketplace; developing curricula; the 
technology role in reducing the costs of education and increasing the quality of instruction; 
and decision making effectiveness and realistic objectives. 
 
In spite of these challenges, Maharey (2011) stresses maintaining quality of knowledge, 
learning and education in the face of change by creating new ways of improving for the 
benefit of the community. Therefore, successful universities are those which will be able to 
address these challenges and will have a competitive advantage over others.  
 
The nature of the challenges dictates the mission of universities and the manner of the 
responses to these challenges. For example, in the turbulent Palestinian environment, 
beside teaching and research, political issues and opposing the Israeli occupation occupied 
a great deal of attention among university leadership, staff and students.  
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Nations and communities that live in the context of war and occupation might be exposed 
to serious difficulties and challenges in different walks of life especially the education 
sector, and thus need to pay high priority to how education can contribute and foster the 
reconstruction process (Maclure and Denov, 2009). In this regard, Seitz (2004) suggests 
that the educational reconstruction process is a potentially transformational process that can 
address fundamental social inequities and injustices.  
 
Bush and Saltarelli (2000) point out that education can play an important role in fostering a 
social reconstruction process and aid in eliminating past corrosive social tension among the 
different groups of the society. If universities seek to become leaders and change drivers of 
the society, they must ensure that the needs of the present and future generations be 
considered and such considerations built upon to serve the community goals and objectives 
(Lozano, Lukman, Lozano, Huisingh, and Lamberechts, 2011). By doing so, they might 
gain their trust and support.  
 
In terms of strengthening the social cohesion between communities and universities, Harris 
and Chapman (2002) found that solid and strong links with the society are more likely to 
gain their support and loyalty, particularly in times of challenge and hardships. Corrall 
(2008:30) believes that, for the success of universities, the leadership “need to have a top-
down, grass-roots and inside-out approach. Need to have clear overall policy and effective 
liaison at level of individuals”. This can be accomplished throughout the entire university 
system, which includes the following inter-linked elements: Education; Research; Campus 
operations; Community outreach (Cortese, 2003); Assessment and Reporting (Lozano, 
2006). In addition, the dedication, commitment and experience of the teachers and staff are 
one of the main reasons for success. Without enthusiastic and motivated educators, the 
chances for success are very limited (Christie, et al., 2007). These important factors and 
their potential impact on IUG are investigated in this study to explore to what extent they 
contribute to the success of IUG. Hicks and Gidley (2012) argue that if teachers are not 
able to empower students in relation to their feeling about the future, then they might have 
failed in their mission to create a new generation of leaders.  
 
In the context of developing countries, universities might be exposed to additional 
challenges. A good example of a university that has operated under conditions of conflict 
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and occupation conditions is the Korean Imperial University (KIU). This university has, to 
some extent, similarities to the challenges and difficulties IUG has experienced. Sohn and 
Kenney (2007:994) report “The first university was Keijo (Japanese) and Kyungsung 
(Korean) Imperial University (KIU) located in Seoul, which was founded in 1924, mainly 
to educate Japanese settlers. The Japanese Imperial Government had little interest in 
providing HE services to Koreans. At the end of the occupation, Korea had an extremely 
weak HE system. The situation in 1945 was dire, because many of the skilled technicians 
and managers were Japanese who were repatriated. At that time, Korea did not have 
sufficient trained manpower to maintain the existing industrial facilities. There were only 
11 Korean doctoral degree holders and approximately 200–300 science graduates (The 
Korean Federation of Science & Technology Societies, 1980). The Korean universities 
began as training institutions rather than new knowledge generators. For this reason, 
universities  had little significant role in new knowledge generation for commercialisation. 
They were not research institutions. The universities trained a large pool of talented 
scientists and engineers that became the workers upon which Korean firms have propelled 
themselves into the world’s first rank and from whose work Korean living standards have 
advanced to near developed country status. They were an excellent base for Korean 
economic development”.  
 
 KIU experienced  a severe lack of resources, particularly qualified staff after the 
repatriation of the Japanese technicians and managers who had left their jobs at KIU after 
the end of the Japanese occupation of Korea. In addition, research and development 
programmes were very weak due to political and economic problems. Consequently, the 
production and transfer of knowledge at KIU were insignificant. The main focus of the 
leadership at KIU was to train a large pool of talented scientists and engineers to overcome 
the difficulties they faced and achieve the objectives of the university.  
 
Some of these challenges KIU faced during the Japanese occupation are similar in part to 
those IUG has experienced such as working under occupation, lack of resources and 
qualified staff, and the lack of R&D programmes. The main difference between KIU and 
IUG is that the Japanese occupation withdrew and therefore KIU was able to manage in a 
post conflict situation, while IUG still has to manage in a post conflict situation while 
conflict still exists.  
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3.2.4 Universities with Ideological Roots 
Although most of universities in the world are socially mixed, there are still some 
universities or institutions today which are ideologically based, and IUG falls into this 
group. The historical development of many universities around the world confirmed the 
phenomenon of establishing universities from religious roots, and with an ideological 
background whether they are Christian, Islamic or Jewish. Ruegg (1992) describes the 
Christian origins of some universities in Europe in the middle ages.  
Over  history, the idea of religious roots  applies to some universities in the USA and 
Europe.. For example, in 1789, Georgetown University (GU) was established as the first 
Catholic and Jesuit university in the USA. By 2014, GU offers a diversity of specialisations 
for 17 858 students (GU website, 2016). In 1842, the Congregation of the Holy Cross 
created Notre Dame university which combined teaching and research, and serving the 
community with Catholic roots (ND website, 2016). These universities have adopted a 
specific ideological culture to accomplish their vision, mission and objectives. 
The University of Sarajevo (UNSA) is the largest and the oldest in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. It was founded in 1531 as an Ottoman Islamic Law College. In 1949, it 
started teaching modern scientific subjects. Today UNSA teaches 50 000 students, who 
study Bachelors, Masters and Doctoral degrees in 30 faculties and institutes (UNSA 
website, 2015). The International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) seeks to restore the 
dynamic and progressive role of the Muslim Ummah in all branches of knowledge and 
intellectual discourse (IIUM website, 2017). 
 
In Africa, the University of Timbuktu was founded in Mali as one of the oldest universities 
in the world (UNESCO website, 2015). It started as an Islamic religious institution. By the 
12th century, it was a big centre of Islamic learning and commercial establishment in Africa 
with 25 000 students in a city with a population of 100 000. Then it grew to one of the most 
important universities in Africa with three departments and 180 Quranic schools, before it 
declined again. Another example is the University Zaytouna in Tunisia which was 
established in 737 as an Islamic institution. The university continued teaching Islamic and 
Quranic subjects and participated in opposing the French occupation of Tunisia from1881-
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1956. By 1951, it had started to offer Bachelors degrees. After independence in 1956, it 
became a modern university (Zaytouna University website, 2015). 
  
In Palestine, different universities are running with different ideological backgrounds 
whether these are Christian, Secular or Islamic. For example, Bethlehem University which 
was established in 1973, is a Catholic co-educational institution that aims to provide quality 
higher education to the people of Palestine and to enrich the minds of its students with 
knowledge on the basis of rationality and moral vision, (Bethlehem website, 2016).  Also, 
Bethlehem Bible College is one of the Palestinian HEIs in the West Bank which 
established in 1979 and aims to encourage spiritual growth. (BETHBC website, 2016). 
Birzeit, An-Najah and Al-Azhar universities are driven by a secular approach while IUG is 
driven by an Islamic approach. 
 
 
 
3.3 The Concept of Organisational Leadership 
Two key authors in the field give different definitions of leadership. Burns (1978:18) writes 
that "Leadership is exercised when persons mobilize institutional, political, psychological, 
and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers".  Another 
definition is presented by Yukl (2010) who argues that researchers define leadership as a 
strategy that focuses on the objectives of the organisation and motivates followers to 
achieve these objectives by influencing their performance and culture. While Burns (1978) 
places greater emphasis on satisfying the motives of followers, Yukl (2010) combines 
satisfaction and the motives of followers with culture to enhance achieving the objectives 
of the organisation.  
  
Burns (1978) presents two main concepts of leadership which are transactional and 
transformational leadership. The conceptualisation of these two concepts by Burns (1978) 
provides the foundation of revolution in the conceptualisation of the role and the value of 
leadership. This concept of leadership focused primarily on what leaders need to do in 
order to accomplish their objectives and be effective leaders.  
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3.3.1 Leadership in Different Context and Cultures: Leadership in Islamic Context 
Organisations in different contexts have  particular external and internal work 
environments which dictates, to a considerable extent, the appropriate style of leadership to 
be deployed and the way this leadership responds to problems, threats and opportunities.  
 
In the context of HE, Dimmock and Walker (2000) have criticised the study of leadership 
for being dominated by Anglo-American intellectual and cultural frameworks, and for 
under-exploring the influence of various cultures on leadership. Dimmock and Walker 
argue that many studies on leadership have been conducted, but much of its concentration 
was on defining the American and Western approach to leadership. What works in a 
Western environment may or may not work well in different environments or cultures 
around the world including Islamic ones. 
 
Kabasakal, Dastmalchian, Karacay, and Bayraktar (2012) argue that, although there is a 
large body of literature that looks at effective leadership prototypes and practices from 
Western countries, few studies have investigated effective leadership prototypes from the 
Islamic part of the world, particularly from the Middle Eastern region. In fact, the Middle 
East leadership styles have not been given adequate attention by scholars. Hofstede (1984); 
Hallinger and Leithwood (1998); and Fidler (2000) emphasise that it is important to 
understand the variations in different societies and cultures in order to understand their 
impacts on leadership. This thesis examines the extent to which Islamic culture, 
particularly in HEIs, might influnced by/affect leadership styles within Islamic context in 
turbulent times. 
	  
 
As an example of the differences between Eastern and Western leadership, Faris and Parry 
(2011) shed light on the leadership in Western communities compared to the leadership in 
Muslim communities. They argue that the Islamic notion of leadership is very close to 
notions of leadership in the Western community that exists in the mainstream literature. 
Differences in the manifestation of leadership are most likely to come from the 
organisational context or the external context. What often distinguishes Islamic leadership 
from traditional Western notions of leadership is the close attachment of leadership to 
religion, especially its moral and human roots. Followers, especially those with strong 
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religious roots, generally, have a religious obligation to obey their leaders as long as there 
is no disobedience towards God and the Prophet (Beekun and Badawi,1999). 
Many Texts from the holy Quran stress on this, for Example: 
 
   ءاسنلاا ةةرروس)59:4 ( "  ااُونَمآآ َنیيِذَّلاا َاھهَُّیيأأ َایي                  
                                 
                   " 
"O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger (Muhammad), and 
those of you (Muslims) who are in authority"	  (Quran	  Surah, An-Nisa' 4:59). 
  
The concept of "        , Altaaea" obedience in an Islamic setting has its own 
implications for both followers and leaders to obey orders of the God and the Prophet 
Mohammad. While followers have to obey their leaders, the leadership have to follow the 
instructions that are aligned and not contradictary with Islamic principles and rules (Al-
Nabulsi, 2008). 
 
In Islam, the concept of obedience (  ,        Altaaea) does not contradict the concept 
of consultation (  ,        Shurah) and both are key concepts of Islam (AL-Khaiatt, 
2004). Obedience of followers is a must only when it comes with Quranic texts or direct 
and clear sayings of the prophet Mohamed. But in other daily life issues or work 
environments, the concept of consultation, which is the backbone of Islamic regulations, 
should be implemented and after taking a decision followers have to obey the instructions 
and proceed accordingly (AL-Khaiatt, 2004).  
 
     َننُوِقفُنیي ُْمھھھهَانْقَززَرر ا َّمِمَوو ُْمَھهنَْیيب ٰىىَرروُش ُْمھھھهُرَْمأأَوو َةةَلا َّصلاا ااوُمَاَقأأَوو ْمِھهِّبَِرل ااُوباََجتْساا َنیيِذَّلااَوو""  ىىرروشلاا ةةرروس)38:42(  
"Those who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular Prayer; who 
(conduct) their affairs by mutual Consultation; who spend out of what We 
bestow on them for Sustenance" (Quran	  Surah, Shurah 4:59). 
The Quranic text here stresses on the need for consultation that characterised those who 
respond to the willing of their lord. 
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Another text clarifies that consultation is a must, and once a decision is taken then leaders 
and followers have to carry out with trust. 
 
 ْنَع ُفْعَاف ۖ َِكلْوَح ْنِم ااو َُّضفنَلا ِبَْلقْلاا َظِیيلَغ ًّاَظف َتنُك َْولَوو ۖ ُْمَھهل َتِنل ِ َّالله َن ِّم ٍةَمْحَرر اَِمَبف" َل ِْرفَْغتْسااَوو ُْمھه ُْمھه
ع للاا ةةرروس) "نِیيل ِّكََوتُمْلاا ُّبُِحیي َ َّالله َِّننإإ ۚ ِ َّالله َىلَع ْلَّكََوَتف َتْمَزَع ااَِذذَإف ۖ ِرَْمْلأاا ِيف ُْمھھھهْررِوواَشَوو نناارم159:3 .(  
"So by mercy from Allah (GOD) that you became compassionate towards 
them. Had you been harsh and mean-hearted, they would have abandoned 
you. Therefore, you shall pardon them and ask forgiveness for them, and 
consult them. Once you make a decision, carry out and rely upon Allah. 
Allah loves those who rely upon Him" (Quran Surah, Al-Imran 3:159). 
 
Therefore, the concept of obedience is not strict or blind, rather, it comes after 
consultations and agreement about a specific decision. Ali (2005: 146) clarifies this by 
arguing that the traditional view of leadership in Islam is that "leadership is a shared 
influence process. Leaders are not expected to lead or maintain their roles without the 
agreement of those who are led, and at the same time, decisions made by those leaders 
were expected to be influenced by input from their followers. The process is dynamic and 
open-ended and the ultimate aim is to sustain cohesiveness and effectiveness". 
 
The main difference is about the extent to which ideology is involved and influences the 
way the leadership of an organisation responds to events and challenges they face. In 
general, ideology seems to be more involved in the Islamic styles of leadership. 
 
In spite of the fact that there is diversity of thoughts and beliefs among Muslims in 
different countries, generally, Islam has its own special conceptions of leadership. 
Clarifying this approach, Beekun and Badawi (1999) contend that Muslims base their 
behaviour as leader or follower upon the word of God that is clearly shown in their holy 
book, the Qur’an. They believe that the leader plays the role of the servant and the guardian 
at the same time. Although the servant style of leaders exists in the Western literature 
(Manktelow and Carlson, 2013), a religious dimension of faith and obedience 
"      " is added in the Islamic contexts. The previous definition might be true for 
leadership of some organisations that adopt Islamic culture and conceptions, but not for all 
organisations or leadership. Most of the organisations in the Muslim and the Arab world do 
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not necessarily adopt or implement these particular concepts. In the case of IUG, the 
Islamic culture shaped, to a considerable extent, the behaviours of the leadership and 
therefore their decisions are affected by such culture. 
 
Comparing traditional leadership theories and Muslim notions of leadership reveals that 
they are not identical in practice. Rather, in general, Faris and Parry (2011) argue that the 
deeply moral and religious aspects of Muslim leadership seem to make the job of leading 
and the job of following clearer. The belief, obedience "      " and commitment of 
followers is part of the doctrine of Islam which deserve the reward from God (An-Nady, 
199). An important difference might be that, in the Middle East, the leadership is less 
democratic compared with Western leadership as the concept of consultation (Shurah) is 
not implemented all the time. This might appear sometimes when some leaders exploit the 
obedience and commitment of followers to achieve their own objectives. 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 The Leadership of HE in Turbulent Times 
In today's conditions of turbulent environments,complex challenges and rapid changes, the 
ability of leaders to adapt and solve problems becomes even more crucial (Martinuzzi, 
2008). This is because the effectiveness and the value of the leadership depends mainly on 
how well the leadership adapt to changes and challenges of the external environment and 
how they deal with threats and opportunities (Yukl, 2008). The future challenges and 
difficulties facing HE might be charcterised by turbulence and uncertainty which requires 
more involvement and action of the leadership.   
 
Faris and Parry (2011) conclude that many of the leadership challenges are internal to the 
organisation or imposed from the external context. These challenges might be social, 
cultural and structural as well as legal, political and economic. These challenges require 
adaptable leaders who are comfortable and do not panic when operating in a turbulent 
environment when solutions to problems are not clear (Collins and Driscoll, 2008). Their 
adaptability might give them a space to organise their human capital and take powerful 
actions in response to various events. This also requires that organisations operating in 
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turbulent environments need to transform themselves to cope with challenges, changes and 
disturbances (Mirkamali, Thani, and Alami, 2011). Mohammadi and Youzbashi (2012) 
suggest that, in turbulent environments, the leadership of an organisation should use 
rational thinking from the point of identifying the problem to taking the right and rational 
actions in response to it. 
 
 
3.3.3 Leadership Styles: Are Transformational Leaders Effective in Turbulent Times? 
The literature provides different styles and classifications of leadership that can be 
exhibited by leaders in different fields. For example, Manktelow and Carlson (2013) argue 
that there are ten styles of leadership: Transactional leadership; Autocratic leadership; 
Bureaucratic leadership; Charismatic leadership; Servant leadership; Democratic 
leadership; Laissez-faire leadership; Task-oriented leadership; People/relations-oriented 
leadership; and Transformational leadership. Siewiorek, et al. (2012) classify eight types of 
leadership which include transformational and transactional, heroic and post-heroic styles 
of leadership in addition to different other styles as shown in Table 6.  Both , Manktelow 
and Carlson (2013) and Siewiorek, et al. (2012) stress the importance and the value of 
transactional and transformational styles. 
 
Table 6: Characteristics of Leadership Styles 
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1.Transactional leadership 
• cost-benefit exchange between leaders and 
their followers 
• contingent rewards 
• active management by exception 
1.1 Transformational leadership 
• inspiring and stimulating followers 
• idealized influence 
• inspirational motivation 
• intellectual stimulation 
• individual consideration 
2. Heroic leadership 
• omnipotence 
• rightness 
• face-saving 
• co-dependency 
2.1 Post-heroic leadership 
• empowerment of members 
• risk taking 
• participation 
• development of members 
 
3. Authoritarian leadership 
 
 
3.1 Shared leadership 
 
• mutual influence – dispersed leadership 
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• high degree of control 
• leader determines all policies, activity 
steps and work tasks – gives orders 
• no active group participation, leader 
mostly makes decisions alone 
 
 
 
role 
• members participate in the decision-
making process 
• members fulfil tasks traditionally 
reserved for a hierarchical leader 
• members offer guidance to others to 
achieve group goals 
 
4. Coercive leadership 
 
• leader demands immediate compliance 
with his orders 
• leader dictates each step taken 
• drive to achieve, initiative, self-control 
 
 
 
4.1 Democratic leadership 
 
• leader encourages group decisions, 
participation and discussion 
• leader builds consensus through 
participation 
• leader shares leadership to some degree 
with members 
• leader builds organisational flexibility 
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Source: Siewiorek, et al. (2012:133-134). 
 
Because the focus of the study is on the style of leadership suitable for an environment that 
is characterised by changes and challenges, the main focus of the study is on 
transformational style with some insight into transactional, heroic and post-heroic styles. 
Table 6 presents useful characterstics of leadership styles  which will be examined in the 
context of IUG. Many scholars argue that in business and management, transformational 
and transactional styles are the most researched and widely used types of leadership 
(Burns, 1978; Bass, 1990; Yukl, 2008, 2010; Warrilow, 2010; Craig, 2011; Siewiorek, 
et.al., 2012; and Manktelow and Carlson, 2013).  
 
Transactional leaders differ from transformational leaders in that they are interested in 
lower level needs of followers compared to higher level needs in transformational style. 
Explaining the approach of Burns, Bass and Avolio (1990) argue that transactional leaders 
encourage followers to perform their missions well to achieve personal gains and for the 
good of the organisation. In contrast, transformational leaders are interested in followers' 
performance and in developing their capacities and in treating them humanely. They create 
and communicate a vision,  and empower employees to act beyond expectations (Bass and 
Avolio, 1990; Vega-Vazques, et al., 2012).  
 
Supporting the specific importance and the outcomes of transformational leadership, Yukl 
(2010) concludes that this style of leadership depends on participation to meet followers' 
needs and motivates them to reach the maximum of their abilities. This type refers to 
behaviours that inspire and challenge others to reach goals (Judge, Bono, Illes, and 
Gerhardt, 2002). It gives leaders the ability to change the goals of their followers according 
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to the mission they need to accomplish (Tourish and Pinnington, 2002). This, in turn 
supports the ability of the transformational style to be flexible and adaptable in the face of 
changes and challenges, particularly in adverse conditions.  
 
Warrilow (2010) focuses on the role of transformational leadership theories arguing that 
they are about a form of collaborative greater good. They build awareness among 
followers, focusing their minds on group objectives rather than on personal interests and 
giving consideration to their aspirational needs. Therefore, they can lead the organisation to 
overcome the changes and challenges in a resilient and timely manner. 
 
Sylvester (2015) found that resilience is correlated with, and a positive low to moderate 
predictor of, transformational leadership behaviours. Therefore, this study examines the 
role of transformational leadership in building resilience throughout the four stages of IUG. 
 
3.3.4 Classifications of Transformational Leaders: 
According to Burns (1978), Bass and Avolio (1990), Yukl (2010), Craig (2011), Senior, et 
al. (2012) and Siewiorek, et al. (2012), transformational leadership has four main 
categories. First, idealised influence, meaning that the transformational leader has the 
charisma to influence followers to obey and respect them while understanding their 
mission. Second, inspirational motivation, meaning that the transformational leader 
encourages followers to have high expectations, develop team spirit among them with a 
good understanding of the organisational vision and mission. Third, intellectual 
stimulation, meaning that the transformational leader motivates followers to be creators and 
innovators, to share the same values and standards of the leaders and of the organisation. 
Fourth, individual consideration, meaning that the transformational leader gives great 
attention to individual needs, with self-esteem and authority. 
  
In addition to these four factors, Siewiorek, et al. (2012) adds another factor to the four 
factors that are shown in Table 6 (P. 80), which is inspiring and stimulating followers, 
meaning that the transformational leader admires followers and make them satisfied with 
the job they perform. This style of leadership is characterised by flexible thinking which 
enables the transformational leader to lead the organisation to achieve their objectives. 
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displayed. There is evidence that the power of organisational leadership has different 
effects on outcomes in different contexts (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Therefore, 
transformational leadership should take into consideration the context and environmental 
changes when they act or plan. Manktelow and Carlson (2013) argue that transformational 
leaders inspire people with a shared vision of the future, set clear goals and motivate people 
towards these goals, manage delivery, and communicate well with their teams. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3.3.5  Transformational Leadership: Strength despite Criticisms 
Burns (1978) describes transformational leadership as a process that provides a clear vision 
of followers’ goals, presenting a marked passion for the work, and enabling followers to 
feel recharged and energized. In spite of the strength that transformational style gives 
leaders, Craig (2011) argues that all leaders suffer from uneven character development and 
not all of them are perfect in mixing virtues and vices. Although Craig is convinced that 
transformational leadership is more successful than other styles, and that leaders invoking 
this style and their organisation can gain extraordinary results, he criticises 
transformational leadership for giving, sometimes, more attention to stakeholders at the 
expense of the organisation as a whole. Also, self-interest can play a negative role 
especially if the transformational leader were to satisfy stakeholders or their own interests 
at the expense of employees. This in turn will affect negatively the satisfaction, 
commitment and performance of employees. However, these criticisms are about all 
leadership styles and not exclusively for transformational leadership.  
 
Reviewing the literature reveals some other criticisms of transformational leadership. One 
criticism is that, it has some ambiguity (Lee, 2014). Also, it is criticised in that some 
transformational leaders see themselves as great men, sometimes at the expense of 
followers (Tourish and Pinnington, 2002; Northhouse, 2013). It is criticised for being 
elitist, rather than democratic, leadership, and for its ability tobe exploited negatively. In 
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addition, it is criticised as looking at personality traits and not behaviours that people can 
learn (Tourish and Pinnington, 2002).  
  
Bass and Avolio (1990) respond to these criticisms by arguing that transformational leaders 
can be democratic mentors and participants and make people satisfied with the job they 
perform. The ability of leadership to communicate effectively and share knowledge and 
information with employees and take their consideration into account can make the 
difference between successful and failing leaders. 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Culture and Ideology 
Every nation, whether in Western or Eastern communities, has its own culture of thoughts, 
beliefs, values, habits and traditions which affect their lives and the way they act and 
interact with different situations in their daily life and in their work environment. Aktas, et 
al. (2011) argue that culture has a strong impact on organisational life and therefore it is 
important to understand the contribution of culture in achieving organisational goals and 
objectives.  
As noted in the introduction of this thesis, IUG is a public educational institution that 
generally adopts the Islamic culture in the laws, regulations and daily practices. The 
curriculum comprises many Islamic subjects such as Quran, Islamic Culture and Islamic 
History, among other Palestinian subjects alongside secular subjects which aimed to raise 
the commitment and national loyalty of students. Therefore, the occupation tried to 
intervene to minimise the effects of such subjects by confiscation of Islamic and national 
books related to the Palestinian cause (Al-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). By having its own 
curriculum, IUG has inculcated a kind of devotion and commitment to its culture and style. 
Although Al-Sinwar and Mouteer state that at the early years of its inception the 
curriculum covered mostly Islamic subjects, currently this is not the case. Islamic subjects 
are part of a wide diversity of science, art and modern subjects that are proper for a modern 
university.   
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3.4.1 Approaches and Definitions 
HEIs are one of the important basics of a country’s development and universities’ 
organisational culture has an important role to play in this process (Zamini, Zamini and 
Barzegary, 2011). The importance of culture, which encompasses thoughts, beliefs and 
attitudes lies in that, it is a strong factor that can motivate followers and contribute to 
improving organisational outcomes (Christie, et al., 2007).  
 
The term ‘culture’ is different, to some extent, from ‘organisational culture’, yet they 
overlap and are affected by each other. According to Tharp (2009), there are many 
definitions of culture and organisational culture. Generally, according to Tusi, et al. (2006), 
there are two main schools of thought. The first school takes a phenomenological approach 
and focuses on understanding the concept and defining the meaning of culture (Pettigrew, 
1979; Allaire and Firsirotu, 1984; Hatch, 1993). The second school takes the functionalist 
approach (Parsons, 1951; Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and focuses on the consequences of 
culture for individuals, groups and organisations.   
 
Drawing from the functionalist perspective, scholars pay attention to the role and impact of 
culture on individuals and organisational outcomes (Denison and Mishra, 1995; Kotter and 
Heskett, 1992). Culture, is a set of beliefs and values that affect member’s thoughts and 
behaviours (Tharp, 2009; Faris and Parry, 2011; Aktas, et al., 2011).  
 
In contrast, organisational culture includes the expectations, experiences, philosophy and 
values of the organisation. Kilmann (1985) defines organisational culture as sharing 
philosophy, ideology, values, assumptions, beliefs, hopes, behaviours and norms that bind 
the organisation together. In line with these definitions, O’Reilly, Chatman and Caldwell 
(1991) define culture as a set of core values shared by organisational leadership and 
members. This definition was adopted by many authors (Tsui, Zhang, Wang,Xin, and Wu, 
2006; Zamini, et al., 2011; Aktas, et al., 2011) because of its effects on organisational 
performance and the individual’s commitment. Another definition of organisational culture 
is that of Schein (1992, 2004) who defines organisational culture as a pattern of shared 
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basic thoughts and assumptions that helps a group and new members to solve problems of 
external adaptation and internal integration. 
 
The two approaches of O’Reilly, et al. (1991) and Schein (1992, 2004) focus on sharing 
culture at the individual, group and leadership levels. These two approaches have 
similarities in that culture is described as the shared thoughts and values of organisational 
members. Therefore, culture and organisational culture are similar and overlap in many 
aspects such as values, thoughts and beliefs. In some other aspects, organisational culture is 
different from culture as it includes systems, rules, experience, vision, mission and setting 
goals.  
 
Culture can be a strategic asset for the organisation, especially when it increases the 
adaptability of and fit between an organisation and its environment (Peters and Waterman, 
1982). In line with the value of culture, Lim (2009) considers culture as an important and 
fundamental component in an organisation, which can actively contribute to solving 
organisational problems and can influence organisational outcomes. When employees of an 
organisation understand the culture of their organisation and when they have the desire to 
implement the stock of values, experience, behaviours and norms, then, they will be more 
able to adapt to challenges and solve the problems of the external and internal environment.  
 
Culture has an impact on job satisfaction, job efficiency, employees’ commitment and 
cooperation, in addition to decision-making processes (O’Reilly, et al., 1991). 
Consequently, culture can affect and shape the organisation. This means that culture has its 
own reciprocal impact on organisational leadership and employees. In a similar way, Yun 
Seok (2007) describes culture as a predictive factor indicating success of an organisation. 
Hence, culture can affect the level of commitment, positive/ negative, of employees and 
their capacity to achieve the objectives of the organisation.  
 
The importance and value of organisational culture lies in that, first: it works as guidance 
for leadership and employees. It forms a pattern of relations and behaviours that should be 
followed by members. Second, it offers an intellectual and organisational framework. 
Zamini, et al. (2011) argue that when leadership and employees of an organisation share 
the same positive beliefs and values, this would strengthen the unity of employees and 
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might be a facilitator for success. Then, a powerful organisational culture exists for the 
benefit of both the organisation and employees.  
 
In conclusion, while culture is a set of thoughts, beliefs and values of individuals or groups, 
organisational culture comprises different factors such as vision, mission setting goals and 
cooperation. However, the culture of individuals has its own impacts on the way people 
behave and interact within their organisation. The culture of the IUG influences and is 
influenced by the culture of individuals in the university, as well as the broader culture in 
Palestine, and in the Muslim world.  
  
 
 
 
 
3.4.2 Features of Ideological Culture: The Islamic Ideological Culture 
Hofstede (1984) argues that organisational culture is divided into four categories: rational 
culture; ideological culture; consensual culture and hierarchical culture.  
 
In the Palestinian environment, there is a diversity of cultures. Some of these cultures are 
based on Islamic concepts while others are not. In addition, among the Islamic ideologies 
there is a diversity of political and ideological approaches and this creates conflict between 
some of them.  
 
Erikson (1968:31) defines ideology as "a system of ideas that provides a convincing world 
image". This system forms the way people see life and events. Khamis (2000) 
conceptualises ideology as a set of attitudes characterised by the expression of politico-
religious beliefs and values relevant to self and identity. Ideology represents a long-
standing commitment to politico-religious principles and choices, commitment to religion 
as faith and practice, and attitudes about political parties. Swidler (1986: 279) defines 
ideology in general terms as "a highly articulated, self-conscious belief and ritual system, 
aspiring to offer a unified answer to problems of social action, which competes with other 
belief systems for dominance over some form of social activity". Another definition of 
ideology, presented by Hsiaoa and Cheng (2006) describe ideology as a set of faiths and 
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thought, or system of concepts which are frequently expressed by people subconsciously or 
intentionally.  
 
These definitions of ideology are diverse, yet overlapping and have similarities. Erikson’s 
(1968) definition focuses on the ideas that provide people with a world image for different 
events and situations. This definition aligns with the approaches of Swidler (1986), Khamis 
(2000) and Hsiaoa and Cheng (2006). These definitions of ideology highlight the important 
role it can play and the effects it can have on the individual and at organisational level. 
Therefore, based on the previous definitions, ideology can be defined as a set of beliefs, 
values and attitudes about faith and destiny and about the world and how to manage life 
and deal with different events and situations. 
 
 
3.4.3 The Potential Contradictory Impacts of Ideology 
Honderich (1995) argues that ideology allows individuals to distance themselves from 
personal prejudice and serves as a foundation for rational rule. In a study of the impact of 
war and ideology on Palestinian adolescents from the Gaza Strip and South Lebanon,  
Khamis (2012) argues that Islamic ideology plays an important role in sustaining the 
Palestinians' life under the most devastating of circumstances. The findings of Khamis are 
aligned with the working of Laor, Wolmer, Alon, Siev, Samuel, and Toren (2006), who 
found that ideology can provide adolescents with a sense of purpose that may serve a 
protective function, increase their level of personal resources which, in turn, protects them 
against severe symptom development. Shirali, et al. (2012) argue that religious beliefs like 
believing in fate have affected how people deal with risk and interpret accidents.   
Haveman and Khaire (2004) found that ideology can have a positive impact on the survival 
of an organisation. The survival of an organisation requires adaptable and coping abilities 
of leaders and followers and, ideology might give a sense of unity and faith which, in turn 
helps in coping with disturbances. 
 
Ungar (2012) believes that organisational resilience can be understood better if it is studied 
across different cultures and contexts which both have a direct impact on resilience. These 
two important components shape the environment in which processes related to resilience 
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occur. The belief in faith and destiny might give the followers the ability to cope with 
shocks and events in a rational and resilient manner. 
 
Ideological zeal may positively affect the whole organisational life (Haveman and Khaire, 
2004). It can put both the leaders and the followers in the right direction to influence the 
behaviours and performance of the organisation which could help the organisation to cope 
with challenging events in a resilient manner.  
 
The Middle East region is characterised by the spread and strong impact of ideological 
culture, some of which is associated with the Islamic religion and adopted by many 
institutions, groups and individuals of the Muslim communities in the region and in the 
world. In Palestine, many factions, institutions, groups and individuals adopt the 
ideological culture based on Islam such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad among other groups. 
The believers of such culture are convinced that it creates unity and social cohesion among 
them and gives them the ability to cope with the challenges they face.  
 
Despite the importance of ideology and its impacts on leadership and the organisation as a 
whole, Khamis (2012) criticises ideology, pointing out that the findings of research in some 
aspects of ideology (protective and coping functions) have been inconsistent. Some studies 
(Punamäki, 1996; Shamai, 2002; Punamäki, Salo, Komproe, Qouta, El-Masri, and De Jong, 
2008) have indicated that ideological commitment to a cause is a protective factor that 
increases the ability to cope effectively in highly stressful situations. 
   
In contrast, in Lebanon, Aljardali, Kaderi, Levy-Tadjine (2012) argue that some of the 
Lebanese public sector institutions suffer from religious issues. They added that religious 
interests that contradict Lebanese University interests often mar the decision-making 
process. Therefore, they advised that religion and politics must be moved away from 
teaching. Some previous studies confirmed this approach and found that ideology is a risk 
factor (Jones, 2002; Kanagaratnam, Raundalen, and Asbjornsen, 2005).  
 
The specific effects of ideological culture, based on religion, remain unclear and some 
paradoxes exist. Scholars have some possible explanations for these paradoxes. First, some 
researchers indicate that depressed individuals who experienced negative life events often 
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turn to religion for the sake of consolation, (Ellison, 1991; Fitchett, Rybarczyk, DeMarco, 
and Nicholas, 1999). Second, other researchers explain that religiosity offers an external 
framework of control such as belief in fate which may contribute to depression (Pargament, 
Smith, Koenig, and Perez, 1998). Third, an important and alternative explanation of 
ideology claims that it provides followers with a belief perspective which enables them to 
deal better with crises, war atrocities and shocks (Punamäki, 1996; Shamai, 2002; 
Punamäki, et al., 2008).  
 
Ideological culture may be an important component of a group’s social capital, especially 
for those who experience continuous existential threat (Khamis, 2012). Therefore, a clear 
understanding of the relationship and the interaction between leadership, culture and 
ideology may help the leadership to take forceful actions in the face of shocks and 
disturbances and gain support of followers.  
3.4.4 The Relationship and Interface between Culture, Ideology and Leadership 
Faris and Parry (2011) argue that the role of external context in understanding the 
relationship between leadership and organisational culture has not been well researched. 
Their criticisms also focus on the impacts and the importance of culture in understanding 
leadership styles (Law, 2012) which has not been given adequate attention by researchers 
(Fidler, 2000; Hofstede, 1984; Schein, 1996). 
 
In spite of these criticisms, some authors highlight the reciprocal relationship between 
leadership and organisational culture. For example, Ali (2005) emphasises the potential 
mutual effects of culture and ideology upon leadership and employees. Also, Faris and 
Parry (2011) found that culture can affect the way leaders think and perform, and therefore, 
the leadership needs to be resilient to understand and adapt to the changes and the 
challenges of the environment and take the right decision accordingly. 
 
In line with this, Wang, et al. (2012) note that there is evidence to support the importance 
of culture in shaping leadership behaviours. In contrast, Tsui, et al. (2006) give more 
weight to the effect of leadership upon culture, arguing that the leadership is the main 
shaper and builder of organisational culture. Once the culture is formed, then, the 
leadership of the organisation is responsible for managing the assumptions and concepts of 
that culture and modifies it when required to keep up with the changes the environment 
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presents (Schein, 1992). Even more, Schein (2004) notes that leadership has a greater 
impact upon organisational culture in problematic and challenging circumstances. Shaping 
and sharing the culture is a formidable task and leaders have a central role to play in the 
process. 
 
Christie, et al. (2007) stress that the relationship and culture are key features in achieving 
resilience and success. Many scholars (Yukl, 2008, 2010; Warrilow, 2010; Craig, 2011) 
believe that transformational leaders are more resilient and have the ability to gain the 
commitment of followers in order to achieve good results even in turbulent environment. 
This requires sharing of a common culture.  
 
The concepts of leadership, culture and ideology reflects the complexity of organisational 
resilience in the context of conflict environment of IUG. The classification and 
categorisation of the factors and strategies employed by IUG is strongly linked to the 
premises of this theory and reflects how organisational resilience theory shapes this process 
through these mediating factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 110  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Strategic Human Resources Management (SHRM) in Turbulent Times 
SHRM is a provider of employees' capacities and actions to create and deploy policies and 
practices that contribute to achieving organisational goals and objectives (Devanna, et al., 
1982; Huselid, Jackson, and Schuler, 1997; Wright, 1998; Dessler, 2008). Jackson and 
Schuler (1995) define SHRM as the means that the organisational leadership use to manage 
their goal, priorities, and behavioural needs. Hence comes the importance of SHRM, 
particularly, in turbulent times. On the one hand, SHRM is the builder of leadership and 
employee capacities that enable them to scan the environment, size the threats and 
opportunities and respond properly. On the other hand, SHRM is a key partner in strategy 
implementation that can be developed and adapted in order to fit with organisation strategy 
(Colbert, 2004).  
However, Fiegenbaum, Hart, and Schendel (1996) shed light on a classic problem in the 
field of SHRM: how to establish and maintain a match between expected external 
environmental demands and anticipated internal organisational resources (Ulrich and 
Brockbank, 2005). In response, Werbel and DeMarie (2005), Fernandez (2009) and 
Demirbag, et al. (2010) claim that the contingency approach of SHRM works to fit and 
align all the functions and policies with the organization strategy. The contingency 
approach is related to leadership effectiveness and rationality in dealing with external 
 111  
threats and internal demands (Grimsley, 2010). This means that it should be dependent 
upon the situation which  dictates the choices of action.  
In turbulent and conflict environments, Chathotha and Olsen (2007) argue that leaders need 
to address the environmental volatility and uncertainty dimensions as well as develop 
resources that support their strategy formulation decisions. The presence of SHRM helps 
the leadership to recognize the threats and opportunities the environment presents and 
enhances their ability to cope with challenges and take the right decisions in a resilient and 
timely manner. Lengnick-Hall, et al. (2011) argues that achieving the objectives of an 
organisation especially in a turbulent environment requires developing capacity for 
organisational resilience through SHRM approach. 
 
3.6 The Value of Leadership with Special Abilities for Organisations in Turbulent 
Environments 
 
According to Dator (2005:201), there are four generic futures facing all institutions, 
organisations and societies: continuation of ‘growth’; collapse ‘from one reason or more 
various reasons’; discipline ‘since growth is not possible and collapse is not desirable, 
institutions need a set of guiding values in order to survive; and transformation. In a 
turbulent and conflict-ridden environment such as the Palestinian environment, which is 
characterised by deep rooted and prolonged occupation and war, organisations are exposed 
to the threat of collapsing, and  they struggle to survive. 
 
When confronted by  difficulties and hardships, some leaders bury their heads in the sand 
until the the storm passes, while other leaders try to keep up to date with all of their skills 
and constantly remain aware of the need to remain resilient  and responsive.  
 
Ulrich and Brockbank (2005) assert that global changes imply that organisations must 
innovate and improve to survive and thrive. To accomplish these goals, the leadership 
deploys their human capital to scan the environment to recognize and size up threats and 
opportunities from this environment (Becker, 1962; Mintzberg, Raisininghani, and Theoret, 
 112  
1976). Doing this enables the organisation to choose and implement the best strategies to 
address threats and exploit opportunities. Organisations with a superior repertoire of human 
capital are in a better position to launch a high volume of complex and forceful actions in 
response to events and challenges (Offstien, Gnyawali, and Cobb, 2005). These rich 
repertoires give the leadership more alternatives to deal with disturbances in a rational and 
timely manner.  
 
To achieve survival and success, organisations need to attract, motivate and retain 
employees (Fitz-enz, 2010). Those people with rich human capital (HC) especially at the 
leadership level can actively contribute to lead their organisation to survival when they face 
adverse conditions. Mattalia (2012) argues that HC acts as the true engine that plays a 
central role in growth,  is considered as a significant determinant of organisational survival, 
and is essential for organisational success (Becker, 1964; Barney, 1991; Lepak and Snell, 
1999; Baum, Locke and Smith, 2001; Yukl, 2008; Franzen and Pointers, 2011; Unger, 
Rauch, Frese, and Rosenbusch 2011; Huang, et al., 2011).  
Some organisations operate in a systematic way and routine that does not give individuals 
or leaders space to deploy their distinctive skills and experience. Offstien, et al. (2005) 
argue that the organisation’s human capital, especially of the leadership, improves the 
organisation’s awareness, motivation, and capability to actively compete and achieve its 
objectives. Becker (1975) concludes that human capital gives the leadership deeper 
understanding and knowledge of the operations, over others who do not have such 
experience. Increasing the capacities of leaders and employees at all levels would increase 
their self-confidence and performance (Kirkhaug, 2010). The capacities of leaders form a 
key difference between success and failure, particularly in times of challenge and 
controversy. Organisational leadership plays a crucial role in overcoming existing barriers 
to any change initiative (Koolhaas, Bartolomucci, Buwalda, de Boer, Flügge, Korte, 
Meerlo, Murison, Olivier, Palanza, Richter-Levin, Sgoifo, Steimer, Stiedl, van Dijk, Wöhr, 
and Fuchs, 2011). 
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3.7 Organisational Resilience Theory 
3.7.1 Introduction and Overview  
Kirkhaug (2010) argues that organisations more or less consciously respond to internal and 
external threats of a turbulent environment with the help of two strategies, an anticipation 
strategy and a resilience strategy. Reason (1997) considers an anticipation strategy to be a 
proactive one. This strategy enables the organisation to prevent the occurrence of risky 
situations and to be aware of emerging dangers through centrally preinstalled patterns of 
action (Wildavsky, 1988).  
 
In contrast, resilience strategy is considered to be a reactive strategy (Reason, 1997). 
According to Marcus and Nichols (1999), resilience organisation theory is based upon the 
notion that risky situations cannot always be predicted, or they may appear in new forms, 
and therefore, organisations cannot take precautions to prevent them. Resilience strategy 
enables organisations to deal properly with both expected and unexpected events.  
 
Reviewing the literature in the field of organisational resilience theories reveals that there 
are two different perspectives of organisational resilience. In the first approach, scholars 
define organisational resilience as the ability to recover from unexpected, stressful and 
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adverse situations, and to pick up where they left off and get back to normal operations 
(Horne and Orr, 1998; Balu, 2001; Gittell, Cameron, Lim and Rivas, 2006). In this 
approach, the ability of an organisation to absorb shocks and recover from them is seen as a 
coping strategy to achieve  survival in the face of disturbances and adverse circumstances. 
Thus, organisations have to struggle to withstand hazardous conditions that are out of the 
scope of the organisation. 
 
The second approach is more interested in moving beyond restoration to apply new 
capabilities in order to take advantage of opportunities or even to create them (Weick, 
1988; Coutu, 2002; Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005). In this second approach, 
organisational resilience is seen as a strategy for survival and thriving because of the ability 
to capitalize on unexpected challenges. This enables an organisation to benefit from its 
resources and capabilities, not only to resolve current problems, but also to exploit 
opportunities and move forward to a bright future (Lengnick-Hall, et al., 2011).  
3.7.2 Definitions and Features of Resilience 
Resilience is the process of and the capacity for successful adaptation, despite extremely 
challenging circumstances (Masten, Best, and Garmezy, 1990; Rutter, 2007; Auerswald 
and van Opstal, 2009; Endersby, 2012). Masten and Reed (2005)  argue that resilience, in 
simple terms, is the ability to spring back from, and/or adapt to, different tribulations 
successfully. These two definitions are about the ability to adapt to challenges and recover 
from these. Adaptation in these approaches is a key component of resilience.  
 
In contrast, Dinh, et al. (2012) refer to resilience as a kind of forward and pro-active 
defence. They believe that it is very difficult to bounce back and recover from disturbances 
if it is too late. This definition is more about anticipation strategy, meaning the ability to 
prevent or predict events and deal properly with them. If the organisation cannot deal with 
events properly and in a timely manner, then it will be difficult to recover and go back to 
normal operations. Recovery and risk reduction are major challenges that need to be a high 
priority (Collier, Hoeffer, and Soderbom, 2006) for the leadership of an organisation. 
 
The first approach of Masten, et al. (1990) and Masten and Reed (2005) is an adaptable 
approach, meaning the ability to absorb shocks after they have occurred (reactive strategy) 
and recover from these in a rational and timely manner. In contrast, the second definition of 
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Dinh, et al. (2012) is more about an anticipation and a pro-active approach that predicts 
events and takes actions in advance to prevent the occurrence of such events.  
 
Saurin, et al. (2012) conclude that resilience can be defined as the ability of an organisation 
to respond properly and keep functioning regardless of poor behaviour, poor design and 
poor circumstances, during both expected and unexpected situations. This implies that the 
organisation should have a portfolio of alternatives and the resources to withstand 
difficulties. Then, flourishing despite adversity and promising outcomes might be achieved 
(Hildon, Montgomery, Blane, Wiggins, and Netuveli, 2010).  
 
Azadeh, Salhi, Arvan and Dolatkhan (2014) assert that in high risk situations the 
consequences of unexpected hazardous events are sometime unbearable. Therefore, it is 
crucial to have different alternatives particularly in turbulent environments to enable the 
organisation to continue working and surviving (Aven, 2011). Thus, resilience appears as 
one of the important approaches that seeks to improve the ability of the organisation, at all 
levels, to create robust yet flexible responses. Lyons, Mickelson, Sullivan and Coyne 
(1998) define resilience as the capability of individuals, to cope successfully in the face of 
significant adverse circumstances and risky conditions. This gives them breath to keep 
going and not to break down or surrender when difficulties and hazardous conditions hit 
their organisation.  
 
Maddi and Khoshaba (2005:6) give a good description of individuals’ response to events 
and shock, they note that “less resilient people show vulnerability under stress. In contrast, 
it is resilience that leads us to thrive at work and at home. Some people are resilient even in 
extreme stressful circumstances. They turn disruptive changes and conflict from potential 
disasters into growth opportunities. This is the heart of resilience. Resilient people resolve 
conflicts, turn disruptive changes into new directions and learn from the process”. This 
approach introduces a key difference between resilient and non-resilient people. Maddi and 
Khoshaba (2005) found that employees who responded resiliently to difficulties they 
experienced had three attributes: commitment, meaning that they were involved with the 
people and environment around them; control, meaning that they kept involved to influence 
the outcomes; challenge, meaning that they tried to find out how to grow through stress.   
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Werner and Smith (2001) identify four factors that distinguish resilient from non-resilient 
individuals. These factors are problem solving abilities, favourable perceptions, positive 
reinforcement and strong faith. Furthermore, they suggest that resilience is a capacity that 
can be developed deliberately. If individuals have such capacities, then they will be more 
able to challenge, control the situation and feel stronger in confronting adverse conditions. 
These factors are examined in this study to determine the contribution of each factor, 
particularly strong faith, in achieving resilience. 
 
Most of these definitions revolve around the following: absorbing shocks and recovering in 
a timely manner (Haims, 2009; Min, 2012), and at low cost which means measuring the 
economic value of resilience (Walker, Pearson, Harris, Mäler, Li, Biggs, and Baynes, 
2010) and the relative resistance of a system to specific disturbances (Derissen, Quaas, 
Baumgartner, 2011).  
3.7.3 Criticisms of Resilience: Some Ambiguity and Vagueness 
Despite the value and the importance of resilience for individuals, groups, communities and 
organisations, Strunz (2012:115) criticises the concept of resilience for appearing 
sometimes as vast and fuzzy and having some degree of vagueness. A similar criticism is 
that the resilience construct is somewhat ambiguous and difficult to pin down (Veronese, 
Castiglioni, Barola, and Said, 2012). The ambiguity, vagueness and fuzziness of the 
concept of resilience might refer to the definition of resilience due to the fact that resilience 
is linked to several levels and contexts such as individuals, groups, communities and 
different kinds of organisations which might makes it more difficult to pinpoint. Resilience 
is a process rather than being a snapshot and therefore the context and the environment 
play a role in the ambiguity, vagueness and fuzziness that appears sometimes when 
constructing resilience. However, this does not mean that people/ organisations do not 
exhibit resilient behaviours. Rather, many scholars stress the effectiveness and the good 
alternatives resilience provides leadership/individuals and organisations in dealing with 
problems and capitalising on difficulties and threats (Lengneck-Hall and Beck, 2005; 
Hollnagel, 2007, 2009; Ungar, et al., 2007; Costella, et al., 2009; Lengneck-Hall, et al., 
2011; Ungar, 2011; Dinh, et al., 2012; Ouyang, et al., 2012; Masten, et al., 2012), and 
encourage them to be resilient in facing the challenges and hardships . 
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The inability to deal with disturbances properly and resiliently might put the survival of the 
organisation at risk. Unexpected shocks and hazardous conditions may lead to a real 
catastrophe if the organisation cannot handle these in a resilient manner (Wood, et al., 
2012). Resilience gives organisations the ability to innovate robust, yet flexible, processes, 
to work under pressure, and absorb shocks and cope with hardships. 
  
Ouyang, et al. (2012) conclude that organisations experiencing shocks and extreme events 
pass through three stages: first stage, resistant capacity correlates with initial damage level; 
second stage, absorptive capacity correlates with maximum impact level; third stage, 
restorative capacity correlates with recovery time and cost. These stages will be applied to 
the analysis of IUG through the four stages of its history. 
 
3.8 Building Capacity for Organisational Resilience Strategy  
Lengnick-Hall, et al. (2011:248) propose a very useful approach for building capacity for 
organisational resilience saying that "A firm's capacity for developing organisational 
resilience is achieved through strategically managing human resources to create individual 
competencies among core employees, that when aggregated at the organisational level, 
make it possible for organisations to effectively absorb uncertainty, develop situation-
specific responses to threats, and ultimately engage in transformational activities so that 
they can capitalize on disruptive surprises that potentially threaten their survival". The 
inability to capitalise on events and shocks makes it uncontrollable and might often lead to 
loss, powerlessness and threaten the survival of any organisation.  
  
Implementing Strategic Human Resources Management (SHRM) in an organisation could 
help in creating a social atmosphere in which employees have a good feeling about the 
organisation (Bowen and Ostroff, 2004), and thus enhance their ability to contribute to 
achieve the goals and objectives of the organisation. It may also provide a sense of 
participation, open communication, sharing knowledge and accountability, and trusting 
relationships in the organisation (Collins and Smith, 2006). This social atmosphere within 
the organisation and the effective management reflects more commitment and enhances the 
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ability to survive and thrive. Building capacity for resilience increases the capacity of 
individuals, communities or institutions to survive, adapt and thrive in the face of acute 
crises and chronic stresses (Martin-Breen and Anderies, 2011). 
 
This repertoire of resilience markers enables the leadership to deal properly with both 
expected and unexpected events. It gives them more alternatives in the face of threats and 
even allows them to exploit them for creating new opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8.1 Qualities, Clusters and Dimensions of Capacities for Resilience 
Hollnagel suggests that resilient organisations should exhibit four qualities; first, the ability 
to respond to regular and irregular threats in a robust, yet flexible manner; second, the 
ability to monitor what is going on, including its own performance; third, the ability to 
anticipate risks, events and opportunities; fourth the ability to learn from experience 
(Hollnagel, 2007; Hollnagel, et al., 2011; Steen and Aven, 2011).  
   
Table 7: Factors, Dimensions, Principles and Clusters of Resilience 
Hollnagel 
(2007) 
Costella, et 
al. (2009) 
Dinh, et al. (2012)         Ungar, et al. (2007) 
 Factors  Dimensions    Principles            Seven Cluster 
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Hollnagel 
(2007) 
Costella, et 
al. (2009) 
Dinh, et al. (2012)         Ungar, et al. (2007) 
 Factors  Dimensions    Principles            Seven Cluster 
Flexibility Flexibility Flexibility  
Monitoring Awareness Controllability  
Anticipation Leadership 
commitment 
Early detection  
Learning Learning Minimization of failure  
  Limitation of effects   
  Administrative controls Experience of social justice 
  Five contributions: 
Design 
Experience of a sense of cohesion with 
others 
  Potential detection Adherence of organisational culture and 
relations 
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Hollnagel 
(2007) 
Costella, et 
al. (2009) 
Dinh, et al. (2012)         Ungar, et al. (2007) 
 Factors  Dimensions    Principles            Seven Cluster 
  Emergency response plan Access to support relations 
  Human management Access to material resources 
  Safety management Development of decided personal identify 
 
Table 7 combines contributions from Hollnagel (2007) Costella, et al. (2009) Dinh, et al., 
(2012) and Ungar, Brown, Liebenberg, Othman, Kwong, Armstrong, et al. (2007) in terms 
of the qualities and dimensions and contributions of resilience. The four core qualities 
proposed by Hollnagel (2007) are important for organisations, especially those that operate 
in unstable contexts. The importance of these qualities are: first, flexibility is a crucial 
component of resilience which involves balance and gives alternatives for responding to 
regular and irregular threats and disruptions. Second, awareness is important to monitor 
what is going on and why and to understand its effects, which in turn, enables leaders to 
control the situation and tackle the problems. Third, anticipation of risks and opportunities 
means that leaders should not panic or lose direction. Fourth, learning is an essential 
component of resilience to learn from self-experiments and experience as well as from 
others. 
 
The principles of resilience proposed by Costella, et al. (2009) match three of the four 
previous qualities of Hollnagel (2007) as shown in Table 7. These qualities are: leadership 
commitment;  the ability to learn from both incidents and normal work (learning); the 
ability to increase flexibility (flexibility) and finally; the ability to be aware of system 
status (awareness). These four qualities of Hollnagel and the four principles of Costella, et 
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al. (2009) explain the concept of resilience and point to some practical ways to assess and 
improve the level of resilience in an organisation. 
 
The six factors set out by Dinh, et al. (2012) are consistent, to a considerable extent, with 
the four points of Hollnagel (2007) and Costella, et al. (2009) and provide a good 
explanation of those points. The ability of an organisation to be flexible (flexibility), to 
learn from the experience and mistakes (learning), trying to be alert and to extrapolate the 
reality and the future (awareness), to redirect their goals and create a commitment of 
employees reflect a resilient organisation. Such organisations have a greater ability to 
anticipate events, deal properly with it, minimise the damage and recover quickly, 
compared to other organisations that do not have such qualities.  
 
In addition, the literature review presents seven common clusters of needs studied in eleven 
different countries which contribute to resilience as proposed by Ungar, et al. (2007), and 
adopted by Wood, et al. (2012) to develop resilience of Lesotho teachers. These seven 
clusters are presented in Table 8, along with explanatory remarks. 
 
These seven clusters of needs and their explanation, as presented in Table 8, shape some 
important markers for resilience and introduce a useful contribution to building 
organisational capacity for resilience. The value of these clusters stem from being focused 
on certain important elements and their role in achieving resilience. In conclusion, the 
dimensions, principles and clusters of resilience are important and should be considered by 
leaders when an organisation is facing disturbances and shocks.  
Table 8: Seven Clusters of Needs that Contribute to Resilience 
1. Access to material 
resources     
Availability of financial, medical, educational and basic human 
needs such as food, clothing and shelter, as well as employment 
opportunities.     
2. Accesses to supportive Presence of a supportive relationship network within the family, 
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relations community, school, work colleagues, mentors. 
3. Development of desirable 
personal identity 
Awareness of life purpose, personal strengths and weaknesses, 
aspirations and beliefs, values, spiritual and religious 
identification, good self-esteem. 
4. Experience of power and 
control 
 
Sense of self-reliance and internal locus of control, sense of 
agency to effect positive change in social/physical environment 
and to access health promoting resources. 
5. Adherence of cultural 
traditions 
Knowledge of, and ability and opportunity to adhere to cultural 
practices, values and beliefs. 
6. Experience of social 
justice 
Formation of a meaningful role in a community, which brings 
with it acceptance and social justice. 
7. Experience of a sense of 
cohesion with others 
Ability to balance interest with responsibility to community and 
to greater good; feeling of being part of something larger than 
oneself; engaging appropriately with others, according to 
cultural and community expectations without losing own sense 
of identity. 
Source: Wood, et al. (2012:431). Adapted from Ungar, Brown, Liebenberg, Othman, 
Kwong, Armstrong, et al. (2007). 
 
Pianta and Walsh (1998) remind us that it is critical that the efforts to understand resilience 
do not fall into the trap of single factor explanations for success under conditions of risk  
Rather, it is a process that needs all the effort and functions to work together toward the 
same objectives and goals. 
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Lengnick-Hall, et al. (2011) believe that organisational resilience can be created by 
developing a configuration of HR practices that are internally consistent and directed at 
nurturing cognitive, behavioural, and contextual dimensions of resilience. Cognitive factors 
contribute to the creation of organisational resilience. An organisation can foster a positive, 
constructive conceptual orientation through a strong sense of purpose, core values, a 
genuine vision, and a deliberate use of language (Freeman, Maltz, and Hirschhorn, 2004), 
sense making and shared mind-set (Weick, 1998). These factors help in solving problems, 
taking action and enable the organisation to understand the challenges and respond in a 
flexible manner to move forward. 
  
In terms of a behavioural dimension, Furniss, et al. (2011) provide a framework for 
reasoning about resilience. They claim that there are many important elements that affect 
resilient behaviours. For example, mode of operations, resources and enabling conditions, 
vulnerabilities and opportunities. They add that responding to vulnerabilities and 
opportunities is a central part of resilience particularly when these reactions are outside 
expectations. Behavioural factors support resilience by taking actions and responses in 
accordance with threats and opportunities the environment presents.  
 
Contextual factors rely on relationships within and outside an organisation to facilitate 
effective responses to environmental complexities (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005). This in 
turn leads to the ability of an organisation to act quickly under emerging conditions that are 
uncertain and surprising. Consequently, building capacity for organisational resilience 
requires time, continuous dialogue, deep communication and trust. This study examines the 
cognitive, behavioural and contextual factors of resilience deployed at IUG. 
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Chapter Four 
 4. Methodology 
The questions of this research revolve around the role of the leadership in fostering 
resilience in HEIs in situations of conflict, post-conflict and ongoing turbulence. These 
questions are also about the responses of the leadership to the challenges IUG experienced, 
and the interface between leadership and culture in building resilience. To address these 
questions the researcher chose a qualitative case study approach to IUG using document 
analysis, individual interviews, focus groups and participant observation. The chosen 
methodology has been shaped by the research questions. By choosing this methodology, 
the researcher seeks to unpack the facts from those who lived it or documented it in  real 
time.  
 
The researcher  embarked on the study as interested witness and researcher who sought to 
provide an interpretive account of the responses and experiences of the leadership. 
Investigating the case of IUG may help other universities and institutions to benefit from 
the positive lessons and the achievements IUG was able to accomplish, as well as to avoid 
its mistakes and deficiencies. 
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4.1 Research Paradigm/ Qualitative Approach 
The main goal of qualitative research is to explain individual actions and behaviours. Many 
qualitative studies aim to understand social situations from the point of view of those 
involved in the phenomena under discussion (Green and Thorogood, 2004; Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005; Britten, 2011). A qualitative approach seeks to use data in the form of 
words and behaviours to understand the meaning and interpretations of human action. 
Applying a qualitative approach is useful for understanding social life and situations from 
the point of view of the people involved in the case under investigation. 
The focus in qualitative methods is on the meanings that participants attach to their social 
world (Patton, 2001). Therefore, qualitative researchers must rely on their ability to present 
a clear description, offer a coherent analysis, and make a strong argument for their 
interpretation to establish the value of their conclusions (Green and Thorogood, 2004). The 
qualitative approach enables the researcher to examine the responses and actions of the 
leadership from the point of view of those who are involved in the process at IUG. 
Creswell (2003) argues that in a qualitative approach, researchers need to give thick 
description which implies giving information, explaining meaning, giving 
examples,analysis and evaluation. Neuman (2011) states that the central aim of qualitative 
research is to understand the social life of people and to explore how people construct 
meaning in natural settings. 
Amaratunga, Baldry, Sarshar, and Newton (2002) argue that there are some weaknesses 
surrounding the use of qualitative methods. First, it is difficult to manage the development 
and the final aims of research. Second, it is not easy to analyse data; and sometimes the 
data gathering needs more resources than using a quantitative approach. In short, 
qualitative researchers are subject to the criticism that they sometimes leave their readers 
with little choice but to trust researchers in that their interpretations of the data are accurate 
and legitimate. Qualitative research has several strengths. Data assembly is more common 
and natural. It contributes to the generation of theories. Its focus is on change processes and 
it is useful tool to help understand people’s behaviours (Amaratunga, et al., 2002). A 
qualitative approach offers more understanding of the meanings that participants had 
constructed about their world and experiences (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Forbus, 2008). 
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4.2 A Case Study Approach  
A qualitative case study is empirical research that primarily uses contextually rich data 
from bounded real-world settings to investigate a focused phenomenon (Barratt, Choi, and 
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Li, 2010). Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2003) agree that a case study approach is a plan 
or approach for achieving research that contains an investigation of specific modern 
phenomena by taking multiple sources of evidence (Jack and Baxter, 2008) in real life 
environments. These approaches seek to examine a specific phenomenon by using multiple 
sources of data.  
Qualitative case studies exhibit three special features. First, they are particularistic, 
meaning that they have a specific focus on a particular situation, event, or phenomenon. 
Second, they are descriptive, meaning that they provide a rich description of the 
phenomenon under-study. Third, they are heuristic, meaning that they serve to illuminate 
the reader’s understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (Merriam, 2001). 
    
A case study is a research strategy used in order to describe the case under investigation. 
Through a case study approach, questions such as who, why, where, how and what can be 
answered (Saunders, et al., 2003; Yin, 2003). These questions help researchers to clarify 
the actions of the real word and give a thick description of the phenomenon. A case study 
approach is about describing, documenting or explaining a particular case as an example of 
a person, practice or organisation. Overall, the case study approach can assist the researcher 
to understand the environment of the organisation (Saunders, et al., 2003; Yin, 2003), and 
how leadership responds or adapts to the challenges and the opportunities it present. 
 
There are two key approaches that guide case study methodology; one proposed by Robert 
Stake (1995) and the second by Robert Yin (2003). Both scholars seek to ensure that the 
topic of interest is well explored, and that the essence of the phenomenon is revealed, but 
the methods that they each employ are different and worthy of discussion.  
 
According to Yin (2003), a case study design should be considered when: first, the focus of 
the study is to answer how and why questions; second, the researcher cannot manipulate 
the behaviour of those involved in the study; third, the researcher wants to cover contextual 
conditions because they  seem  relevant to the phenomenon under study; or fourth, the 
boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context.  
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Stake (1995) uses three terms to describe case studies; intrinsic, instrumental, and 
collective. If the researcher is  interested in a unique situation, according to Stake they 
should conduct an intrinsic case study. This simply means that the researcher has an 
intrinsic interest in the subject and that they are aware that the results have limited 
transferability. If the intent is to gain insight and understanding of a particular situation or 
phenomenon, then Stake suggests that the researcher use an instrumental case study to gain 
understanding. Stake also uses the term collective case study when more than one case is 
being examined. Therefore, this researcher believes that the instrumental approach of Stake 
(1995) is more appropriate to gain more understanding of the case of IUG. This is because 
the study seeks to explain  how IUG was able to operate in conflict, post-conflict and 
ongoing turbulence. 
 
 
4.2.1 The Choice of IUG as a Case Study 
The overall intent of the study guides the selection of the case that helps the researcher 
achieve his objectives. Yin (1994) argues that historical issues can be described by using 
the case study approach. Choosing IUG as a case study was not a random choice for this 
research, rather, it reflects the difficulties and challenges most of the Palestinian 
universities has been subjected to. IUG represents a pattern of a HEI that was established 
and is still operating under the difficult circumstances of the Israeli occupation. Like all 
Palestinian universities, IUG has been subject to the general problems of Gaza and the 
West Bank. In addition, it has been a particular focus of animosity, through non-
recognition of IUG degrees and graduates for 15 years, and bombing from the Israeli 
occupation during the wars of 2009, 2012 and 2014. 
 
Thus, the selection of IUG, the first and the biggest university in Gaza, as a case study was 
based on the premise that it offers a useful manifestation of the phenomenon. In spite of the 
severe challenges and difficulties, IUG has survived in the last 34 years and was able to 
grow in many different aspects. Therefore, all stages of success and failure of IUG may 
provide similar organisations with replicable lessons that can guide the future leadership of 
IUG as well as the leadership of other HEIs, particularly those working in conditions of 
prolonged conflict and war. 
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In summary, the study seeks to derive insights (both theoretical and operational) pertaining 
to institutional survival and thriving in turbulent and obstructive environments using IUG 
as a platform from which to derive these insights; thus making the instrumental nature of 
the study evident. 
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4.3 Data Collection  
Barratt, et al. (2010) say that, in qualitative research methods, there are several data 
sources: interviews (either structured, semi-structured or unstructured); observations; and 
archival sources of data such as documents and reports. This study used different sources 
of data in the form of documents, individual interviews and focus group interviews in 
addition to the participant observation of the researcher. 
 
The use of multiple sources is encouraged to promote an in-depth understanding of the 
phenomenon under study. This diversity of data gives more weight, strength and validity to 
the analysis process and the outcomes of this research. 
 
 
4.3.1 Ethical Considerations of the Research 
Undertaking a study in an area where hostilities are ongoing, poses particular ethical 
constraints. As the findings from this study will be in the public arena, care had to be taken 
to ensure no adverse consequences for respondents, from the occupying authorities or 
anyone else. Although confidentiality of information was granted to all interviewees, no 
classified or secret information, whether it was made available to the researcher during 
interviews or in documents, was used. The interview questions focused, exclusively, on 
managerial concepts. In addition, anonymity was offered to interviewees but all 
interviewees expressed their willingness to have their names used in this study. 
 
The researcher obtained informed consent from the interviewees. Before starting the 
interviews, the nature and the goals of this research were clarified to all participants and 
they were given the right to withdraw from interviewing any time. Also, recording the 
interviews was only with the permission and the acceptance of interviewees.  
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4.3.2 A Strategy of Data Collection 
The focus of this study was on the past and current realities of IUG as experienced and 
interpreted by the leadership and the staff of the university. The researcher adopted a 
strategy of diversifying the sources of data. The process started with collecting 70 different 
documents that covered the history of IUG and included the diversity of challenges and 
responses IUG experienced. Then, the process of collecting data from interviewees started 
with conducting 5 individual interviews with key employees with more than 25 years of 
experience at IUG. The aim of conducting these interviews first was to draw a road map of 
the data that needed to be collected and the areas to be focussed on during the questions 
and the discussion.  
 
Once the data needed was clearly understood, the researcher began classify IUG 
documents, such as the correspondence between the occupation authorities and IUG 
leadership, reports of the meetings of the Board of Trustees and the University Council, 
and partnership agreements between IUG and different institutions and universities. The 
researcher realised that the process of collecting data would be more efficient if he engaged 
directly in collecting the data. This gave the researcher more insight into the value of the 
information that flowed through the interviews and gave guidance in the analysis process. 
 
Further data were obtained through participant observation, as the researcher continued in 
his position as the manager of the IUG conference centre for the duration of the research. 
Because the researcher has been employed at IUG from 1983 as an administrator in 
different departments, a process of self-reflexivity added to the richness of the data. Some 
tables and figures were used to clarify the development of IUG in terms of enrolment of 
students, graduates, and qualifications of staff members over the past 34 years of IUG’s 
history. 
 
The strategy of using different sources of data gave more trustworthiness, validity and 
reliability to the collected information. It also helped in clarifying points of agreement as 
well as points of disagreement between the different sources of data. Document analysis 
provided the basis of the information. It worked as a reference to support or challenge the 
data collected from other sources. The data collected through individual interviews needed 
an in-depth discussion and clarification. This was achieved through the two focus groups. 
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Self-reflexivity and participant observation presented the view and the experience of the 
researcher who lived through these events, and therefore, helped the researcher to ensure 
more validity and reliability of the information that flowed through the individual and 
group interviews. The combination of these different sources consolidated the 
trustworthiness of the findings of the research.  
 
 
4.3.2.1 Documentation 
 
Wesley (2010:3) argues that document analysis is a valid research strategy with 
considerable merit as a methodology and that the evidence embedded in the text is 
objectively identifiable .  
 
Holliday (2007: 7) suggests that “most qualitative research involves making sense of the 
often “messy reality” of social life. Doing so requires the qualitative document analyst to 
make dozens of difficult and subjective decisions throughout the research process – choices 
about which similarities and differences constitute real “patterns” in the text; to what 
degree certain parallels constitute genuine “themes”; which titles should be used to identify 
these themes; which passages constitute solid “evidence”; how much discrepant evidence 
must exist to refute a particular set of findings; and many others. There are no inherently 
right or wrong answers to such questions. There are only stronger or weaker justifications 
of these choices. As a result, a qualitative document analyst must be explicit in identifying 
and defending the various decisions they made throughout the research process”. 
 
Therefore, the researcher, through document analysis, tried to answer these questions and 
examine to what extent the results of document analysis fit or differed from those that 
emerged through the interviews. When researchers analyse documents, they need to keep in 
mind the key questions of who, what, where, when and how to help the researcher to prove 
the focus of the document and analyse the body of the document and answer the research 
questions. 
 
According to Bilville and Willson (2012), researchers should take into account and 
consider some important steps when analysing documents. These are: type of document; 
why the document was created; is the information in the document primary or secondary 
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information; is the information valuable and has no bias of information; the era of the 
document; compare documents from the same type and same era; examine the originality 
of the document; and familiarity with the handwriting of the time and place from which the 
document originates. The researcher took into consideration these steps. The researcher 
used 70 original documents that covered 6 different types of documents. These documents 
covered different stages of IUG history and contained valuable information. This in turn 
helps the researcher to best analyse the documents in a valid and reliable manner. 
 
Table 9: Types of IUG Documents 
Document Numbers Types of Documents No. 
 
5, 7, 8, 13, 22, 25, 33, 34, 41, 42, 45, 
47 
 
Military Orders and Decisions Sent to 
IUG 
 
1. 
 
4, 6, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 
28, 29,30, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 43, 44, 
46  
 
Responses of the Leadership Sent to the 
Occupation Authorities 
2. 
 
2, 3, 9, 10, 26, 49, 51, 52, 53 
 
Correspondence with Universities and 
Academic Unions 
 
3. 
50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 
63, 66, 67, 68, 69 
Partnership and Twin-ship Agreements 4. 
1, 16, 18, 48 
 
Minutes of Meetings of the Board of 
Trustees and the University Council 
5. 
11, 12, 17, 39, 40, 64, 65, 70 Legislations, Proclamations and leaflets 6. 
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Document analysis comprised a very important primary data tool of this research. It 
provided valuable and realistic information in real time. Most of the documents (36 
documents) are correspondences with the occupation which are direct and formal letters. In 
addition, 24 documents are correspondences with universities and partnership agreements 
as shown in Table 9.  
 
Table 9 clarified that there was diversity of documents to be analysed in this study in order 
to cover the main subjects under investigation. The researcher believed that the chosen 
sample of documents served the research purposes and objectives. While some important 
documents were included in chapter two, a table of all documents is included in Appendix 
F. 
  
 
4.3.2.2 Individual Interviews 
The individual interviews conducted for this study were designed to explore the values, 
beliefs and reactions of IUG leadership in dealing with challenges. Interviews sought to 
unpack the factors and strategies that enabled IUG to survive and achieve its objectives. 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe  (2002: 86) believe that the interview is “an opportunity 
for the researcher to probe deeply to uncover new clues, open up new dimensions of a 
problem and to secure vivid, accurate inclusive accounts that are based on personal 
experience”. Polkinghorne (2005) argues that interview aims to generate deeply contextual, 
nuanced and authentic accounts of participant’s outer and inner worlds. 
 
Semi-structured interviews assist researchers to find out any new data that was not 
mentioned in the questions (Saunders, et al. (2003). Semi-structured interviews also allow 
individual respondents some room and freedom to add new information Therefore, semi-
structured questions through the interviews of IUG staff and others allowed the researcher 
to follow up in depth some aspects that emerged from the answers of interviewees.  
 
 A total of 39 interviews were conducted, 27 initial interviews and a further 12 once 
preliminary results had been obtained. To maximise diversity and to enrich the data 
collected, the researcher selected the interviewees, for both individuals and focus groups, 
very carefully. These interviews were conducted with people with different points of view 
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from inside and outside the university. Individual interviews were conducted with 22 
members of IUG leadership and staff members as follows: The Chairman of the Board of 
Trustees and the secretary general of the board; The current chancellor of the university 
and two previous chancellors of IUG; Five members of the University Council; Ten 
employees from different academic and administration levels, Two administrators who 
retired from IUG a few years ago. 
 
Additional semi-structured interviews were conducted with four academics who had left 
IUG to join Al-Azhar University in 1992. These were in addition to interviewing the 
General Manager of HE in the Gaza Strip. These five interviews from outside the 
university gave more reliability and trustworthiness to the data collection as they provided 
different sources and different points of view. All the individual interviews with IUG staff 
were conducted at their offices during work hours. The researcher chose the sample very 
carefully to cover all the stages IUG has been through.The researcher was keen to create 
diversity when choosing the sample for the interviews both for the individuals and the 
focus groups. The chosen sample represents staff with different points of view from 
different segments and multiple levels from the university (leaders, academics and 
administrators, both male and female) and from outside the university, some of whom 
previously worked at the university and some who retired several years ago. Appendix C 
provided name of interviewees, date of employment and their position. 
 
Some individuals in this sample have worked at IUG since its establishment and have lived 
and witnessed its events. Others started working at the university in the 1990s, a period in 
which the university had launched the consolidation stage. What distinguishes the selected 
samples is the experience they have which ranges from 17-30 years. 
 
The researcher realised the importance of interviewing some members who have 
managerial background and experience which helps them in judging and evaluating the 
events and responses from a managerial point of view. Thus, choosing some interviewees 
from the Department of Business Administration in the Faculty of Commerce served the 
idea and the goals of this research study.  
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Through the interviews the researcher used a mixed strategy of recording the interviews 
and writing important notes that emerged through the discussion. This strategy helped the 
researcher to concentrate more on the main questions and follow up the points that flowed 
through the interviews. Each interview lasted approximately 60-90 minutes.  
 
For more trustworthiness and reliability, at the end of the analysis and evaluation process, 
and after drawing the preliminary results, the researcher decided to conduct a further 12 
individual interviews with some of the university staff who were not at the leadership level, 
but from the academic and administrative area. These interviews were conducted randomly 
and without pre-selection of candidates and held quickly. The main focus was on a single 
question about the most important factors that have helped the university to achieve 
survival and growth under the conditions of the disorder and hardships. The main objective 
of these random interviews was to check the main results of the study and to achieve more 
confidence, transparency and credibility of this research and thus test the strength of the 
expected result. 
 
4.3.2.3 Focus Group Interviews 
In addition to conducting individual interviews, the researcher conducted two focus group 
interviews. Focus group interviews allow deep discussion using individual interaction, and 
capitalise on communication between research participants, in order to generate data 
(Kitzinger, 1995).  
 
According to de Boer (2010) focus groups consist of groups of people brought together to 
discuss opinions, issues, and concerns about something, are among the most well-known 
qualitative research methods and have been in use for many years. Focus group interviews 
provide participants with the best opportunity to express their views and experiences.  
 
The researcher conducted two focus groups, one conducted after five interviews with key 
employees, and the other after conducting all the individual interviews. They provided an 
opportunity for more interaction and brainstorming to clarify information that might agree 
or disagree with the data from individual interviews and compare it with the data from 
documents. The focus groups also gave an opportunity for new data to emerge.  
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These two focus group interviews were conducted with leadership and staff members of 
IUG. Fifteen persons participated in these two groups: seven persons participated in the 
first focus group; and eight participated in the second one. Six of them participated also in 
the individual interviews. This helped the researcher to ask questions based on the results 
of the individual interviews. For this purpose, the researcher asked questions different from 
those he asked in the individual interviews. This helped the researcher to clarify, confirm 
and follow up some aspects that were not clear from the individual interviews. The focus 
group discussions lasted approximately 140 minutes each. 
 
The participants of the groups were chosen very carefully with different views, and to 
cover all different stages of IUG, the past and the current realities of the university. Some 
of the participants have a good background in the management field as they are staff 
members at the Faculty of Commerce at IUG. This helped the researcher to unpack their 
experience and information from a management point of view. 
 
 
4.3.2.3.1 Language of Interviews 
Although the English language is the language of this research, the environment in which 
this research was carried out is an Arabic region and the mother language of all the 
interviewees is the Arabic language.  
Therefore, the language used in the individual and focus group interviews was the Arabic 
language for many reasons. First, many of the interviewees are not good speakers of 
English which makes it difficult for them to answer the interview questions. Second, the 
flow of information would be much easier for the interviewees when individuals answer 
the questions in their own language. Third, Arabic language facilitated the flow of 
discussion through the interviews. Fourth, and finally, answering the questions in  Arabic 
reflects their real expressions more easily when answering the interview questions in their 
mother language which in turn give more credibility to the information. After reducing the 
data to themes the researcher started the translation process into  English.  
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4.3.2.3.2 Interview Questions 
The challenges and difficulties IUG experienced through its different stages have shaped 
the responses of the leadership in dealing with these events. Therefore, interview questions 
mainly focused on these challenges and events. The interview questions revolved around 
the responses of IUG leadership and examined whether these responses contributed to the 
survival and growth of IUG. 
 
Additional follow up questions were asked to answer the research questions and to help the 
researcher to unpack the factors, capacities and strategies used by the leadership in dealing 
with different events in order to achieve the survival and growth of IUG. 
 
4.3.2.4 Participant Observation 
Marshal and Rossman (1989:79) define participant observation as "the systematic 
description of events, behaviours, and artefacts in the social setting chosen for study". 
Participant observation is about watching behaviours and events in their natural settings. 
The process of observation can be direct by watching events or indirect by watching 
results.  
 
Kawulich (2005) describes participant observation as the process enabling researchers to 
understand the real activities and behaviours of people under study as well as 
understanding the events in their natural settings (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002). They add 
that it is a research methodology that helps in understanding the phenomena under study in 
an objective way and can increase validity in spite of its limitations. In this regard, 
DeMunck and Sobo (1998) clarify that one of the disadvantages of participant observation 
is that sometimes the issue of bias might increase the subjectivity of the researcher. When 
observation is added to additional sources of data such as document analysis and 
interviews, it can strengthen validity through thick description. Participant observation was 
conducted deliberately from the beginning of the research project from 2011 to the end.  
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4.3.3 Research Database 
As the case study of IUG includes different sources of data, it was important to create a 
data base in order to keep the data and to help readers follow the source of any information. 
Yin (1994) supports creating a case study data base in an endeavour to increase the 
reliability and credibility of the case under discussion. A data base provides a series of 
evidence from initial research questions to the conclusions of the study. This implies 
empirical materials to be organised and categorised to be available when required. 
 
For the purpose of the data base of the IUG case study, computerised audio files of the 
individual interviews and the focus group discussions were created. In addition, an A4 
book for all the documents used in this research was also provided. The availability of 
these sources of data is of specific importance to the researcher and readers. It enables the 
researcher to clarify some issues and unpack further information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 141  
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Data Analysis  
Thematic Content Analysis (TCA) is a methodology in the social sciences for studying the 
content of communications of people. Schamber (2000) argues that content analysis helps 
the researcher to interpret interview responses (or other qualitative data) in a way that does 
not compromise the original expression of the subject. Neuendorf (2002) suggests 
examining  themes, categorising and coding them and then seeing what similarities and 
differences emerge from the data.  
 
When using TCA, the aim is to build a model to describe the phenomenon in a conceptual 
form or to test a theory on the ground. Inductive content analysis is used according to 
Schamber (2000), in cases where there are no previous studies dealing with the 
phenomenon or when it is fragmented. 
 
In inductive content analysis, concepts and coding categories are derived directly and 
inductively from the raw data (Schamber, 2000; Moretti, van Vliet, Bensing, Deledda, 
Mazzi, Rimondini, Zemmermann, and Fletcher, 2011). When applying an inductive 
approach, researchers avoid using preconceived categories, allowing the categories and 
names for categories to ‘flow from the data’ instead. They immerse themselves in the data 
to allow new insights to emerge (Moretti, et al., 2011). 
 
 
4.4.1 Applying Inductive Content Analysis 
The researcher applied  inductive content analysis in analysing the 70 documents, the in-
depth 27 individual interviews, and the two focus group discussions. The inductive content 
approach was used because  no previous studies dealt with the case of IUG or similar cases 
in similar conditions. Therefore, applying the inductive approach was to help the researcher 
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in answering the research questions by allowing the flow of data and new insight and 
categories to emerge. 
 
The first step was analysing the 70 documents. After categorising and organising 
documents based on Table 6 (p. 80), the researcher started analysing them the same way 
using inductive content analysis. The researcher wrote down each point or theme emerging 
from the data and categorised the differences and similarities of documents from same 
subject. Analysing the documents was crucial for checking the data flowing from 
interviews. The researcher evaluated to what extent these documents supported or 
otherwise conflicted with the results from the individual and focus group interviews. 
Finally, the researcher collected all the results and read them carefully for another 
evaluation, then unpacked the conclusion and recommendations from these results. 
 
The second step was analysing the 27 interviews. The researcher summarised the data 
while maintaining the presence of the evidence. Summarising the data means reducing each 
interview to a few paragraphs and then reducing each to a point and theme form. 
Summarising the data was done by way of vertical analysis of every interview separately. 
Then, the researcher translated it to the English language and organised it to be ready for 
analysis. This led to a first level of coding involving assigning descriptive labels (open 
codes) to text passage.  
 
Using an inductive content approach means that the researcher looks at events and themes 
that flow through the interviews one by one (vertical analysis). Then, after categorising and 
coding these themes from all the interviews, the researcher started looking at the 
similarities and differences (comparison) of these themes from all interviews (horizontal 
analysis). This was the second level of coding involved clustering similar codes and 
assigning inferential labels or pattern codes (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Finally, the 
researcher evaluated the themes and unpacked the results and developed conclusions.  
   
The third step was analysing the two focus group interviews in the same way as the 
individual interviews were analysed. Later the researcher compared the two groups and 
conducted horizontal analysis between them and unpacked the similarities and differences 
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between them. The researcher evaluated the results of the individual and group interviews 
and clarified points of agreements and disagreement among them.  
 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Triangulation of Data 
One of the main criticisms of qualitative research is the validity and reliability of the results 
(McKinnon, 1988). The integration and analysis of the data collected is important for the 
validity of the research (Wesley, 2010). This process often involves collecting different 
types of data to facilitate and strengthen this integration. 
There are some factors that affect the validity and reliability of the case study approach. 
McKinnon (1988) highlights five important factors that can undermine the validity and 
reliability of a case study. First, observer-caused effects can cause respondents to change 
their behaviour in interviews. Second, interviewer bias can affect the registering, 
interpreting and coding of responses and events during the interview. Third, since data 
gathering through the interview method is restricted to the time frame of the interview, 
there are limits to the quality and quantity of data that can be obtained. Fourth, in 
recognising the complexities and limitations of human thought processes, it is 
acknowledged that statements made by respondents cannot always be taken at face value. 
Respondents can consciously seek to mislead or deceive the researcher, and even if 
respondents provide honest and accurate responses, their statements can still be affected by 
natural human tendencies and weaknesses. Fifth, the interview method relies heavily on the 
integrity and intellectual honesty of the researcher, as the experience cannot be replicated 
and tested. 
 
The notion of interviewer bias does not simply refer to the way which questions might be 
asked and how answers are responded to. Rather, interviewer bias refers to the whole 
process, including the drawing of conclusions (David and Sutton, 2004). The interviewer 
should be wary of selectivity which leads to overconfidence in some data, especially when 
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trying to confirm a key finding, and should take into account the fact that information from 
some sources may be unreliable (Hair, Wolfinbarger, Ortinau and Bush, 2008).  
 
One of the most commonly used techniques for improving the credibility (validity and 
reliability) of qualitative research is through triangulation: “a validity procedure where 
researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to 
form themes or categories in a study” (Creswell and Miller, 2000: 126). Although 
triangulation may also include multiple methods of data analysis beside multiple sources of 
data collection, the focus here is on triangulation of data collection. 
 
The triangulation of data means using more than one source of data (Brannen, 1992). The 
researcher collected the data from different sources. This triangulation provides increased 
reliability of the data and stronger substantiation of construct and proposition (Barratt, et 
al., 2010; Choi and Hong, 2002). Therefore, using triangulation or multiple sources of data 
can facilitate and help researchers to clarify their theoretical propositions and the basis of 
their results. This can offer a better understanding of the links between theory and 
empirical findings and develop new theory (Ostlund, Kidd, Wengstro, and Row-Dewar, 
2011). Also, triangulation gives more reliability and validity of the data collected, and 
limits the potential bias of the researcher and some interviewees. In addition, it helps to 
achieve the research objectives in the various stages of the study, and to answer the 
research questions, evaluate them and draw conclusions from them.  
 
Triangulation is important in confirming and clarifying the emerging findings. This enabled 
the researcher to build credibility and trustworthiness of the information collected and 
analysed. Also, triangulation helped to overcome the weakness or intrinsic biases and 
problems that come from one source of data.  
  
In summary, triangulation provided a double check for the results and consequently 
increased the validity and reliability of the results. This was another way to increase the 
credibility, validity and reliability of the research by getting feedback and input from others 
with both analysis and interpretation. The interest of the researcher in producing a valuable 
and trustworthy academic project was crucial for the reputation of the researcher and for 
the benefit of IUG’s future as well as for similar organisations. 
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4.6 The Researcher 
The long experience of the researcher as an administrator at IUG since late 1983 allowed 
him to live through some of the difficulties and challenges the university experienced and 
the responses of the leadership in coping with them. The researcher participated in and was 
an eye witness to the turbulent life of the university. The researcher was involved in many 
different events through the four stages of IUG history. For example, the researcher was 
involved when the leadership challenged the occupation orders and started constructing 
temporary buildings under risk and dangerous conditions. It was a real struggle for 
participants and was combined with stress and fear. Also, the researcher witnessed the 
violent clashes that took place from time to time between different groups of students. This 
left the researcher with a lot of sorrow and sadness over how brothers and colleagues who 
study at the same classes could fight each other in such a hurtful and violent manner. 
Teaching in public places and providing off-campus classes in the second uprising was 
seen by the researcher as a national duty to grant the basic right of education for all 
generations, and therefore the researcher participated in finding private and public places 
for teaching such as homes and sports clubs. While conducting this research, the war of 
2014 took place two days after the researcher returned back home from working on his 
PhD at Wits University in Johannesburg,. Two weeks after the ceasefire, IUG persevered in 
holding graduation ceremonies for more than two thousand graduates to give them some 
hope about the future. The researcher was the organiser of this joyful occasion, yet full of 
tears as 48 graduates have been killed in this war. IUG celebrated those graduates as well.  
The researcher lived the changes IUG experienced from the tiny roots of religion subjects 
to a modern university that combined science with Islamic culture. The researcher believes 
that the modernity of the university and the rationality of the leadership should be 
maintained in order to face the future challenges.   
 146  
Participant observation can increase validity (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002) and access. The 
researcher was granted full access to IUG documents and staff, and conducted this research 
within a context of trust. However, because of the researcher’s deep connection to IUG, 
and his position as an employee there, the chances of bias were particularly high. The 
researcher realized that this is an academic project that seeks to document the history of the 
university in an honest and transparent way which requires objectivity. In addition, for the 
future of IUG and new generations, it is important to present the facts as they happened in 
the real world in order to unpack the replicable lessons of both success and failure. In this 
regard, the long experience of the researcher at IUG matured the approach of the researcher 
and enabled him to see points of strength as well as points of weakness of the leadership. It 
is also important for the researcher to have a good academic reputation and gain the trust 
and confidence of academic colleagues at IUG and other universities and readers in 
Palestine and elsewhere.  
Therefore, to help the researcher in his struggle to be impartial and to avoid personal bias 
as well as avoiding interviewee bias, the steps taken to address this problem and minimise 
potential bias were triangulation, reflexivity, and conducting an additional 12 interviews 
after the first results had been analysed. The researcher began the research with document 
analysis. Documents offer a specific moment-in-time lens for the facts as they occurred in 
the real world. The discussion with the focus groups provided deeper understanding of the 
initial findings from documents and individual interviews. Interviewing employees with 
long experience and with different political affiliation, whether in the individual or the 
focus group interviews, provided different perspectives on the issues under discussion. In 
addition, the self-reflexivity and participant observation helped in clarifying different 
issues raised through the interviews. The researcher has the obligation and commitment to 
be dispassionate, objective and academic. The researcher took some additional practical 
steps to avoid potential bias. The first step is trying to avoid generalisation when 
introducing information or making judgements. The second step is providing evidence to 
support the arguments and statements provided in the report. The third step is self- 
awareness meaning avoiding personal assumptions without providing strong evidence, as 
well as sharing personal experience and views with the reader. 
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In addition, the researcher used some proven academic strategies for promoting validity 
and reliability of the research. The first was rich and thick description that provided good 
description to conceptualise the study and convince the readers about the data and the 
results of the study (Taylor and Gibbs, 2010). The second was member checking where the 
researcher took the data and interpretations to the interviewees and checked if they were 
plausible (Polkinghorne, 2005). In addition, the 12 random interviews were conducted after 
analysing all the data and writing the first draft of this thesis in order to give more 
credibility and trustworthiness for the findings of this research. These interviews were 
conducted without any prior arrangements with interviewees, rather, the researcher visited 
them at their offices and asked them about the most important reason behind the survival 
and thriving of the university. The outcomes of these interviews stressed the importance of 
keeping IUG a resilient and a modern university 
The specific importance of this research is to provide IUG and similar organisations with 
beneficial lessons stemming from a reliable and transparent  diagnosis of the challenges 
and the responses of the leadership in dealing with situations of conflict and post-conflict 
and ongoing turbulence. If the study were thoroughly biased and only described the 
positive ways in which the leadership of IUG had responded to threats and challenges, this 
bias would harm not only the reputation of the researcher, but also the value of this 
research for the future of IUG in particular and for other Palestinian or foreign institutions 
that might learn from the lessons and experience of IUG in general.	   
The researcher hopes to play a positive role in building more awareness and understanding 
of the challenges IUG might be exposed to in the future and the best way to overcome 
these. This implies clarifying points of success as well as points of failure or deficiencies. 
Translating this report into the Arabic language may contribute to achieving these goals as 
the translated version will be available to the whole staff, students and the community.    
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Chapter Five 
 
 5.0 An Initial Analysis of the Emerging Themes 
The concept of organisational resilience provides the conceptual framework of this 
research. It offers the specific moment-in-time lens which the researcher used to 
comprehend the broader question of the role of leadership in HE in a situation of 
conflict, post conflict and ongoing turbulence.	   
 
This chapter considers the specific importance of leadership in promoting resilience 
and ensuring the survival of IUG through turbulent times. Then, the chapter explores 
and categorises the different factors used by the leadership in dealing with the 
challenges and shocks IUG has been through in the different stages of its history.  
  
 
5.1 The Main Challenges IUG Experienced and the Responses of the Leadership 
The occupation measures have affected every aspect of Palestinian life and caused 
serious damage to the education infrastructure (de Santisteban, 2002; Seitz,2004; 
Giacaman, et al., 2007; Chenoweth, et al., 2007; Smith, 2011).  
The challenges that IUG faced were at three levels: The first level existed at the level 
of individual staff members. The staff faced different challenges and restriction, not 
the least of which was working under stress, risk and war conditions. This includes 
the risk of being arrested, injured or killed. In addition, they had to cope with the 
denial of salaries for long months, and severe restrictions on freedom and mobility of 
movement and travelling. All these obstacles produced psychological and social 
stress. 
  
The second level existed at the leadership of the university. The leadership found 
itself working in a turbulent environment and very complicated internal and external 
conditions.. Some of these were traditional challenges that might face any emerging 
institution, while the turbulent Palestinian environment posed additional challenges. 
These challenges are diverse and sometimes unpredictable and cannot be prevented. 
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The third level existed in the system and includes structural and environmental 
aspects that influence and constrain the organisation. These include lack of resources, 
human and material, and lack of facilities and technology. This is in addition to 
external factors such as siege and closure and wars that require the system to adapt to 
all the challenges. 
Some of the challenges are similar to those challenges facing any emerging university 
in any context (Kwiek and Maassen, 2012; Sevier, 2014). However, the turbulent 
environments of IUG posed additional challenges and barriers that needed responses 
from the leadership. The challenges IUG faced through the four stages, and the 
leadership’s responses to them were diverse yet overlapping. Some problems occur 
across all stages but each stage also has some unique difficulties. Sometimes the same 
challenge elicited different responses in different stages. Some of these challenges 
were predictable, while many others were not.  
The diversity of sources of data collection (documents, individual interviews, focus 
groups and observations) gave different evidence and deep understanding of these 
challenges and responses. The documents from IUG revealed the challenges and 
restrictions the leadership experienced, and how the leadership dealt with them. The 
main topic of these documents and date of issue are included in Appendix F.  
The individual interviews clarified the severe difficulties of establishing a university 
under occupation. Prof. Mohamed Shoubair, who acted as the Chancellor of IUG 
from 1992 to 2008 said that:   
“Actually, the Israeli occupation has put many obstacles to prevent the 
establishment of IUG. At the beginning many youth had refrained from 
joining the university, for they said that there is no recognition. 
Therefore, they did not want to waste their time, money and efforts, 
and they went to work inside the occupied territories to earn their 
living as this certificate will not be a great deal in the future as it is not 
recognised. Yet, these obstacles had been resisted by the university.” 
(Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013). 
Due to the context in which IUG operated , the mission of IUG was not  limited to 
education and research, but included raising the awareness of the people about their 
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national rights and  opposing and resisting the occupation. Opposing the occupation 
was one of the main reasons behind the severe difficulties and the disruption of the 
educational process at IUG.  
 
 
5.1.1 Facing the Dilemma of the Israeli Non-Recognition 
Organisational leadership, staff members, students and many leaders from the 
community consider the Israeli non-recognition of IUG as a collective punishment for 
the population (Al-Ajez 1996). 
 
The leadership realised the consequences of this dilemma. At the local level, the 
leadership issued different communications, visited and exchanged messages with the 
occupation. The evidence from many documents revealed the concerns of the 
leadership from not recognising the university. In a series of letters addressed to the 
occupying authorities (documents 4, 12, 13, 25, 26, 32, 37 and 38), the leadership 
requested the occupation to recognize IUG and to allow hiring of its graduates. These 
documents cited the basic right to education for the Palestinian community which is 
guaranteed by international law (Sullivan, 1994) and the right to establish and manage 
their own universities (EPACBI, 2015). In addition, documents also listed the 
consequences of not recognizing IUG degrees and the negative impacts on students, 
staff and the community. This series of documents provided examples of intense 
engagement with the occupation in order to overcome this problem.  
 
The general view of the individual interviews and the focus groups stressed the risks 
of not recognising IUG. This jeopardised the survival of IUG and put the future of 
thousands of students, graduates and staff at risk. The Israeli occupation affected both 
the work life of the graduates and the intentions of pursuing any postgraduate studies 
after graduation. 
 
Commenting on the negative effects of this dilemma, Professor Al-Hooly, a 
respondent from the academic staff relates an experience from 1990:  
“I graduated as a valedictorian Master’s degree from the Jordanian 
University. Although I got the highest marks in the job interview, I was 
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not allowed to be hired as a teacher at schools in Gaza, since my 
bachelor degree was from IUG” (Focus group1, Jan. 2014). 
The issue of not recognizing IUG was summed up by a staff member who graduated 
from IUG in 1987 and works now as a PhD lecturer at the Faculty of Commerce, he 
reported that: 
“There were two important issues hindered by the occupation like 
refusing to approve the IUG degrees, and to give the graduates their 
rights in public work. This had instigated a lot of institutions like 
UNRWA to not recognize IUG degrees” (Samour, individual interview, 
Jan. 2014). 
 
In addition, the participant observation of the researcher showed that this issue 
affected the number of enrolled students as they were worried about their careers, 
particularly in the early years of IUG inception.  
 
The leadership tried to solve this problem in different ways. The previous Chancellor 
of IUG confirmed that: 
"We work in different direction and at different levels to find a solution 
and obtain the admission of IUG, and therefore we conduct intensive 
communications with the occupation authorities as well as with the 
UNRWA. This is in addition to community leaders to enforce the 
occupation and the UNRWA to recognize IUG certificates and give its 
graduates equal opportunities for job vacations" (Shoubair, individual 
interview, Dec. 2013).  
 
The issue of non-recognition was unbearable because it did not come only from the 
occupation authorities, but also from the UNRWA. Document 49 shows that the 
UNRWA refused to recognise or hire IUG graduates. The UNRWA required the 
recognition of the hosting government (Egypt and later the Israeli occupation) as a 
pre-condition to hire IUG graduates. Although the United Nations was supposed to be 
neutral in the conflict between the Israel occupation and Palestinians, UNRWA 
followed the lead of the occupation, and therefore, refused to recognise IUG degrees. 
It was very hard to understand why the UNRWA should follow suit.  
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The leadership tried to engage the occupation to admit IUG and its graduates. The 
leadership believed that the recognition of IUG would strengthen the support of the 
community, and hundreds of new students would join the university. The 
determination and struggle of the leadership played an important role in gaining the 
support of students and the community. In spite of this dilemma, IUG became the 
largest university in Palestine in terms of the total number of enrolled students, even 
before their degrees were recognised. 
 
The Chairman of the Board of Trustees Jamal AL-khodary concludes that: 
“Despite the difficulties and the effects of the non-recognition, our 
determination to keep going and teach our kids was stronger than the 
willing of the occupation. We were not disappointed nor we gave up, 
we worked hard and we gained recognition from different countries 
and academic unions” (AL-Khodary, J., individual interview, Feb. 
2014). 
 
The leadership was determined to carry on and overcome these obstacles. The 
leadership worked on an international level to find alternatives to local recognition. 
Since the 1980s and beyond, they have issued various communications and messages 
and sent many delegations to Arab, Muslim and foreign countries requesting them to 
recognise IUG degrees to overcome the Israeli non-recognition (document 4, 15, 28, 
48).  
 
The evidence from documents and interviews revealed that while the leadership failed 
to obtain recognition from the occupation authorities and the UNRWA for 15 years, 
they succeeded in achieving it from the Union of Arabic Universities in November 
1980 (document 2), the Union of Islamic Universities in April 1984, the Union of 
Mediterranean Universities in 1998, and membership of the World Association of 
Universities in 2004. This strategy was one of bypassing the occupation and finding 
suitable alternatives elsewhere.  
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After the international recognition, local recognition followed, once the Oslo accords 
were signed in 1993. Document 51 showed that IUG received recognition from the 
UNRWA in October 1993, and in June 1994, IUG received a similar recognition from 
the PNA few months after its creation as shown in document 52. The Oslo accord 
played a crucial role in obtaining the recognition and hiring of IUG graduates. This 
was considered by the leadership, staff, students and the community as a breakthrough 
and the best alternative to the Israeli non-recognition.  
 
As a result of the recognition, more partnership agreements were signed with 
European, Asian, African and American universities as was clarified in chapter two. 
In the meantime, the leadership tried to find job opportunities for its graduates, 
especially in the Arabic Gulf countries. Achieving recognition from these important 
bodies opened further opportunities for IUG staff to conduct their postgraduate 
studies abroad with fewer restrictions, apart from those imposed by the occupation 
authorities.  
 
In conclusion, the individual interviews demonstrated on different occasions a spirit 
of patience, struggle and calmness under the pressure of this dilemma. Nevertheless, 
in some other occasions university leaders took quick and forceful actions such as 
opening the faculty of Nursing, but they have to cope with the consequences of 
deporting 36 academics. The focus group concentrated more on the deep impacts of 
the dilemma of non-recognition which continued for 15 years. The leadership was 
unable to solve this dilemma until 1993 leaving hundreds of graduates with very 
limited job opportunities inside the Gaza Strip. The document analysis clarified how 
the leadership tried to engage with the occupation authorities to obtain the recognition 
but failed. Simultaneously, they bypassed the occupation authorities by obtaining 
recognition from different unions abroad. Despite political conflict, the leadership 
exploited the Oslo Accord in a resilient and rational manner obtaining recognition 
from both the PNA and the UNRWA. 
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5.1.2 Lack of Resources 
The availability of resources can enhance the outcomes of an organisation (Zhou-
Ling, 2009; Fitz-enz, 2009) and helps them in coping with threats (Andrews, 1995).  
 
  
5.1.2.1 Lack of Qualified Staff 
 
A strong, qualified academic and administrative staff is a strength and a competitive 
advantage in any university (Gertler and Vinodrai, 2005; Mamman, Kamoche, and 
Bakuwa, 2012). This factor directly affects the quality of the administration and the 
satisfaction of the students. In addition, it can effectively contribute to scientific 
research. Table 5 (p. 48) in chapter two, shows to what extent there was a lack of 
qualified staff, particularly, in the inception stage, and how it developed through the 
different stages of IUG history. 
 
Any emerging university might lack qualified staff either because of financial 
problems or lack of competitive advantage (Teixeira and Amaral, 2007). Universities 
operating in turbulent environments, such as the case of IUG, seem to suffer from 
more complicated problems. For instance, IUG suffered from the occupation’s 
attempts to control the university by imposing certain policies, such as preventing the 
staff from getting a residency, and thus preventing the university from recruiting 
qualified staff from other countries. The more skilled and competent the 
organisation’s leadership and employees, the more likely the organisation will meet 
its strategic goals and objectives (Hitt, et al., 2001). This is why the lack of a qualified 
staff was the main problem that IUG faced in its first years. When a university lacks 
qualified staff, then the goals to be achieved will be very difficult. 
 
Document analysis revealed to what extent the issue of qualified staff concerned  the 
leadership. Different messages (documents 14, 20, 28, 29 and 44) were sent to the 
occupation authorities requesting permission to hire qualified staff from the West 
Bank and from abroad.  
 
 155  
Individual interviews shed light on the lack of qualified staff and the strategies used 
by the leadership to address it. The Dean of the Faculty of Commerce, Prof. Majed 
Al-Farra reported that: 
"Most of the staff members, in the inception stage, were bachelor 
degree holders. Therefore, it was necessary for the leadership to find 
alternatives, and thus the leadership started to think and collaborate 
with universities in Jordan to recruit professors to work at the 
university. In addition, they decided to send academic staff to conduct 
their postgraduate studies abroad” (Al-Farra, individual interview, 
Jan. 2014). 
 
This empowerment and development of staff members’ qualifications played a crucial 
role in overcoming the Israeli restrictions. Christie, et al. (2007) found that the 
experience of the teachers and staff is one of the main reasons for success, and such 
capacities improve the outcomes of the organisation (Phillpot, et al., 2011). The 
leadership therefore tried to overcome this problem by hiring qualified staff from the 
West Bank, Jordan and Egypt, however this required permission from the occupation 
authorities.  
 
The policy of the occupation was to put the leadership under threat and pressure all 
the time. The occupation authorities cancelled the residence of seven academics from 
the staff in September 1983 (document 13). Also, they deported 36 academics in 
October 1985 (document 30). They expelled prof. Mohamed Saqer, the Chancellor of 
IUG in 1984 and the vice Chancellor Mohamed Siyam in 1988, and 23 of the 
academic and administrators were deported to Marj Al-Zohoor in South Lebanon in 
December 1992 (AL-Sinwar, and Mouteer, 2009). 
 
One respondent (a professor in chemistry), who left IUG to join Al-Azhar University 
in 1991 was proud of this response by leadership saying that:  
“Students who are sent by the university to complete their HE have 
returned from abroad after they achieved their master and PhD 
degrees; and thus were eligible to work in the university. It also 
attracted a number of Palestinian professionals who are working 
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abroad to work in the university” (Taym, individual interview, Jan. 
2014). 
 
The strategy of relying on the local staff was  key: by sending them everywhere 
possible for postgraduate studies to avoid the Israeli restrictions. By supplying 
scholarships, despite financial crises, the leadership was able to send staff and 
students abroad to different universities. The leadership exploited the closure of IUG 
in the first uprising in 1987 to send more academics abroad to pursue their 
postgraduate studies. The other strategy was recruiting Palestinian professionals who 
worked abroad (in the UK Germany and USA), particularly those who have the Gaza 
identity. These strategies helped IUG to fill the gaps and released, to some extent, the 
leadership from the Israeli pressure.. At the same time, IUG continued recruiting 
qualified staff from the West Bank, Jordanian and Egyptian universities.  
 
These strategies enabled IUG to have a diverse and well qualified academic staff 
complement. Literature emphasises the importance of diversity of the workforce and 
how it can lead to positive outcomes (Mamman, et al., 2012). The former Chancellor 
commented on this matter by saying: 
 “As I pointed out, the main goal was sending the academics of the 
university abroad to benefit from various experiences. I assume that 
we were in the founding phase, so cultural variety and diversity of 
certificates benefited the building of advanced Faculties (engineering, 
information technology, medicine, and other specific departments). We 
believe that this diversity offers different experiences, and this was 
reflected on the level of the academic quality” (Shoubair, individual 
interview, Dec. 2013). 
 
IUG leadership was able to overcome the problem of insufficient qualified staff by 
sending them abroad to obtain their postgrduate studies. 
 
 
5.1.2.2 Lack of Facilities (Buildings and Equipment) 
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The document evidence showed that this issue was of great importance for the 
leadership in order to provide students and the staff with good quality of education. 
Much correspondence was sent to different Israeli authorities as shown in documents 
6, 21, 28 and 32. These documents stressed the dire need for buildings and equipment, 
and that IUG had the right to provide a suitable and comfortable educational process 
for its students and staff. The Israeli authority rejected these demands and sent 
different messages to the leadership as shown in documents 7, 33 and 34 threatening 
them if they constructed any buildings without military approval. These documents 
demonstrate two opposite strategies, on the one hand, the documents of the university 
revealed that the leadership tried to engage with the occupation authorities, but when 
this did not work they decided to challenge and defy their orders. The documents sent 
to IUG showed that the occupation tried to impose their authority and control and 
exercise their power against IUG. 
 
Some interviews and a focus group revealed that there was debate among the 
leadership about the timing to challenge the occupation and start the building process. 
Some of the staff were scared of the consequences and the anger of the occupation. 
The support of volunteer students and staff enabled the leadership to construct 
temporary buildings - the so called Baraksat which looked like prefabs.  
“The occupation prevented the establishment of permanent buildings 
for the Islamic University, and it’s hard to imagine that the university 
first consisted of tents then of the so-called Baraksat (temporary 
buildings) approved by the occupation to be set up under great 
pressure by the community” (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 
2013). 
 
The operation of constructing the buildings started in secret at nights over weekends, 
but a day later, the occupation destroyed what had been built. The IUG started to re-
build it again with the help of staff, students and the community. Social cohesion 
played its role in the process of challenging the occupation. A respondent explained 
that: 
 “The occupation prevented the establishment of permanent buildings 
for the Islamic University, and it’s hard to imagine that the university 
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first consisted of tents then of the so-called Baraksat (temporary 
buildings) approved by the occupation to be set up under great 
pressure by the community” (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 
2013). 
 
 Another respondent elaborated further that: 
"The university started building temporary classrooms, but the 
occupation demolished them. And, soon we rebuilt it again and again 
till we had some temporary buildings. The university faced many 
difficulties in promoting its projects to have them funded by donors” 
(Shaath, individual interview, March 2014). 
 
The focus groups shed light on the dangers of constructing building without Israeli 
permission. 
“The leadership took the risk of being arrested or deported if they 
build without permission. However, the process was classified and few 
members knew about it in advance” (Focus group 2, Mar. 2014). 
 
During the first and the second stage, the leadership tried to find temporary solutions 
to this critical problem. This situation continued until the third stage in 1993 when the 
PNA came to power and took control of the situation in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip. Soon after, IUG leadership launched a consolidation process in different 
domains. One of the most important things was launching a campaign to raise funds 
for constructing permanent buildings.  
 
The Chairman of the Board of Trustees confirmed that:  
“One of the key responsibilities of IUG leadership is to ensure that all 
the facilities are provided to student and staff, especially comfortable 
buildings. We exert huge efforts to find donors to construct permanent 
buildings and as you see we succeed to do so” (AL-Khodary, J. 
individual interview, Feb. 2014). 
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This statement confirmed that building a modern university with a comfortable 
environment was always a high priority of the leadership. The interviews and the 
observation undertaken provided strong evidence that the leadership was able to 
construct most of the new buildings based on a structural chart prepared for IUG by 
the faculty of Engineering. However, there were still challenges and direct risks 
surrounding IUG. This was made very clear when the Israeli fighters bombed the 
main buildings of IUG in the war of December 2008. 
 
Al-Ajez who is one of the pioneer workers at IUG concluded that: 
“When buildings got demolished we built tents in the morning. When a 
teacher was absent, his colleague filled his place without complaining 
or asking for compensation, and all that is an evidence for loyalty and 
affiliation to the university” (Al-Ajez, individual interview, Nov. 
2013). 
 
The determination to keep IUG functioning was the aim of both the leadership and 
staff even under tents. The members of IUG fulfilled their tasks and the team work 
spirit made them work very hard under extreme conditions. The leadership deployed 
different strategies to solve this problem; one strategy was being flexible to engage 
and convince the Israeli authorities to give the required permissions for buildings. The 
second strategy was perseverance and insistence to challenge the occupation orders 
and constructing temporary buildings. However, the price was high and some 
members of the leadership were arrested and the pressure from the occupation against 
IUG increased.  
 
 
5.1.3 Teaching in Risk, Stress and War Conditions 
The occupation’s attempts to control IUG made the job of higher learning harder and 
more dangerous because the leadership worked under the direct threat of the 
occupation and its security measures against IUG and its staff and students. The 
literature review provides evidence that conflict and wars undermine the functioning 
of the education system and also destroy education infrastructure (Seitz, 2004; Novelli 
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and Lopes Cardozo, 2008), in addition to putting people under stress and affecting 
their mental health (Miller and Rasmussen, 2010). 
 
Dolatkhan (2014) asserts that in high risk situations, the consequences of unexpected 
hazardous events are sometimes unbearable. IUG was exposed to both expected and 
unexpected disturbances forcing the university to work in stressful and risky 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
  
5.1.3.1 Disruption of the Educational Process 
 
As an institution building itself under the occupation, IUG was subjected to many 
disruptions that caused a temporary interruption to its activities. For instance, the 
Israeli occupation often shut down the university (Sullivan, 1994) and arrested some 
teachers and students. Individual interviews focused on the occupation’s attempts to 
disrupt the teaching process. One respondent said: 
“The Israeli troops stormed the university many time in the 1980s and 
arrested many students to prevent political activities. Even more, they 
shut down the university many times in advance or after political 
events and demonstrations had taken place” (Al-Rantisi, individual 
interview, Dec. 2013). 
 
Opposing the occupation and raising the awareness of staff and students were 
important steps in to challenging the Israeli orders against the university and the 
community as a whole. But sometimes not opposing orders, in order to absorb the 
anger of the occupation was also important. 
 
Some respondents noted that the leadership had to shut down the university or 
evacuate students and staff to prevent the occupation’s troops from storming the 
university and arresting some students or staff members. 
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“We had to shut down the university many times for several days as an 
act of protection and defense for our students after the Israeli soldiers 
would break into the campus and arrest a number of students” 
(Samour, individual interview, Jan. 2014). 
 
The evidence from documents showed also that the Israeli targeting of IUG did not 
stop. Many documents provide strong evidence about the Israeli attempts to disrupt 
the educational process at IUG since the early years of inception. For instance, 
documents 7, 8, 22, 25, 33, 34 and 47 are messages sent from the military authorities 
to IUG leadership. These documents detailed the restrictions and difficulties IUG was 
exposed to by the occupation and how the occupation tried to intervene in the policies 
and practices of the university. For example, the military governor asked IUG in 
document 22 issued in December 1983 to provide them with the agenda and the 
minutes of their meetings. The leadership sometimes sent very short reports to the 
military governor to absorb the occupation’s anger. They sent many different letters to 
the Israeli authorities to convince them to remove the restrictions on IUG. Most of the 
time, though, the leadership challenged these obstacles and ignored such requests of 
the occupation. 
 
Documents number 16 and 17 sent to the Israeli military governor in October, 1983 
stressed the right of IUG to perform their policies and practices for the interest of the 
students and community away from the Israeli pressure. In addition, documents 
number 18 and 21 which were sent to the Israeli general coordinator in October and 
December, 1983 rejected the restrictions imposed by the occupation to disrupt the 
educational process. These documents, among many others, reflected the spirit of 
challenge, defiance and exercise of power 
 
The general view of many respondents is summed up by the Chairman of the Board of 
Trustees:  
"The Israeli disruptions didn’t stop; they tried whatever they can to 
impede any progress of IUG. They deport chancellors and academics; 
they imposed restrictions on travelling and accommodation of staff; 
they prevent buildings; they block our funds and so on, but we kept 
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going as our main goal is to continue the educational process "(AL-
Khodary, J., individual interview, Feb. 2014).   
 
All these measures negatively affected the smooth operation of teaching and disrupted 
the functioning of IUG. Nevertheless, these disruptions did not stop IUG from 
providing services to students, staff and the community. There was a perception that 
the leadership was able to carry on and create innovative solutions to overcome 
closure. This issue was confirmed by many respondents even those who left IUG to 
join Al-Azhar university in 1991:  
“At the beginning of Intifadat AL-Aqsa in 2000, The Gaza Strip was 
being dismembered, and as a result, students couldn’t reach school. 
Therefore, the university founded a communication center for the 
students in the south of Gaza Strip. The university succeeded in using 
this center as an alternative so that the students can go on with their 
education. We held lectures at homes, Mosques and clubs” (Zourob, 
individual interview, Jan. 2014). 
 
IUG leadership was the pioneer of universities in the Gaza Strip,  finding alternative 
solutions in order to keep the educational process moving forward. This 
communication centre played a strategic role in facilitating the distribution of lectures 
and examinations via networks between the main campus in Gaza and the centre in 
the South. The leadership  created opportunities out of threats and hardships. This is 
one of the ways in which IUG adapted to hazardous conditions, finding alternatives 
and working under all the circumstances. The initial results were not so promising 
because the siege continued for many years, but nevertheless, the educational process 
kept going.  
 
The observation of the researcher showed that there was huge panic and shock among 
students and the staff when the war and bombing started suddenly, because thousands 
of students were in their classes. In such moments of extreme risks, students look for 
guidance, support and immediate protection (Mutch, 2015). There were a number of 
respondents who thought that it would be very difficult for IUG to return normal 
operations after the destruction of its main buildings.  
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This issue was outlined by one respondent who said that: 
“When we returned to the university after the destruction of two main 
buildings in the war of Dec. 2008, we couldn’t help to see the scattered 
debris. Class rooms weren’t ready, and students’ mentality was 
damaged because they lost either someone or something. All that made 
us feel that we couldn’t act as if the semester was finished. Hence, we 
made some examinations just to sense the students desire to overcome 
the ordeal which actually was surprising even to the top management, 
and I was the academic deputy that time. We even doubted that we 
could start the examinations after two or three weeks, but we found 
ourselves astonished as after four or five days we started running 
examinations successfully with extra care for the students who suffered 
during the three weeks of war” (Awad-Allah, individual interview, 
Nov. 2013). 
 
Despite the damage the war left, and despite the feelings of shock and 
disappointment, the insistence on the strategy of keeping the educational process 
moving was crucial for the leadership, meaning that the university did not give up and 
did not break or shatter even if most of the buildings were bombed.  This experience 
made it clear that the university was something beyond buildings: an educational 
community that continued to function, and even function well, after infrastructure was 
destroyed. Steps taken in order to successfully complete the semester and keep 
moving were self-reinforcing, and  gave more power, control and authority to the 
leadership in dealing with shocks.  
 
The day after the war ended, the leadership started to find alternatives to continue the 
educational process. After cleaning the mess, they opened new rooms as laboratories 
with the little equipment that was not damaged; they co-operated with other 
universities such as Al-Azhar and Al-Aqsa to use their labs. Although Al-Azhar had 
been set up in opposition to IUG, in this crisis and similar occasions, particularly 
those related to opposing the occupation, they were prepared to help. The co-
operation between IUG and these universities enabled the leadership to overcome the 
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lack of resources and facilities required for the educational process. The leadership 
also moved quickly to buy whatever equipment they could. The leadership was on the 
ground to determine the policy and the required steps, to supervise the process of 
construction and to give orders and instructions.  
 
The Chairman of the Board of Trustees as many other respondents explained that:  
“We did our best to overcome this shock, the mess was huge and the 
damage was unimaginable. But soon we consulted with many different 
members of the staff. Challenging the occupation and the willing to 
survive was stronger than the destruction and we gain all the support 
to rebuild what the occupier destroyed” (AL-Khodary, J. individual 
interview, Feb. 2014). 
  
The participation of the staff in this decision empowered the staff and motivated 
them.Thus, the intellectual stimulation of the leadership which characterises 
transformational leadership (motivate followers to be creators and innovators, to share 
the same values and standards of the leaders and of the organisation) made the staff  
ready to sacrifice and fulfill their mission. The researcher observed that  not only in 
spite of, but perhaps because of, the severe damage of this war, the sense of unity and 
cohesion among the staff and with the community increased. IUG gained the support 
and funds to rebuild the destroyed building from the Islamic Bank-Jeddah in Saudi 
Arabia who used to give support to Palestinian universities and institutions. 
 
 
5.1.3.2 Moving Forward: Offering Off-Campus Classes 
 
Most of the Palestinian universities were subjected to a variety of Israeli assaults and 
invasion such as shutting down universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
Sometimes, this required exceptional responses and measures such as working 
underground while facing dangers. For instance, in the first uprising in 1987, The 
occupation authorities issued military orders and closed the Palestinian universities 
(An-Najah, Birzeit, Bethlehem and Hebron in the West Bank and IUG in the Gaza 
Strip). IUG was closed for four years by military order as shown in document 47. The 
shutting down of IUG as a HEI was a decision the occupation  seemed likely to make. 
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The number of IUG students downsized dramatically from 4504 to only 358 as shown 
in Table 2 (P. 26) and Table 3 (P. 40). Thus, the situation during the first uprising 
foreshadowed such a decision which was a serious challenge to the existence of the 
university.  
 
Although the military order to shut down IUG was disappointing and affected 
students, staff and the community, nevertheless, it was a great motivator to challenge 
the occupation and teach underground. Birziet university was the pioneer to do so in 
the West Bank and later IUG followed suit in the Gaza Strip. The leadership decided 
to continue the educational by offering off-campus classes, exploiting all the options 
and alternatives they had. The individual interviews and the focus group gave 
different explanations. Some of the interviewees stress the importance of challenging 
the occupation and saving the career of the students by teaching underground, while 
others focused on the risk and the price of rejecting the military orders and open off-
campus classes. 
“The IUG leadership convinced many of the faculty members to teach 
in their homes, Mosques, sport clubs and in all available places to save 
students career” (Taym, individual interview, Jan. 2014). 
 
Confirming this reality, Professor Jawad Wady, Al-Azhar’s previous Chancellor, who 
was one of the pioneer staff at IUG, and left for Al-Azhar University in 1991, 
expressed the difficulties and risks of teaching underground: 
“It was scary and dangerous to teach students at our homes at that 
hard times, some of our colleagues reject the idea while many others 
was ready to sacrifice” (Wady, individual interview, Feb. 2014).  
 
This intellectual stimulation and empowerment of followers worked well. At that 
time, the self-reflection of the researcher indicated that although some academics 
refused to teach underground as they were scared of being arrested or punished, others 
took risks and were ready to struggle and sacrifice. Some of them have been arrested 
for teaching underground. 
 
Members of the focus group discussion said: 
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"We dealt correctly with closure; we were the pioneers  in Gaza to do 
so, but we acknowledged that the price was high” (Focus group 1, Jan. 
2014). 
 
The flexibility and the open-mindedness and calmness under pressure enabled the 
leadership to find alternatives and solutions to restarting the educational process. 
Respondents from the focus group were convinced that: 
“Teaching underground or in public places was a strategy used in two 
occasions; once in the first uprising in 1987 and the other in the 
second uprising in 2000. In the two occasions the aim was to prevent 
the collapse of the educational process and to save the careers and the 
futures of thousands of students” (Focus group 2, Mar. 2014). 
 
The self-reflection of the researcher points to the threats of working underground on 
the staff and leadership as well as students. This situation repeated itself after the 
breakout of the second uprising in 2000 and the isolation of the cities of Gaza Strip 
from each other. The suffering of the staff and students at the checkpoints they had to 
cross to reach campuses was almost unbearable and cast risks on their personal safety. 
 
In spite of risk and dangers, the leadership decided to keep going with the educational 
process. From their previous experience and with the support of the community, the 
leadership started teaching again at informal venues for more than two years until 
they were able to construct a  new campus to serve students in the isolated areas.  
 
5.1.4 Loss of Authority and Control 
Under the Israeli occupation, it was very difficult and challenging for Palestinians to 
formulate their own education system, improve the quality standards and direct it to 
meet economic and social demands (Ramahi and Davies, 2002).  
 
Document analysis showed the attempts of the occupation to control IUG, and how 
the leadership used different strategies in dealing with this dilemma. Many messages 
issued to IUG from the Israeli authorities reveal the extent to which they tried to 
impose their control and authority over IUG. For example, document 8 issued to IUG 
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in October, 1982 gives evidence how the Israeli authorities limited the number of new 
students to only 200. In addition, they rejected hiring qualified staff and the expansion 
of the members of the Board of Trustees. They tried to intervene in simple things 
pertaining to  the running of IUG such as preventing opening a new gate (document 
45) a few days after the first uprising broke out in December 1987.   
 
The leadership realised that the loss of authority and control would impede any 
attempts to progress and move forward. Therefore, they tried to keep their control 
over their resources and strategies. To deal with this dilemma, they conducted 
intensive communications with different Israeli authorities requesting them to stop 
their intervention, and warning them of the consequences of continuing such policies 
and oppressive measures. For instance, in May 1981, an open letter (document 4) was 
sent to the Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, and many academics abroad, 
requesting approval from the military governor to allow IUG to function and to carry 
out its development plans.  
 
On other occasions, the leadership rejected the Israeli intervention in IUG issues. A 
series of different messages were sent (documents, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 28, 38, 43 
and 44) to the occupation authorities rejecting the limitation of the number of 
registered students, the ban on constructing of new buildings, rejecting the departure 
of some of the staff members and the ban on opening a new gate. It was not easy to 
reject the military orders as this jeopardised the personal security of the leadership 
and the continuation of the educational process. Some of these documents 
demonstrate how the leadership engaged and tried to convince the occupation to 
release restrictions on IUG: documents 16 and 17. Other documents defied and 
rejected the oppressive and illegal measures of the occupation as shown in documents 
18, 20, 21, 23, 28, 38, 43 and 44. 
 
This was confirmed by members of the focus groups: 
“Many times when we open new faculties or specialisations, we were 
determined to take forceful actions and to evaluate the Israeli reaction 
and deal accordingly” (Al-Hooly). 
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Taking forceful actions, while taking risks into account, are characteristics of the IUG 
leadership. Sometime the leadership was able to challenge these military orders and 
overcome the obstacles, while some other times they had to absorb the shocks 
although the price was relatively high. Therefore, in certain cases, the leadership had 
to freeze some decisions (for example opening the faculty of Nursing) for months. 
They absorbed the anger of the occupation, to avoid repercussions. 
 
The pioneer employees at IUG realised these facts as there was a complaint among 
many respondents from both individual and group interviews that: 
“The university suffered from the dominance of the occupation. For 
instance, the occupation was sizing the university and specifying the 
number of students. However, this did not prevent the leadership from 
completing the registration with the numbers they want” (Asori, 
individual interview, Dec. 2013). 
 
The previous Chancellor confirmed that:     
“The occupation threatened to close the Islamic University among 
other threats in order to force the university to retreat from the 
decision to establish the Faculty of Nursing. We did not know the 
reason behind the occupation’s rejection, but to absorb their anger we 
had to freeze the decision for months” (Shoubair, individual interview, 
Dec. 2013).  
This point of view presented two main concepts; the deep understanding of the 
leadership when it should use a strategy of challenge and taking forceful actions and 
when it should use a strategy of absorbing the anger and the tough reactions of the 
occupation.  
 
5.1.5 Financial Crisis 
The evidence from documents, most of the interviews, focus group and participant 
observation acknowledged that the financial crisis is an old yet recurring problem 
which   continues to plague the leadership and staff of IUG.  
The previous Chancellor of IUG said: 
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“We know that the funding of all Palestinian universities at that time 
was by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Money was 
transferred by banks, but occupation curtailed transfer of money to the 
university” (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013). 
 
This prolonged problem of money transfer characterised the case of IUG. But in spite 
of this, some respondents gave examples of their ability to cope with these challenges 
and to sacrifice for the interest of the university.  
One key respondent clarified that:  
 “In fact, in times of financial crises, all the extra work we did was 
charity for the sake of the university. Sometimes we didn’t receive our 
salaries for 8 months and we still continued to work” (Al-Hindi, 
individual interview, Nov.2013). 
Another example highlighted that: 
“There were financial problems at IUG, and we have to sacrifice and 
deal with this problem. Furthermore, the support of Muslim 
institutions played a big role in facilitating the financial issue” (Wady, 
individual interview, Feb. 2014). 
 
These examples demonstrated the spirit of sacrifice, affiliation and commitment of 
employees, particularly in times of crises. Islamic charities in Arab countries, Turkey 
and Malaysia among others gave support and funding to IUG. Document analysis 
showed that in spite of this spirit of sacrifice, the leadership exerted more pressure on 
the occupation authorities and sent them a series of messages requesting them to ease 
financial restrictions (documents 18, 19, 23, 24 and 28). In the meantime, they spent 
efforts on fund raising to meet the urgent needs of the university. Furthermore, they 
asked the occupation (document 27) to allow delegations to travel abroad for fund 
raising for IUG projects. 
The focus group members believed that this dilemma has intensified over the past 
three decades due to the economic decline under occupation (Abadsa, 2006) and the 
inability of students to pay tuition fees. Moreover, some of them highlighted the 
deficiencies of the leadership accusing them of not taking the required step to solve 
this problem instead of depending on financial support from abroad. 
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“We suffered from financial constraints, and the leadership still 
unable to find creative solutions to this dilemma” (Focus group 1, Jan. 
2014). 
  
In summary, the observation as well as documents and interviews confirmed that the 
support from Muslim individuals, groups and institutions was of great importance in 
helping IUG to overcome this problem until the end of 2012. Thereafter, most of the 
support stopped, particularly from Turkish foundations, as they turned to support 
needy people in Syria. There was a widely held view among interviewees that the 
financial situation of IUG is one of the most difficult dilemmas that IUG leadership 
still has not been able to solve, due to many different reasons including the inability of 
more than 8000 students to pay tuition fees. In addition, due to the political division 
since 2007, the Palestinian ministry of HE excluded IUG from the financial support 
that the ministry is committed to giving to universities in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. Another reason for the continuation of the financial crisis is IUG’s inability to 
raise the tuition fees due to the harsh economic situation in the Gaza Strip since the 
breakout of the second uprising in 2000  
 
By the end of 2012, the financial crisis has been exacerbated due to the previous 
reasons, and also due to the three different wars waged against the Gaza Strip in the 
last five years, coupled with tightening of the Israeli siege and closure. The literature  
(Iwasaki, 2014) confirms that the financial crises are significant factors that affect the 
survival of the organisation. This dilemma still plagues the leadership as well as the 
staff, and therefore, there is concern about how the leadership will be able to 
overcome it in the future. Moreover, IUG workers are now calling for their rights and 
financial dues just like their peers in Al-Azhar and Al-Aqsa universities who earn full 
salaries smoothly every month while their colleagues at IUG receive only 50-70 
percent of their salaries. 
 
5.1.6 Political Conflict and Division 
The existence of the Israeli occupation and its attempts to control universities created 
many political conflicts among Palestinian groups on how to stand against the 
occupation. It is impossible for Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza 
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Strip to distance themselves from the political environment (Sullivan, 1994) and 
ideological contexts in which they operate. The leadership had to cope with 
challenges and exploit the opportunities to thrive even under political risks (Henisz 
and Zelner, 2003). Political conflict can ruin the unity of groups and community and 
have a negative effect on the confidence, respect and trust among people (Hibbing, 
Smith, Peterson, Feher, 2014). Political disputes become even worse in times of crises 
and hazardous conditions. This was reflected in the emergence of political conflicts 
that, in some cases, developed into violence among the students.  
Some respondents, particularly the pioneer employees at IUG, believed that the 
conflict was mainly about the identity and the culture of the university and to which 
political party it should belong.. For example, one respondent argued that:  
 “At the inception stage, there were division among stakeholders about 
the identity of the university and its culture. This was reflected in some 
violent clashes between different groups of students. But the result was 
the dominance of the Islamic culture and ideology” (Al-Ajez, 
individual interview, Nov. 2013). 
 
At the early stages of the creation of IUG,, there was a serious debate among staff, 
students and political groups about IUG’s political affiliation. The researcher 
witnessed this dilemma and its impacts on IUG staff, students and the community. 
The continuous political conflict in the Palestinian territories was a major obstacle 
confronting Palestinian universities as well as the leadership of IUG. Each political 
party wanted to force its ideology and philosophies on the university.  
 
A female respondent argued that: 
“Most of the employees have a political affiliation which helps them to 
withstand the hazardous situations” (Najem, individual interview, 
Dec. 2013). 
 
The environment and the occupation forced the political conflict to rise to the surface 
between different political parties competing to control IUG. 
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“Some political affiliations have worked hard to govern the university, 
sometimes by using violence, but the leadership’s wise management 
outlaws all these endeavours” (Samour, individual interview, Jan. 
2014). 
 
The focus groups gave more explanation concluding that:   
“Another challenge was flagrantly apparent which is having two 
parties competing to head IUG; Fatah and Hamas. That period was 
very critical since it inserted more conflicts and clashes. After the 
foundation of Al -Azhar University which is affiliated with Fatah, the 
general situation has become less complicated. Moreover, the division 
has been occurring between brothers, Hamas and Fatah. This was a 
very complicated stage that may have led to many conflicts, but the 
university dealt with it sensibly” (Focus group1, Jan. 2014). 
 
The conflict of interests and the desire for dominance creates sometime an exercise of 
power among different groups (Hardy, 2015). The leadership exerted great efforts to 
keep the university away from such division and to prevent violent incidents. They 
held intensive meetings with staff and student representatives. In addition, they held 
numerous meetings with community and movement leaders until they reached 
agreement between the conflicting parties.  
 
This was also confirmed through document analysis, as shown in documents 11, 12 
and 40. These documents give examples of the bad effects of conflict on student and 
the educational process. While some respondents see the affiliation as a positive 
factor in ensuring the survival of  IUG, others acknowledge the bad effects of this 
conflict which arose because of affiliation on the society in general and on IUG in 
particular.  
 
These views of respondents are aligned with the approach of Bush and Saltarelli 
(2000) about the two faces of education in decreasing conflict and eliminating tension 
and violence among different groups of the society, and in creating an environment 
that increases conflict and violence among different groups. The results of the effects 
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of conflict in IUG confirmed the long-lasting effects that undermine their 
reintegration and overall safety of communities under wars and conflict (UNICEF, 
2007). However, while leadership succeeded in calming down the situation 
sometimes, they failed to prevent some clashes between students which took place 
occasionally, and the leadership had to cope with the consequences. In these 
occasions, the leadership had to shut down the university for a few days in order to 
calm the tension among the rival parties. 
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5.2 The Factors Used by IUG Leadership in Dealing with Hardships and 
Challenges 
The main question of this research was about how leaders can promote resilience in a 
HEI  in an environment of conflict, post-conflict and ongoing turbulence. Answering 
this question implies examining the manner of responses when dealing with and 
adapting to the challenges and obstacles IUG has faced throughout its history and how 
the leadership and culture interacted in building resilience. A diversity of 
characteristics of the leadership to achieve these goals emerged from this study.   
Professor Shehada Zourob is convinced that IUG is characterised by:  
“First, the challenging circumstances created men with fierce and 
unique personalities that can excel and compete everywhere. Second, 
the limitless giving environment of the academic staff, students, and 
top management. Third, esprit de corps of the team and team work. 
Fourth, the desire to serve Islam and the nation. Finally, persistence 
and ability to work under hard circumstances” (Zourob, individual 
interview, Jan. 2014). 
 
In the environments of turbulence and conflicts, the university leadership needs to 
have a clear vision and mission. The points of Prof. Zourob summarise the positive 
effects of the challenges upon the leadership and staff. These include: creating strong 
and qualified people; teamwork abilities; commitment and affiliation to serve the 
religion and the community. Rearranging the priorities is one of the fundamental 
factors that helped the institution to succeed in facing the difficulties and challenges. 
 
One respondent from the pioneers at IUG noted that:  
“We believe that IUG’s role was to keep going, resist, and work 24 
hours to come up with solutions for challenges. For example, when a 
teacher is imprisoned we manage to find who fill his place later in the 
same day. If they close the classes we study in houses. The persistence 
of the leadership is what made the university stand against all odds. 
The major view of the Islamic University and the efforts of the youth 
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and the staffs of the university are what make it succeed through their 
loyalty and cooperation” (Al-Ajez, individual interview, Nov. 2013). 
 
5.2.1 Partnership between the Board of Trustees and the University Council 
IUG leadership was characterised by both co-operation and tensions between the 
Board of Trustees and the University Council. Since the inception of IUG until 1992, 
the Board of Trustees as well as the University Council comprised members from 
different political groups and independents.  
 
The individual interviews and the observation of the researcher stressed the positive 
impact of this partnership. Prof. Al-Ajez believed that: 
“The Board of Trustees and the Chancellor were in continuous 
cooperation which made the Israelis turn the blind eye, particularly in 
1980s and early 1990s, for a period that made us capable of 
establishing some buildings” (Al-Ajez, individual interview, Nov. 
2013). 
This partnership and co-operation of the leadership appeared strongly in challenging 
the occupation's oppressive measures because they gained the support of the staff, 
students and the community to stand against the occupier. Therefore, the occupation 
authorities sometimes turned a blind eye, such as  at the opening of some departments 
or in the case of registering more students than agreed upon. This is because the 
occupation authorities were not ready all the time to escalate the situation with 
students and the community.  
 
It was acknowledged by many respondents, and through documents and observation 
that there was a high level of co-operation and partnership between the Chairman of 
the Board of Trustees and the Chancellor. Most of the respondents were convinced 
about the main role of the Board of Trustees. 
“The role of the broad of trustees since the establishment of the 
university and until today is a positive role; for example, they were 
travelling to bring money and support the university and also were in 
contact with the teachers” (Taym, individual interview, Jan. 2014). 
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From 1992 onwards, the partnership grew stronger, especially between the Chairman 
of the Board of Trustees and the Secretary General of the board, and the Chancellor of 
the university. They performed as an informal team. This thesis argues that this 
distinctive relationship comes from the fact that Mr. Jamal AL-Khodary, the 
Chairman of the board, is a very charismatic person with special skills and very 
effective communication with different local and international groups and individuals. 
He attended at his office at IUG almost every day and met with the Chancellor of the 
university and different members and visitors. This is despite the fact that he was 
working on a voluntary basis and did not receive a salary. At the same time, Mr. 
Khalid AL-Hindi, the secretary general of the board is a key adviser to most of the 
IUG Chancellors. Therefore, both of them with the previous Chancellor, prof. 
Shoubair, who acted from 1992 to 2008 and thereafter with the current Chancellor, 
Prof. Shaath, who has acted since 2008, formed an effective team who used to 
manage many different issues that IUG has confronted since its establishment. 
 
The previous Chancellor confirmed the co-operation between himself and the Board 
of Trustees:   
“We used to have almost daily informal meeting with the Chairman of 
the Board of Trustees as we used to discuss different important issues 
and take decisions” (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013). 
 
Document analysis provided evidence that reflected the strong co-operation, 
understanding and unity between the two partners. Both sides used to sign together 
many messages sent to the occupation authorities (documents 4, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 
19, 20, 21, 28, 35 and 48). This exceptional partnership and participation presented a 
strong style of leadership as it gave them power, a high degree of control and 
authority, support and idealised influence upon most followers. 
 
The focus group highlighted a different point of view. Despite the partnership and its 
fruitful results, there were tensions and arguments, particularly, in the discussions on 
campus and also expressed by some interviewees, about the relationship between the 
University Council and the Board of Trustees.  
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One respondent from the focus group said that: 
“I think the dominance of the Board of Trustees was at the expense of 
the University Council and created conflict of the authorities of both 
sides” (Focus group1, Jan. 2014). 
 
It should be acknowledge that during the observations of the researcher, especially in 
the recent few years, there were some examples of internal, yet informal, criticisms 
about the role of the Board of Trustees and their unnecessary intervention in the daily 
issues of the university. They argued that this intervention diminished the role of the 
University Council for the interest of the Board of Trustees.  
 
The researcher’s own observation confirmed, in spite of some criticisms, the positive 
outcomes of this partnership. Most respondents gave examples supporting the view 
that the Board of Trustees have played a crucial role in supporting the university by 
all means possible, not the least with the stand against the Israeli oppressive measures, 
constructing permanent buildings and opening new Faculties and departments.  
 
The researcher argues that in the early stages of IUG, the Board of Trustees played a 
stronger role in the university compared to the University Council as they represented 
the university in front of the occupation authorities. In the creation stage of IUG, the 
Board of Trustees, where representatives of different political and ideological 
affiliation sat side by side, has played an important founding role and securing funds 
to IUG. But in 1992, after the creation of Al-Azhar university, the Board of Trusted 
was restructured. Some of the newly structured Board are independents while others 
have Hamas affiliation. The role of the Board has changed and the confrontation with 
the occupation retreated to the consolidation stage of securing funds to launch new 
buildings and creating networks of communications, agreements and partnership with 
different universities and groups. During the fourth stage, the role of the Board was to 
secure scholarships for thousands of needy students and  to rebuild what the wars of 
2009, 2012 and 2014 destroyed. Hence, the role and the priorities of the Board have 
changed, but there is still serious debate  and criticisms among some different groups 
of the staff member about the role of the Board of Trustees, particularly their 
intervention in the daily issues of the university. 
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5.2.2 Communications and Networks  
IUG leadership communicated in two directions, external and internal. Externally, 
IUG made connections with other universities around the world. As part of these 
relationships, IUG has received local and international delegations, and sent 
delegations of its own to other universities. The evidence from document analysis 
provided some examples of these visits. For instance, the visit of the American 
Ambassador (document 55), the Qatari Ambassador (document 58), and the Egyptian 
Ambassador (document 60). 
  
Also, the evidence from individual interviews gave support to the effectiveness of the 
communication networks at IUG. Some respondents were convinced that the 
communication of IUG was good enough to support IUG in different disciplines. For 
example, one administrator respondent from the pioneer females working at the 
registration office since 1980 said that: 
"The university is keen to work with international institutions to 
provide scholarship to staff and students to achieve postgraduate 
degrees and come back to serve IUG and the community. IUG has 
always kept international relations with different prospects to offer 
scholarships and educational expeditions to its students to come back 
afterwards with high degrees" (Abu Shaaban, individual interview, 
Dec. 2013).  
 
This view was supported by the previous Chancellor who led the university in 
difficult and challenging times. He clarified that:  
“The university has joined many Education Unions including Arab, 
Local, and International ones to serve the purpose of recognizing IUG 
and its graduates. Following these steps, we conducted different visits 
and communication and we signed numerous agreements. I believe 
that IUG has become more powerful in spite of being not recognized 
by the Israeli occupation” (Shoubair, individual interview, Dec. 2013). 
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This diversity of communications and relations played an important role in helping 
IUG to find alternatives and solutions to some important problems they faced. 
 
With regard to the internal communications, there was a view among some 
respondents that the leadership has had good communication and relationship with the 
staff. For example, Al-Jabier who worked at IUG in 1981 as an administrator and 
retired in 2012 agreed that: 
“Generally, for more than 30 years, the administration has been in 
communication with the employees at the levels of working and social 
events. Moreover, the employees have a good relationship between 
each other based on respect and communication as one family” (Al-
Jabier, individual interview, Jan. 2014). 
 
This left a positive influence upon followers giving them the feeling of partnership. In 
line with this view, another respondent from the administration staff said: 
“I feel that the university appreciated and still appreciates and 
respects the needs of employees. It also works in harmony with them 
and provides them with what it can afford. IUG’s leadership has 
always respected its employees and is always eager to offer whatever it 
could to meet their needs" (Barhoum, individual interview, Feb. 2014). 
 
The individual consideration and the close relationship between the leadership and 
staff inspired and stimulated many of the staff members to follow instructions as 
partners rather than just as employees.  
 
This harmony and effective communication appeared strongly, particularly in times of 
crises and shocks. Gallagher, Fontenot and Kris (2007) stress the importance of 
communication particularly in turbulent times. In such situations, the relationship 
between the leadership and the staff becomes stronger which, in turn, helps in 
alleviating the pressure and overcoming the problems.  
The evidence given by many interviewees has supported this view. 
"The leadership of the university is in full harmony with the staff. 
There is high and reciprocal confidence. The leadership is considered 
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to be a role model for staff, and the relationship between them is based 
on brotherhood. For instance, informational emails are exchanged 
daily between the leadership and staff. There is no barrier between the 
leadership and staff as it is easy for any employee to reach and meet 
with the president of the university himself. Employees can socially 
engage with the leadership in social events and visits to employees as 
well” (Al-Rantisi, individual interview, Dec. 2013).  
 
The flexibility of communication built trust and confidence between the leadership 
and the staff. 
 
There were some respondents, academics and administrators, who thought that these 
communications were not strong enough all the time, especially with regard to 
informing the staff about funding issues, such as salaries or the rewards system. One 
respondent from the focus group believed that: 
“The absence of transparency and good communications with different 
levels of staff members created misunderstanding and a gap between 
the leadership and some employees” (Focus group 2, Mar. 2014).   
 
Communication networks were strong enough through the first three stages of IUG, 
but in the fourth stage the communications show some weakness. Communication 
became more difficult with larger campus and under conditions of tight siege and 
closure, and with salary problems which raised the tension between the leadership and 
employees' union at IUG.  
 
In summary, through the interviews, documents and observations, it can be seen that 
the networks of communication and relationship the leadership built throughout the 
years at both external and internal levels have played a crucial role in solving different 
challenges and hardships to which IUG were exposed. The external communications 
helped in finding alternatives and overcoming many challenges, such as hiring 
graduates, guaranteeing scholarships to conduct post-graduate studies, fundraising for 
buildings and equipment and supporting needy students.  
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In terms of internal communications, the leadership tried, generally, to keep good 
communication with staff whether they were formal or social. However, sometimes 
the leadership did not communicate with all levels of employees or with their 
representatives. As the university grew, communication structures were not adapted or 
developed quickly enough to reach all levels of a large staff complement. The level of 
communication was not good enough, particularly in recent years when it is related to 
some personal interests of employees such as salaries. The conflict of personal 
interest with the organisational interests created occasional loss of trust and the 
communications with employees did not succeed in filling this gap all the time. 
 
The communication networks between the leadership and the staff oscillated between 
strength and weakness. The networks of communication and relationship were good 
and strong enough in the first stage of IUG’s inception particularly when it related to 
challenging the occupation measures. But in the second stage of closing IUG from 
1988 to 1992 and the first years of the third stage of consolidation, the effectiveness 
of these networks was not good enough because of the shutting down of IUG and the 
risks of being arrested. In late 1990s and early years 2000s in the fourth stage, the 
communication improved as the leadership adopted and communicated a new system 
of salaries and rewards.  
 
Confronting the policy of siege and closure and opposing the occupation strengthened 
communications and created a sense of affiliation. But the financial crises which 
appeared strongly in 2012 and beyond, created a loss of confidence and weakened the 
communications between the leadership and employee representatives and parts of the 
staff members. However, in spite of some weaknesses, the communication networks 
contributed in finding a basic ground of understanding in order to apply the strategies, 
policies and objectives the leadership aims to achieve. 
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5.2.3 Social Cohesion: Embracing and Protecting the University 
The story of IUG  demonstrates the reality and the value of social cohesion and to 
what extent it existed between IUG and the community. The occupation’s practices 
against the university’s staff and students developed a sense of unity and compassion 
and strengthened their steadfastness. 
 
The evidence from interviews and participant observation shows that there was a 
widely held view regarding the efforts IUG leadership exerted to gain the support and 
trust of the community. For example, Professor Fatheya Al-lolo, a female who has 
worked at IUG since 1996, and currently acts as the Dean of the Faculty of Education 
stated that:    
“The university seeks to serve the community and the administration of 
the Islamic thoughts. Moreover, it supplies the local community 
cadres, enlightens ideas to promote quality of life, and employs 
techniques in dealing properly with people” (Al-lolo, individual 
interview, Dec. 2014).  
This was echoed by other respondents, The Dean of the Faculty of Commerce said 
that: 
 “Social accountability is important because we don’t only work for 
our own benefits, but also for our community which, as a result, 
cherishes our efforts and supports us. This is an indicator that the 
university exits to serve the community’s needs which are the focal 
point and our main target to meet. We, as a community-based 
organisation, work to enhance the opportunities for our community so 
it prospers. That’s why the community embraces us and we embrace it 
as well” (Al-Farra, individual interview, Jan. 2014). 
 
Serving the community and looking after their needs is a pre-condition to gain their 
support and trust. IUG gained the support of the community. Opening classes beyond 
university venues showed social cohesion and support. 
 “The community helped us to held lectures at homes, Mosques and 
clubs” (Zourob, individual interview, Jan. 2014). 
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Serving the community was crucial to gaining their support, and this is one of the 
main objectives of IUG that was confirmed by members of the community and 
academics who left IUG in 1991. Also, Dr. Mohamed Abo Jarad, the Undersecretary 
of the Ministry of HE in the Gaza Strip, who did not work at IUG confirmed that: 
 “IUG opened the University College for Applied Science to serve the 
community needs of practical specializations. Also, IUG graduates 
gain good reputation and they compete in different vacancies” (Abo 
Jarad, individual interview, Feb. 2014) 
Opening this college was important as it provided the community with the necessary 
practical specialisations.  
 
Individual interviews emphasised the efforts of the leadership in serving the 
community and establishing a tight social cohesion. Baliamoune-Lutz, (2009) states 
that when social cohesion reaches a threshold level then positive effects might appear. 
Through the observations, the researcher noted that many different conferences, 
exhibitions, trips, cultural activities and graduation ceremonies were held for the 
benefit of students, staff and the community as well (e. g. graduation ceremonies two 
weeks after the war of July 2014). 
 
Personal observation also confirmed the support of the community for IUG in terms 
of donating to the university. Palestinians, individuals and groups, played an 
important role in fund raising. In addition, the community has supported IUG many 
times during the demonstrations against the occupation particularly from 1984-1987. 
On these occasions, the confrontation turned to be between the people and the Israeli 
soldiers. These demonstrations took place in Gaza cities soon after the occupation 
besieged the university. Different groups, individuals, families of students and staff 
and youths participated in these demonstrations. Even more, some of the community 
leaders participated by asking the occupation to stop the siege and withdraw. This 
social cohesion put more pressure on the occupation to stop and leave in order to calm 
down and control the deteriorating situation on the ground.  
 
However, conflict, as well as social cohesion, affected the community. One key 
respondent, who actually was a student at IUG in 1980 and became a staff member in 
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1985 and later a Secretary General of the Board of Trustees shed light on the 
difficulties which resulted from the political conflict among students in the 1980s. He 
said that: 
“We suffered a lot from the conflict among us as students which turned 
sometimes to violent actions. But both parties with the help of the 
leadership of IUG and the community leaders tried to contain these 
accidents and we were back at work as soon as possible” (Al-Hindi, 
individual interview, Nov.2013).  
 
The conflict between students has occasionally, in times of clashes, affected the 
community. During these times, part of the community who has the same Islamic 
political affiliation strongly supported IUG, while those who have different political 
affiliation such as secular or leftist were less supportive towards IUG.  
 
Document 11 revealed that the leadership tried to solve the violent incidents between 
supporters of Fatah and Hamas which resulted from electing a new employees’ union 
in 1983. Document 12 clarified how the leadership succeeded in bringing the two 
rival parties together and containing the tension in order to keep the educational 
process going after being disrupted for few days.  
  
In addition, document 39 revealed the intervention of the Chairman of PLO, Yasser 
Arafat, to solve the problem between the rivals of the Islamic Trend and Fatah by 
accepting the results of the elections for the employees union and approving the 
appointments IUG asked for. The relationship between Fatah and Hamas played a 
paradoxical role in the social cohesion. On the one hand, with regard to challenging 
the occupation, particularly after the establishment of IUG in 1978 until the creation 
of the Palestinian authority in1993, the two parties were always trying to overcome 
their political disagreements in order to confront the occupation with some kind of 
unity and cohesion. From 1993 to 2005  the two parties in IUG experienced a period 
of calm. On the other hand, violent clashes took place in an exercise of power and 
control after Hamas won the majority in the free elections of 2006.  
 
 185  
The researcher’s observation confirmed that IUG suffered from this division. The 
social cohesion was strongly affected by this violence. In these incidents of 2007, 
IUG paid a high price. Some main buildings were partially burned by some security 
forces. Since then, the PNA stopped the financial support of the ministry of HE which 
was provided to IUG as well as other universities. The exclusion of IUG from 
financial support was a collective punishment to IUG. The political conflict between 
Fatah and Hamas was the main reason behind this dilemma, and IUG pay a price. 
 
Despite the bad effects of the conflict on the social cohesion, it was striking that both 
sides were able to get their unity back. This happened many times, particularly in 
times of besieging the university or when students were captured or arrested during 
demonstrations, and when IUG was bombed in recent wars. The current Chancellor of 
IUG confirmed that by saying:   
“After the destruction of 72 laboratories during December 2008 war, 
some equipment was saved from under the rubble, but the main 
equipment was repurchased. Laboratories of Al-Azhar and Al-Aqsa 
universities were borrowed, in addition to the cooperation with the 
university College for Applied Science (UCAS)” (Shaath, individual 
interview, March 2014). 
 
The Palestinian community and its institutions demonstrated the ability to forget their 
domestic problems and competition and turned to co-operation and unity when 
confronting the occupation. This is because they believe that the main conflict and 
struggle should be with the occupation not against each other. The researcher 
observed that soon after the bombing of IUG, thousands of the people came to see the 
damage and to give solidarity with the university. The social cohesion with the 
university, whether among the population or HEIs, was high.  
 
 
5.2.4 Spirit of Affiliation and Commitment 
Affiliation and the commitment of employees is one of the important factors which 
help any organisation to perform well. The importance of commitment and the spirit 
of affiliation increases in turbulent and crisis times. Many scholars (Punamäki, 1996; 
 186  
Shamai, 2002; Punamäki, et al., 2008) believe that commitment is a protective factor 
that increases the ability to cope effectively in highly stressful situations, and is 
regarded as a contributor to resilience (Hollnagel, 2007; Seery, 2011). This is because, 
in such hazardous conditions, the leadership needs the commitment of followers to 
take forceful yet rational actions, and sometimes change the goals and direction in 
order to deal properly with the new challenging events.  
 
The individual interviews showed that there was a general agreement about the 
existence of the commitment and affiliation among the majority of the staff.  For 
instance, Professor Jawad Wady said that: 
“The affiliation of the leadership and staff was the critical factor of 
what the university has reached” (Wady, individual interview, Feb. 
2014). 
 
This view was supported by a member of the top management who said: 
“Honestly, under these circumstances, the leadership and employees 
were like one body. Also, the leadership along with highly trusted 
people is respected and well appreciated even in times of financial 
crises, and that was the main reason behind its success. One colleague 
have told me that they have been teaching for more than 25 hours per 
week while the average load was 12-15 hours, which means more than 
double the work; this example happens repeatedly. This means that in 
times of crisis, both the leadership and employees have to sacrifice” 
(Awad-Allah, individual interview, Nov. 2013). 
 
This commitment and partnership between the leadership and employees empowered 
the members and created a sense of affiliation among the staff. There is no doubt that 
the existence of the occupation and their oppressive measures against IUG were a 
motivator to raise the commitment and affiliation of the staff and to stimulate them to 
challenge the occupation and stand against the odds.  
 
One female respondent from the administration staff stressed that:  
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“IUG leadership along with its employees was able to adapt with the 
surrounding circumstances. Also, they were able to carry on with the 
educational process according to the instructions of the leadership. 
The main reason behind the success in dealing with the circumstances 
is the commitment and devotion of the staff” (Abu Shaaban, individual 
interview, Dec. 2013).  
 
A similar example also provided by one of the pioneer employees at IUG who 
expressed that:  
“We loved our university, we were ready to sacrifice and work under 
dangerous conditions. Sometimes we worked extra time with no 
compensation and we covered each other in these tough conditions. 
Simply, we were ready to work under various and challenging 
conditions” (AL-Ajez, individual interview, Nov. 2013).  
 
Such commitment, sacrifice, affiliation and adaptation are important indicators which 
reflect the extent of resilience of IUG staff. Hoogervorst, De Cremer, van Dijke, and 
Mayer (2012) believe that sacrifice is correlated with belongingness of leaders or 
individuals. Having a spirit of affiliation created a sense of purpose and sacrifice. One 
female respondent revealed that: 
“Of course there is a feeling of affiliation among the staff; they feel 
that they are the sons and daughters of the university and part of it” 
(Al-lolo, individual interview, Dec. 2014). 
 
The strong belonging, commitment and partnership was felt and confirmed even by 
those who have stopped working at IUG. One of the academics who left to work in 
Al-Azhar University in 1991 stated that: 
“For us, there was a motivation to work in this university, and there 
was love, belonging, and loyalty to the university and the country, so 
the issue of salaries didn`t stand as a barrier to stop work at the 
university" (Taym, individual interview, Jan. 2014).  
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The ability to work hard with no compensation and sacrifice was a good marker of 
affiliation and commitment which are important factors that helped the leadership to 
achieve the objectives of the university. This was also emphasised through the group 
discussion. Members of the focus group concluded that:  
“Even nowadays, this can be shown deliberately, i.e. crises related to 
electricity, politics, strikes, or gas cannot take its way to stop the 
university. Actually, the secret is that; we have devoted committed 
employees supporting and helping this place” (Focus group1, Jan. 
2014). 
 
 Affiliation at IUG played an important role in strengthening the relationships and 
cooperation with those with the same ideology. However, it created tension among 
those with different political affiliations. 
 
In summary, most of the respondents of individual and group interviews believed that 
the level of affiliation and commitment among the staff was high especially in 
confronting the Israeli disruptions. This was salient in the first and the second stages 
as well as in different events in the fourth stage, such as the bombing of the university 
in 2009, and in the war of 2012.  
 
In times of political conflict, also, the affiliation was relatively high, but played a dual 
role for the sake of IUG on the one hand, and for the sake of political interests of 
Fatah and Hamas on the other hand. Importantly, in times of stability throughout the 
third and the fourth stage, the personal interests were raised and the demands of 
employees in terms of salaries and promotions played a negative role at the expense 
of the commitment of some members of the staff.  
 
 
5.2.5 Retention of Employees 
Employee retention in the institution is an important factor that keeps the institution 
stable, particularly those employees with special capacities. Most organisations are 
competing to hire and retain the most qualified employees (Mattox and Jinkerson, 
2005). The retention of IUG employees was at stake during different times. The staff 
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was working in conditions of stress, risk and war. Many of them were exposed to 
arrest, humiliation measures, loss of  their accommodation and deportation.  
 
The researcher’s own observation showed that the retention of the staff was very high 
in the first two stages of IUG till the creation of AL-Azhar university in 1991. This 
was the main reason behind a large number of the staff leaving to join the new 
university. One of those who left IUG later became the Chancellor of AL-Azhar 
University. He said that:   
“The number of faculty members who have doctorate and masters’ 
degrees in IUG before the establishment of Al- Azhar University was 
about 150; about 60 of them joined Al-Azhar university in 1992-1993 
and the remaining members were the main core of IUG. Later on, 
they established the faculty of Engineering alongside many other 
colleges” (Wady, individual interview, Feb. 2014).  
  
IUG lost about 40% of their qualified staff at this time. Political conflict played a dual 
role.  It was the main reason to leave for part of the staff as well as the main reason to 
stay for the other part. This is in addition to the financial issue of salaries which 
played a role in the decision to leave. PLO stopped the support to IUG and stopped 
salaries for those who did not join the new university.  
 
The general view of most of the remaining members of the faculties at IUG was 
similar to the faculty of Education which provided a strong example presented by a 
key member of the faculty who has worked as a staff member since 1980: 
“In the Faculty of Education there were 17 teachers; seven went to 
pursue their HE, and four left to AL-Azhar University. Only six 
members remained. We managed to sort things out ourselves, and we 
employed some of our graduates in order to fill the gap.” (Al-Ajez, 
individual interview, Nov. 2013).  
 
In analysing the reasons for this dilemma, the Dean of the faculty of Commerce 
believed that: 
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“The goal behind withdrawing teachers from IUG and moving them to 
the new university was to cripple the educational process, but thanks to 
the right decision taken in the right time, this deficit was covered soon 
enough although the quality was affected” (Al-Farra, individual 
interview, Jan. 2014).  
 
While some respondents argued that the remaining staff were able to fill the gap 
and, thus, students were not affected by this dilemma, other members argued that the 
quality of education was affected. This is because of the qualified staff leaving, 24 
were PhD holders and 38 were Master holders and about 18 from the administration 
staff within a very short period of time. This disrupted the education process for a 
while and left negative effects on the quality of the teaching process. Hiring new 
graduates did not give the same quality of teaching. Nevertheless it was an attempt 
to keep the educational process moving despite obstacles. 
  
The discussion in the group interviews asserted that such a big number leaving at 
once created an academic vacuum and it took time to fill the gap. 
 “Shifting many of the qualified staff to Al-Azhar was very difficult and 
challenging because it was combined with threats and fund restriction 
on salaries” (Focus group 1, Jan. 2014). 
 
In these hard times, the strategy of the leadership was to keep moving forward with 
the educational process and keep the staff motivated. Face-saving was important to 
IUG leadership and the remaining staff in order to demonstrate the ability to survive 
despite these crises. It was a real challenge to the leadership to demonstrate high 
levels of control and motivation of followers and to involve them in the process.  It 
was strongly acknowledged that, apart from this dilemma of the creation of AL-
Azhar University, there was a high level of retention of employees. They were ready 
to struggle and sacrifice as they saw IUG as a national project. 
The current Chancellor stated that: 
“Personally, I was never offered another job nor did I ever look for or 
think about another job opportunity. Even if I was offered another job, 
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I would not accept as this my prior decision” (Shaath, individual 
interview, March 2014).  
With regard to the main reasons behind the retention of employees at IUG, a key 
respondent said that: 
I believe that the main reason behind staff retention is their affiliation 
and lack of job opportunities outside the university. However, many of 
the staff members wanted to sticks around because they loved the 
university, its ideologies, and its comfortable working environment” 
(Al-Farra, individual interview, Jan. 2014). 
 
One respondent summarised different reasons behind the retention of IUG staff:   
 “From my point of view, there are three main factors behind 
employees’ retention in IUG: 
1- The position and weight of IUG as it’s the first and oldest 
university in the Gaza Strip. 
2- The working environment in IUG is comfortable financially, 
psychologically, and in many other aspects regardless of all the 
obstacles it faces. 
3- The affiliation of the employees and their belonging to the 
university ideology” (Samour, individual interview, Jan. 2014). 
 
In summary, apart from the dilemma of 1991, the previous discussion indicated that 
the retention of IUG staff was relatively high. The ideology of IUG played an 
important role in the retention of employees. These results are aligned with the 
approaches of Chatman (1991) and Andrews, Witt, Kacmar (2003) that sharing the 
same thoughts and beliefs increase the rate of retention of employees. Most of the 
staff saw IUG as a national project that is worth challenging the occupation and 
sacrificing for.  
5.2.6 Training and Development Programmes 
Training and development programmes are important indicators of the progress of 
institutions. Literature  provides a view that experienced and well-trained employees 
have the ability to deal resiliently with shocks and unexpected events (Furniss, et al., 
2011). As the university was still emerging in 1978 and 1980s, it lacked research and 
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development programmes. This was due to the lack of resources (human, material, 
and funding) which were associated with the level of distress experienced by 
Palestinians (Hobfoll, Mancini, Canetti, and Bonanno, 2011). The main goal of IUG 
at that time was to keep operating despite all the hard conditions it went through. 
Nevertheless, after the PNA arrived in Gaza in 1993, many research programmes 
were initiated and encouraged by the leadership, giving the chance to large numbers 
of staff members to participate in conferences and conduct research around the world. 
This was confirmed by the focus group: 
 “There weren't sufficient training programmes till 1995, then it 
started gradually to target different levels of employees with diversity 
of programmes” (Focus group 2, Mar. 2014). 
 
In the first and the second stage of the development of IUG, some interviews in 
addition to the observations of the researcher clarified that the priority was not on 
training programmes, rather, it was keeping the functioning of IUG and providing the 
main service of teaching students and standing against the Israeli odds. 
“There weren’t adequate training programmes in the first years, just 
very few programmes such as using the pc and management 
programmes and theses programmes were offered to specific 
employees” (Taym, individual interview, Jan. 2014).  
 
After the consolidation stage, the leadership launched various training and 
development programmes. Individual interviews provided a view that many training 
programmes were held to raise the capacity of the staff members. For instance, at the 
academic level, one respondent from the faculty of Education explained that: 
“The university gave a lot of motivation to its workers regarding this 
matter. The workers are generally attracted to these training 
programmes as they enhance their abilities and scientific background” 
(Al-Rantisi, individual interview, Dec. 2013). 
 
In addition, the Community Service and Continuing Education Deanship (SCED) has 
provided staff, students and the community as a whole with a diversity of training and 
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diploma courses in order to raise their capacity and to contribute to the development 
of the society.  
 
The focus group interviews stressed that there were a lot of training programmes in 
the consolidation and the fourth stage of IUG history. They claimed that these 
programmes lacked understanding of the priorities of the staff. 
“We noted in late 1990s and early 2000s that there was training 
programmes, but not attracted a lot of the staff” (Focus group 1, 
Jan.2014). 
The researcher observed that the quality and diversity of training programmes 
improved gradually to meet the needs of the staff members. 
 
  
5.2.7 Recruitment of Employees 
Recruitment standards based on qualification and competitiveness are indicators of 
good quality of institutions and contribute in building the society (Florida, 2002; Betts 
and Lee, 2005). IUG lacked qualified staff especially in the first two stages until 
1993. To overcome this shortage, the leadership tried to recruit qualified staff from 
the Gaza Strip, West Bank and from neighboring countries.  
 
Documentary evidence shed light on the attempts of the leadership to recruit qualified 
staff from abroad as Gaza lacked qualified staff. Therefore, a series of letters sent to 
the occupation during the 1980s (documents, 13, 19, 20, 28, 29, 44 and 46) showed 
the engagement and the attempts of the leadership to grant the acceptance of the 
occupation to recruit staff from the West Bank and from abroad.  
 
The reflections and the observation of the researcher clarified that political loyalty 
played an important role in hiring candidates. It reflected most clearly in the 
recruitment process as every party (Fatah and Hamas supporters) tried, particularly at 
the inception stage, to give more weight to their supporters and recruit them in an 
attempt to control the university. This was, sometimes, at the expense of recruitment 
standards. The recruitment standard did not work very well particularly when hiring 
administrators and support staff. In the consolidation stage (1993 onward) IUG 
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recruited many qualified academic staff based, to a considerable extent, on 
qualification and competitiveness. Even more, after 2002, the recruitment process 
became more coherent and based on quality standards. 
 
The individual interviews revealed that some respondents believed that there were 
mistakes and irregularities in the recruitment process. Others argued that it was 
crucial to recruit those who shared IUG vision, mission and Islamic culture.  
One respondent illustrated this: 
 “The process of choosing the staff in the university is based on 
professionalism and the role of every individual who believes in the 
philosophy and message of the university and is willing to work on the 
success of its vision in order to achieve the university’s goals” (Al-
Farra, individual interview, Jan. 2014). 
 
Sometimes the recruitment process gave more weight to political affiliation at the 
expense of certificates. Members of the focus group gave support to this view 
confirming that: 
“Recruitment standards were not implemented adequately at IUG in 
the first years of its inception because the main goal was to hire those 
who shared IUG it message and culture” (focus group 2, Mar. 2014). 
 
This was one of the points the university was criticised for. However, the same factor 
might be the reason behind the strong feeling of affiliation, belonging and sacrifice for 
the sake of the university, as everyone shares the same goals and culture of the 
university. 
 
In summary in the first two stages the recruitment process gave more weight to 
political affiliation and loyalty. But in the third and the fourth stages more weight was 
given to qualification, quality and transparency.  
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Chapter Six 
 
 6. Diversity of Strategies, Leadership Styles and Resilience at IUG 
This chapter links the results with the literature review and answers the main question 
of the study about the role of the leadership in fostering resilience at IUG. Therefore, 
the chapter starts with analysing the strategies used by the leadership in dealing with 
different challenges. Then, the chapter classifies the characteristics and the styles of 
IUG leadership utilised in the four stages of IUG. Next, the chapter provides evidence 
about resilience at IUG. It unpacks the cognitive, behavioural and contextual markers 
of resilience. Finally, the chapter analyses the role of culture and ideology and its 
contribution in to the survival of IUG. 
 
6.1 Strategies Used by the Leadership 
In the previous chapter, the researcher analysed the factors used by the leadership in 
responding to the various difficulties IUG experienced. This section concentrates on 
the main strategies IUG followed through the four stages by utilising these factors.  
Suikki, Tromtedt, and Haapasalo, (2006) and Yukl, (2008) assert that if organisations 
seek to survive and prosper in unstable contexts, they need adaptable leadership that 
can understand the obstacles which affect the organisation and deal appropriately with 
them. Shepherd, et al. (2000) believe that incompetent leadership is a crucial factor 
that might lead to failure of an organisation. 
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The results of this study show that the leadership succeeded in keeping the university 
surviving and the educational process moving forward despite hurdles. The individual 
interviews provided evidence that the leadership deployed different strategies 
throughout the four stages: challenge and defying, social cohesion, bypassing and 
absorbing,  moving forward, and the exercise of power. 
The Chairman of the Board of Trustees confirmed that: 
“IUG working according to a clear vision; in those hard times, our 
main goal was to keep the educational process going whatever the 
price will be. We challenged all the internal and external disruptions 
and obstacles” (AL-Khodary, J., individual interview, Feb. 2014,).  
 
There was a widely held view among respondents that the survival of IUG was a 
consistent goal in the face of extreme adverse circumstances. For example, a female 
respondent who graduated from IUG in 1987 and started working at IUG in 1992 as 
administrator in the office of the Dean of Student Affairs was convinced that:  
“Insisting on going on was the path of the university operations. This 
strategy was the main reason of its permanency, which helped IUG 
achieve its goals” (Najem, individual interview, Dec. 2013). 
  
The main goal of IUG leadership was for the university to survive especially in the 
first and the second stages of its inception. to achieve this goal, the educational 
process needed to continue, regardless of the dangers and the price. Therefore, they 
engage, bypass and challenge the occupation orders in order to survive. 
  
Tushman and Romanelli, (1985) believe that it is easier to survive and grow when the 
organisation’s operations are relatively stable for a considerable period of time rather 
than constantly changing and turbulent . But although the environment has been 
turbulent, the first and the main goal for IUG was to survive and to carry on. Davies 
(2004) believes that adaptation is crucial to the survival of an organisation, and 
considered as a sign of organisational success (Beer, Voelpel, Leibold, and Tekie, 
2005). Organisations seeking to survive need to attract, motivate and retain employees 
(Fitz-enz, 2010), and orient and adapt their behaviour to their particular environment 
(Suikki, et al., 2006). The leadership was able to adapt and cope with different kinds 
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of challenges. They was able to motivate followers and orient them toward serving 
IUG and sacrifice for this national project. 
 
Another administrator was convinced that social cohesion was also a key strategy: 
“The leadership has a clear vision that the university seeks to expand 
its relations with the society in order to provide the services they need” 
(Al-Jabier, individual interview, Jan. 2014). 
 
Serving the society and consolidating the social cohesion was a clear strategy that 
appeared many times. The view was acknowledged by many respondents that the goal 
of IUG leadership was moving beyond survival to thriving where possible. Professor 
AL-Ajez said: 
“While we suffered lack of resources and staff, we opened different 
Faculties and created new departments. We aimed to build our 
university and serve our community” (Al-Ajez, individual interview, 
Nov. 2013).  
 
The second goal was looking beyond survival to growth (Lengnick-Hall, et al., 2011). 
Opening new faculties and departments in spite of all obstacles was part of the growth 
strategy of the leadership. Improving the qualifications of the staff was another 
indicator of growth. Improving the university environment by constructing permanent 
buildings with the required facilities and equipment also was important signs of 
thriving. 
 
One of the strategies used by the leadership was the exercise of power between the 
occupation and the IUG, through alternately engaging, absorbing the anger of and 
bypassing the occupation. Although the literature does not give adequate attention to 
the exercise of power particularly in HEIs in turbulent times, it sheds some light on 
the exercise of power between different groups within an organisation and in business 
relationships.  Rindt and Mouzas (2015) believe that the stronger party is likely to be 
able to dominate and exercise power and therefore, determine the process and its 
outcomes. At IUG the party which seemed the weakest: IUG leadership, nevertheless 
managed to prevail.  
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The exercise of power derived from coercive sources increases conflict and reduces 
trust and satisfaction (Leonidou, Talias, and Leonidou, 2008). Internally, the political 
division and the attempts to dominate IUG, in the 1980s by  Fatah and Hamas 
increased the conflict and created an environment of less confidence and trust and 
therefore led to some violent clashes. Externally, the coercive military orders of the 
occupation increased the conflict and raised the national sense of struggle and 
sacrifice. 
The leadership realised since the early stages of IUG that, on the one hand, the 
occupation sometimes had a lot of power to implement and impose their military 
measures: expelling the Chancellors of the university; imposing severe restrictions on 
movement and transfer of money; and shutting down the university. This is because 
the occupation authorities could impose their will and control over these issues more 
easily. At other times, their power was curtailed: they were not able to prevent the 
erection of buildings; the opening of new faculties and departments; and the 
increasing the number of registered students. This is because the control of the 
occupation upon these issues was relatively limited and put the occupation in a direct 
confrontation with thousands of students, staff and the community both in Palestine 
and internationally. 
 
The findings confirmed that IUG leadership had at least four modes of dealing with 
the occupation: engaging, absorbing their anger, bypassing and defying.  They 
engaged them; writing many letters to request permission to take in additional 
students, permission to construct buildings instead of tents, requests for recognition, 
requests for the release of restrictions on fund raising and transfers of money and 
requests for the release of restrictions of mobility of movements. They attempted to 
absorb the anger of the occupation, for example, by closing the university on national 
holidays to stop the Israeli forces from attacking demonstrating students. Also, this 
happened when freezing the planned opening of the faculty of Nursing. They defied 
the occupation authorities: for example, they constructed buildings when permission 
had been denied and they increased the number of registered students when the 
occupation attempted to limit the numbers of enrolled students. They bypassed the 
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occupation orders; for example, by seeking recognition elsewhere, and by opening job 
opportunities for graduates in different countries around the world.  
 
This diversity of strategies confirmed that IUG leadership had a portfolio of 
alternatives with the ability to adapt and act in accordance with the situation.  
Lengnick-Hall, et al. (2011)  argue that in order to cope with challenges and to adapt 
to a turbulent environment, resilient organisational strategy enables organisations to 
absorb uncertainty, develop situation-specific responses to threats, and ultimately 
engage in transformational activities so that they can capitalise on disruptive surprises 
that potentially threaten their survival. This is what happened at IUG 
 
There were some criticisms that a formal and written strategy was not in existence for 
more than 15 years.  In this regard, there were a number of respondents who thought 
that: 
“Since the establishment of IUG and until the year1993, there were no 
clear written strategic plan, but there was certainly some procedural 
plans and continuous proceeding that follows up with the events 
through the specialized parties, in addition to the engineering plan that 
existed for more than 20 years, showing what the university facilities 
was aimed to be like” (Abo AL-Roos, individual interviews, Feb. 
2014).  
 
The focus groups supported the  sentiments of the individual interviews that the 
leadership deployed different strategies to overcome the challenges IUG faced.  
“The leadership succeeded to deal properly with different internal and 
external challenges. If we want to evaluate the role of the leadership, 
we can say that they kept IUG survived and thrived for more than three 
decades. May be there was some deficiencies and ability to do better in 
some disciplines” (Focus group 2, Mar. 2014). 
 
A different point of view was presented by members of the focus group 1: 
“In the stage of reinforcement, IUG started to establish its facilities 
based on correct scientific foundations, depending on a complete 
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engineering plan that shows how the university facilities will look like 
in the next 20 years. This vision was written, clear, and executed to 
prepare for developmental programmes that enhance the university 
along with its facilities and staff. The staff was established and 
improved through preparation and training, new programmes 
emerged, and the university facilities were enhanced” (Focus group 1, 
Jan. 2014). 
  
Through the deep discussion with the focus groups and interviewees it is clear that the 
leadership was proceeding with a clear work plan since 1993 (the consolidation stage) 
to thrive where possible. However, the members of the focus group argued about what 
could be done better to achieve more goals and objectives.  
 
In recent years, particularly in 2005, IUG started to set up a formal written strategic 
plan for the next five years. Professor AL-Faraa, who acted as the Dean of Planning 
and Development Affairs and then as the Dean of the faculty of Commerce, revealed 
that: 
“IUG was the first university in Palestine to set a strategic plan in 
2005 for it has some qualitative cadres. This strategic plan includes 
deep consideration and analysis of the abilities and future vision of the 
university in the coming years” (Al-Farra, individual interview, Jan. 
2014).  
 
One respondent from the management department in the Faculty of Commerce gave 
more details and explanation of IUG strategies in recent years arguing that: 
“We have many strategies including the strategy of openness, the 
strategy of quality and the application of quality theories in 2002, in 
addition to the strategy of globalizing the university to offer its services 
to many foreigners. There is also a written and clear strategy set to 
clarify the position of the institution from 2005 to 2010 which includes 
evident working and execution paths and documents the working 
process and its proofs.” (Al-Dajani, individual interview, Jan. 2014). 
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This flexibility and openness of implementing these different strategies enhanced the 
ability of leadership to achieve the objectives of the university. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2 The Characteristics and Styles of IUG Leadership 
The literature describes transformational leadership as a style of adaptable leadership 
characterised by its adaptability to challenges and capacity to change direction, 
combined with the ability to inspire and motivate individuals (Burns, 1978; 
Siewiorek, et al., 2012).. 
The four types of transformational behaviours, presented in Table 6 ( page 80) are: 
idealised influence; intellectual simulation; individual consideration and inspirational 
motivation (Bass and Avolio, 1990; Yukl, 2010; Siewiorek, et al., 2012). According 
to Yukl (2010:275) with transformational leadership “the followers feel trust, 
admiration, loyalty, and respect toward the leader, and they are motivated to do more 
than they were originally expected to do” .The study confirmed the adoption of this 
style in response to many different events over the four stages of IUG’s history.  
 
For example, since the early years and subsequently, they convinced followers that 
IUG is a national project for educating the new generation and opposing the 
occupation, which requires from the leadership and the staff a willingness to sacrifice 
and endure hardship. In addition, the leadership was able to share knowledge with 
staff and inform them about the challenges and obstacles the university faced.  
 
The leadership shared knowledge and information with them. Also, training 
programmes, conferences, workshops and overseas travel have contributed to the 
intellectual development as well as the motivation of the staff.  
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In terms of idealised influence, the previous analysis of interviews, documents and 
observation revealed that the leadership had idealised influence upon followers. They 
were, generally,  the first line in confronting the occupation; some of them spent years 
in prison or were deported (e.g. previous Chancellors, Saqer and Siyam) or were 
assassinated. They worked in conditions of stress, risks and wars. They sacrificed 
delaying their salaries many times.  
 
In relation to inspirational motivation, the leadership was able to gain followers’ trust 
and commitment. They motivated followers by rewarding them for achievements with 
financial rewards, free training programmes and appreciation letters.  
 
With regard to individual consideration, the leadership gave great consideration to 
individuals’ needs. As was explained in the analysis, the leadership was keen to raise 
followers' skills, strengthen the relationship with them and provide them with the 
required facilities.  
 
In addition, through the four stages, the case of IUG confirmed the three 
characteristics of transformational leadership presented by Bass and Avolio 
(1990) which are: importance of outcomes; transcending self-interest; and activating 
higher-order needs. Therefore, it is clear that IUG leadership possesses characteristics 
which fit with transformational style.  
 
In spite of this, it was striking that although the transformational style strongly existed 
and was implemented, there were additional characteristics of leadership behaviour in 
dealing with some events. Some of these characteristics are: power; face saving and 
rightness of decisions (Siewiorek, et al., 2012). These characteristics confirmed the 
style of heroic leadership which applied in dealing with certain events, particularly in 
opposing the occupation measures.  
 
Other important characteristics displayed by the leadership included empowerment of 
followers, risk taking, participation and development of members. These 
characteristics belong in the category of post-heroic style of leadership which was 
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strongly used by IUG leadership on many occasions particularly in the consolidation 
stage and beyond. 
 
These characteristics are indicators of the diversity of the styles IUG deployed in 
dealing with different events. Sometimes IUG leadership demonstrated a high degree 
of control and authority in dealing with some events. But, most often, they involved 
followers in the decision-making process which, it turn, increased their commitment 
(Zopiatis, Constanti and Theocharous, 2014). The situation on the ground and the 
nature of the challenges IUG faced dictated the pattern of behaviours in doing 
sometimes one thing, and sometimes another thing. For example, the leadership 
behaved in a consultative manner on many different occasions such as when opening 
new faculties and departments and when opening a new branch in the South in times 
of siege which isolated the south of the Gaza Strip from the North. Authoritarian style 
of leadership was rarely used, apart from some specific occasions through the history 
of IUG. At these occasions, the leadership was not able to communicate and meet 
with followers particularly when they decided to challenge the occupation such as 
when constructing temporary buildings in 1983-1984, and when working underground 
during the first intifada in 1987. In responding to some specific events, Claeys and 
Cauberghe (2012) argue that the leadership has to respond very quickly instead of just 
informing stakeholders of what happened. 
 
In summary, IUG leadership displayed different styles of leadership beside the 
transformational style such as heroic and post-heroic styles depending on the given 
situation. Due to security reasons and in order to protect followers, on some occasions 
they deployed an authoritarian style of leadership. By using this style, the leadership 
demonstrated a high degree of control and took decisions alone without consultation 
with others. These styles were used and manifested themselves at the four different 
stages of the history of IUG. The different challenges and shocks IUG experienced 
whether they were predicted or unpredicted, required different patterns of 
characteristics and responses.  
 
The first stage of inception, 1978-1987, was characterised by transformational, 
transactional and heroic styles of leadership in order to confront the internal and 
 204  
external challenges and difficulties. Usually, this implies consultation with followers, 
influencing them to gain their support and leading them to achieve the desired goals. 
Sometimes, the leadership displayed heroic styles to take quick and forceful actions to 
deal with some challenges.  
 
In the second stage of closing IUG for four years, 1987-1992, authoritarian and heroic 
styles were used occasionally, which implies forceful and secret actions in order to 
teach students underground in risky conditions. 
The third stage of consolidation, 1993-2000, was characterised mainly by 
transformational and post-heroic styles as it required constructing new buildings, 
opening new faculties and departments in addition to launching a communication 
campaign after years of closure and lack of resources. The fourth stage of closure, 
political division and wars, 2000-2012, was a stage of both consolidation and 
hazardous conditions. It was characterised by applying transformational, 
transactional, heroic and post-heroic styles. Closure and siege requires deploying both 
heroic and transformational style to take forceful actions, and meanwhile to gain the 
support of followers in order to perform at full capacity. The political division 
required transformational and heroic style to keep IUG functioning and away from 
being involved in this conflict. The two wars in 2008 and 2012 required heroic and 
post-heroic leaders, along with transformational style to keep IUG moving forward 
with the educational process.  
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6.3 Resilience at IUG 
This study adopted Hollnagel’s (2007, 2007, 2009) definition of resilience. Hollnagel 
defined resilience as the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, 
during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain the operations 
required under both expected and unexpected conditions (Hollnagel, 2007, 2009, 
Hollnagel, et al., 2006, 2011). The study also adopted the definition of Lengnick-Hall, 
Beck, and Lengnick-Hall (2011:243) who believe that in adverse circumstances "only 
resilient, agile and relentlessly dynamic organisations will thrive in these turbulent, 
surprising, continuously evolving environments".  
Resilience at leadership and individual level provides a useful starting place for 
defining resilient organisations, since actions and interactions among individual 
organisational members underpin an organisation's collective capacity for resilience 
(Morgeson and Hofmann, 1999). Organisational leaders, as decision makers, are the 
motivators and facilitators for executing and implementing resilience capacities. 
The documents, individual and group interviews, and the observations which were 
discussed and analysed in the previous chapters gave strong indicators of resilience at 
IUG. While some respondents, particularly from the top management, highlighted 
directly the concept of resilience in some answers, the majority of respondents 
highlighted indirectly the extent of resilience by providing examples of resilient 
behaviour at different levels within IUG in dealing with different events and 
hardships.  
 
One female respondent from the administration staff stressed that:  
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“IUG leadership along with its employees was able to adapt with the 
surrounding circumstances and carry on with the educational process. 
The main reason behind the success in dealing with the circumstances 
is the commitment and devotion of the staff” (Abu Shaaban, individual 
interview, Dec. 2013). 
 
  
The Dean of the Faculty of Commerce believed that:  
“If IUG hasn’t been resilient or dealt with resilience in many aspects, 
it wouldn’t have succeeded till now” (Al-Farra, individual interview, 
Jan. 2014). 
 
As an example of an indirect highlight: 
“The leadership was characterized with flexibility and wisdom in 
facing big problems and that what kept IUG stand on feet” (Al-Hindi, 
individual interview, Nov.2013).  
 
Flexibility and rationality (Masten and Reed, 2005; Walsh, 2012) are important 
markers of resilience. The diversity of responses of the leadership to the occupation 
measures at different times is a good marker of flexibility, which is one of the 
cornerstones of resilience (Hollnagel, 2007; Hollnagel, et al., 2011; Steen and Aven, 
2011). The evidence introduced by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees added 
challenging, adaptating, and finding solutions as additional factors: 
“Our strategy of keeping IUG functioning under all circumstances was 
a great motivator to find alternatives and solutions to the obstacles we 
faced. We faced difficulties by challenging it, yes challenges were 
difficult and we suffered a lot, but we were able to adapt with them” 
(AL-Khodary, J. individual interview, Feb. 2014). 
 
Providing other important markers of resilience, the previous Chancellor of IUG 
revealed that: 
“We usually used to inform and consult with many of the staff 
members about our difficulties, particularly the big issues which, in 
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turn helped us to take forceful and proper actions” (Shoubair, 
individual interview, Dec. 2013).  
 
Sharing knowledge with the staff raising their understanding of the reality of the 
challenges was an important step in building trust and sharing accountability, and thus 
gaining their commitment which is one important marker of resilience	  (Costella, et al., 
2009).  
Supporting this view, a similar example was also provided by an expert academic in 
the field of HRM who is working at the faculty of Commerce. He noted that: 
“The leadership was keen to consult with staff members, and sometime 
they established crises management teams in order to solve big 
dilemmas” (Abo AL-Roos, individual interviews, Feb. 2014).  
 
Sharing knowledge and accountability with the staff was an effective policy in 
diagnosing problems and finding suitable alternatives to solve them. Sharing 
accountability at any institution increases control of leadership (Goddard and Powel, 
1994) particularly in turbulent times. Forming crisis management teams was crucial 
for IUG to respond properly and in a timely manner. Also, the commitment of the 
staff and the adaptation to the instructions and sharing accountability, besides 
following orders, played an important role in dealing with hardships IUG faced in a 
resilient and timely manner.  
 
The literature describes different factors of resilience identified by key scholars in the 
field (Hollnagel, 2007; Ungar, et al., 2007; Costella, et al., 2009; Lengnick-Hall, et 
al., 2011; Dinh, et al., 2012). These factors have been summarised into Tables 10, 11 
and 12 describing cognitive, behavioural and contextual factors with brief examples.  
 
 
6.3.1 Cognitive Factors 
Table 10: Cognitive Factors of Resilience at IUG 
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No. Factors Examples of Practical indicators at IUG 
1.  Flexibility 
 
- Finding alternatives to manage events (e.g. non- recognition, buildings). 
- Different forms of communication with the occupation authorities  
- Shutting down IUG to prevent violent political clashes between students. 
- Freezing the establishment of the faculty of Nursing. 
- Partnership with employees. 
2.  Open 
mindedness  
- Meeting and communicating with Israeli Defence Minister and other 
military authorities. 
- Consultation and participation of the staff in the decision making process. 
- Conducting a campaign of communication with other universities, 
individuals and countries  
3.  Expertise 
and learning. 
- Good experience of communicating and negotiation with the occupation 
authorities. 
- Absorbing the anger and tough reactions of the military troops and 
preventing them from storming the university and arresting students or staff 
members. 
- Benefitting from the experience of working underground  in the second 
uprising and  teaching at homes, clubs and Mosques. 
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- Resuming the study programme in record time after the bombing in the war 
of December 2008. 
- Learning and experience with working under stress, crises and risk 
conditions. 
4.  Opportunism - Exploiting opportunities even under threat by opening new faculties and 
departments. 
- Raising the level of demands from the occupation to achieve the targets and 
goals (buildings, finance and qualified staff).   
- Using the troubles of the occupation to develop staff loyalty and community 
support  
5.  Creativity - Teaching underground at homes, clubs and Mosques. 
- Opening a branch for IUG in the isolated areas in 2005. 
- Relocation of teachers to teach students in the isolated areas. 
- Insistence to thrive despite hardships and threats (e.g opening new faculties 
and departments) 
- Providing the staff and students with scholarships for studying abroad. 
- Creating diversity of qualified staff from different cultures and continents. 
6.  Partnership - Full cooperation and partnership between the Board of Trustees and the 
University Council. 
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- Consolidate the feeling of partnership and team spirit. 
- Involvement of community leaders in IUG’s difficulties and challenges. 
- Partnership and twinning agreements with different universities abroad. 
7.  Relationship - Strong relationship between the leadership and staff (individual 
consideration). 
- Strong relationship among the staff members. 
- Working in a spirit of family and team-work.  
- Good network of relationships, local and internationally with universities, 
countries and individuals, creating opportunities for fund raising for 
buildings, equipment and scholarship. 
 
Some of these seven cognitive factors are derived from the literature: flexibility and 
learning (Hollnagel, 2007; Costella, et al., 2009; Dinh, et al., 2012); relationship 
(Ungar, et al., 2007); opportunism (Coutu, 2002; Lengnick-Hall, et al., 2011);  open 
mindedness (Werner and Smith, 2001; Tukl, 2008,2010). Other factors such as 
partnership and creativity were derived from the case of IUG. All these factors 
contribute to the creation of resilience. They indicate a strong sense of purpose, core 
values, a genuine vision, and a deliberate use of language. 
6.3.2 Behavioural Factors  
Table 11: Behavioural Factors of Resilience at IUG 
No. Factors Examples of Practical indicators at IUG 
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   1. Commitment - Working under risk and war conditions,teaching at homes and 
clubs. 
- Patience and sacrifice of salaries and working extra time. 
- Exposure to humiliation, arrests and deportation.  
- Waiting long hours at check points  
- Relocating their places to teach students. 
- Retention of staff 
   2. Awareness - Understanding the situation and challenges. 
- Expecting some of the events such as actions and reactions of the 
occupation. 
- Observing the development of events and minimizing their 
impacts. 
- Storing and saving data in safe places. 
     3. Acting quickly - Opening new faculties and departments. 
- Constructing new temporary buildings, teaching in tents. 
- Teaching underground. 
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- Sending staff members and graduates abroad to study and work. 
- Keep functioning despite siege and closures. 
- Reopening IUG only one week after the bombing in 2009.  
4. Robust 
responses 
- Rejecting occupations orders such as preventing construction of 
buildings, limitations on the number of registered students and 
requests for the records of IUG leadership meetings. 
- Obtaining recognition of IUG from international bodies. 
- Diversity of responses in dealing with different events. 
5. Sharing 
culture 
- Sharing Islamic culture at the levels of staff and leadership and 
the organisations. 
- Strong affiliation, performance, sacrifice, and cooperation.  
- Faith, obedience and following orders. 
6. Sharing 
knowledge 
- Meeting with staff members. 
- Workshops, leaflets, emails, conferences…etc.) to inform them 
about the difficulties and events and how to deal with them. 
7. Personal 
networks 
- Good and open communication between leadership and the staff. 
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- Social relationship. 
8. Problem 
solving 
- Care to find appropriate solutions and diversity options and 
creating special crisis management team. 
- Solving the non- recognition dilemma. 
- Solving the lack of qualified staff. 
- Solving the lack of facilities and building. 
- Teaching underground. 
- Opposing the military orders and measures. 
- Studying in isolated areas. 
- Continuing the educational process soon after the destruction of 
the main buildings. 
- Cooperation with local and international universities. 
- Operating despite threats (opening faculties and departments). 
9. 
      
Faith, 
sacrifice and 
struggle 
 
- Belief in destiny and obedience "Altaaea" of leaders 
- Working under risk and stress conditions 
- Working additional hours without compensation 
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- Sacrifice with salary for months 
- Participation in opposing the occupation 
- Coping with humiliation measures 
- Sharing responsibility 
 
10. Access to 
resources 
- Facilities of communication and networks. 
- Facilities to access to data and archives. 
- Facilities to access the library. 
- Facilities to procurements of equipment and tools. 
- Non-bureaucratic procedures of purchases and payments in times 
of crises. 
	  
Some of these ten factors are derived from the literature: commitment and awareness 
(Hollnagel, 2007; Costella, et al., 2009); acting quickly and problem solving (Werner 
and Smith, 2001); sharing knowledge (Collins and Smith, 2006); personal networks 
and access to resources (Ungar, et al., 2007). Other factors such as sharing culture, 
robust responses and faith, sacrifice and obedience are derived from the case of IUG. 
All these factors are strongly related to the mode of operations and actions, 
availability of resources and enabling conditions.  
 
6.3.3 Contextual Factors 
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Table 12: Contextual Factors: 
No. Factors Examples of Practical indicators at IUG 
 
1.       
 
Social cohesion 
 
- Clarified in details in section 5.2.3 and 1.7.4 
  
2. 
 
Developing 
interpersonal 
connections 
 
- Consultation and listening to staff, face to face meetings 
- Workshops. 
- Visits , team work spirit  
- Good relations among leadership, staff and between staff 
and leadership. 
- Social communication. 
- Developing personal skills of staff through training 
programmes. 
  
    3. 
 
Organisational 
orientation 
 
- Expecting events, changing direction and priorities  
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- Finding alternatives. 
- Raising commitment and affiliation and sense of sacrifice 
and following orders.  
- Keeping the educational process going under adverse 
circumstances. 
- Opposing the occupation and serving the community and 
greater public good. 
 
   4. 
 
Sharing 
accountability  
 
- Sense of belonging and affiliation. 
- Success of IUG is a success for individuals. 
- The confidence that IUG is a national project. 
- Consultation and participation in decision making. 
- Sharing knowledge and information. 
- Coping with difficulties. 
- Working extra hours without compensation 
- Acceptance of working under risky and stressful 
conditions.  
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   5. 
 
Building trust 
 
- Good personal relationship, individual consideration. 
- Participation in decision making. 
- Sharing knowledge and dialogue 
- Meeting and communications, visits, and social relation. 
- Staff facilities. 
- Rewards system. 
- Idealised influence.  
 
   6. 
 
Facilitative 
structure 
 
- Facilitative environment (building, offices and equipment) 
- Communication networks. 
- Entertainment facilities 
- Technology tools. 
- Flexible system of teaching and examinations in time of 
crisis   
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- Scholarships and training programmes. 
 
Some of these six contextual factors which support resilience are derived from the 
literature: developing personal identity and facilitative structure (Angar, et al., 2007); 
building trust and sharing accountability (Collins and Smith, 2006); organisational 
orientation (Freeman, et al., 2004; Suikki, et al., 2006). Social cohesion is derived 
from the case of IUG. These six factors are strongly related to the relationship and 
communication networks within and outside the organisation. 
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6.5 The Role of Culture and Ideology at IUG 
The culture and ideology of IUG are fundamental factors in forming the vision and 
the mission of the university. Therefore, they have a great effect on the leadership and 
staff and can play an important role in the progress of societies (Zamini, et al., 2011).  
O’Reilly, et al., (1991); Schein, (1992); Tharp, (2009); Aktas, et al., (2011)  all state 
that, in an organisation, culture guides and shapes the behaviours of the leadership, 
staff and the organisation. The Islamic ideology and culture of IUG shapes the 
patterns of relationships and behaviours characterising the majority of the leadership 
and staff. 
The current Chancellor described the relationship between Islam and IUG: 
“Since its establishment till now, IUG reinforces the Islamic values in 
the society, including dignity, sacrifice, selflessness, and holding on to 
our rights. And thus, the university was the mother that never stops 
giving, as these values were remembered and practiced by the students 
and workers in times of hardships” (Shaath, individual interview, 
March 2014).  
 
The argument of the Chancellor is not about adopting Islamic ideology at IUG, rather, 
it is about influencing the community and building its values and beliefs in order to 
sacrifice for the national rights and to oppose the occupation.  
 
With regard to the recruitment of new staff members for IUG, ideological and 
political affiliation was one of the important factors that was taken into account 
particularly during the first years of IUG . Some respondents supported this view, for 
example: 
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“There is clarity in the culture of the university regarding choosing 
employees who adopt its vision and beliefs and are aware that the 
university is facing several challenges, so whoever is ready to adapt 
and deal with them is welcome to the university” (Al-Farra, individual 
interview, Jan. 2014). 
  
These words support the idea of clarity of the vision and mission of IUG and the 
ability of the leadership and the staff to sacrifice and deal properly with challenges 
and difficulties. However, there are also dissenting voices: 
 “Ideology has played a crucial role in the survival of the university, 
but the price was very high and sometimes unbearable. It put IUG, all 
the time, under targeting and humiliation measures of the occupation. 
It also created conflict and violent incidents among students as each 
party tried to impose their ideology whether it is Islamic or Secular. 
(Focus group 2, Mar. 2014) 
 
O’Reilly, et al., (1991); Lim (2009); and Aktas, et al., (2011) all emphasise the 
important role that the culture and ideology can play, while Yun Seok (2007) 
describes the potential mutual influence of culture upon leaders and followers. Culture 
and ideology might play a dual role in the organisation. On the one hand, they may 
help to strengthen the affiliation, faith and sacrifice which, in turn, helps in coping 
with difficulties and hardships. Honderich (1995) found that ideology allowed 
individuals to distance themselves from personal prejudice and serves as a foundation 
for rational rule. More positively, Haveman and Khaire (2004) found that ideology 
has a positive impact on the survival of an organisation. 
 
On the other hand, ideological culture might be a cause of disagreements and 
increasing conflict among individuals or groups. In this regard, Hsiaoa and Cheng 
(2006) believe that, although ideology aimed to help humans, the original meaning of 
ideology was gradually debased, and became associated with a negative form of 
social determination. Therefore, ideology may have the potential to play a positive or 
a negative role.  
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In terms of the university’ environment, both approaches of the dual, positive and 
negative, influence of ideology are found in the literature. Glass and Jacobs (2005) 
suggest that religion can play a positive role in university success, and that religion 
will not decline or disappear as rates of HE increased (Briggs, 2011). In contrast, 
Marriott et al. (2011) argue that religion might be a source of discrimination and can 
be a fertile environment for the emergence and growth of such discrimination.  
 
With regard to the negative effects of ideology upon students and staff, Aljardali, et 
al. (2012) found that the religious interests of some students and staff contradict 
Lebanese University interests, and Jones, (2002) and Kanagaratnam, et al., (2005) 
regard religion as a risk factor.  However, the case of IUG showed, despite some 
criticism and the negative side effects, that ideology could play an important role in 
assisting the university to survive and in increasing the ability of the staff and 
leadership to cope with hazardous events. 
 
The current Chancellor believes that: 
“In IUG, Islamic values are always present in its facilities and among 
the administration and employees, and it’s dishonorable to commit a 
deed that contradicts these values. Therefore, the university practices 
these values with personal differences between the individuals” 
(Shaath, individual interview, March 2014, individual). 
 
With regard to common culture and ideology and its positive contribution to the 
university, one respondent reveals that:  
“Our values and beliefs of Islam play a crucial role in increasing our 
ability to sacrifice and cope with challenges” (Abo Husien, individual 
interview, Dec. 2013).  
 
Another respondent felt that: 
“The Islamic spirit that prevails among us is the spirit of brotherhood, 
love and tolerance. We believe in our fate and destiny and that what 
motivates us to more patience and steadfastness” (Shamieah, 
individual interview, Nov. 2013). 
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The argument here is that the Islamic culture gave a sense of unity and willingness to 
sacrifice for the good of the nation and the university. 
 
Most of the respondents were convinced that ideology was a motivator of staff to 
oppose the occupation, and helped the university survive whatever the price might be. 
It gave them a sense of unity, faith and belief in destiny. Most of the respondents 
experienced hardships such as humiliation, arrests, casualties and many different 
restrictions. Nevertheless, they were satisfied to be part of this struggle against the 
occupier and to serve their country and religion. One of the pioneer workers at IUG 
said:  
“We believe that this university served the community by dissemination 
of Islamic culture that increases the affiliation and commitment of 
people toward their national rights to regain their freedom and their 
homeland” (Al-Ajez, individual interview, Nov. 2013).  
 
It was striking that there was a widely held view, even from those who had a different 
political point of view such as those who left IUG to work at Al-Azhar University, 
that ideology played an important role in struggling against the occupation.  
 
Because the Palestinian nation has lived under occupation for more than six decades, 
they are, generally, deeply interested in politics, as politics affects every aspect of 
their lives. This applies particularly to university  students, and as a result.  political 
conflict appeared among students in many Palestinian universities.  
 
Individual interviews focused on the positive role of ideology and most interviewees 
did not talk about the negative role. However, the focus group talked about the 
contradictory, positive/negative, role of ideology.  
“Ideology was a two face weapon, it created conflict and violent 
clashes sometime, but it was a crucial reason behind the survival of 
IUG and opposing the occupation and raising the national sense of 
commitment and affiliation”  (Focus group 1, Jan. 2014). 
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Participant observation and self-reflexivity by the researcher provided strong evidence 
that the conflict among staff and groups of students was mainly about the dominant 
ideology and who would control the decision-making process. This complex 
relationship fluctuated from co-operation to conflict and back to co-operation at 
different times, based on internal Palestinian circumstances. 
 
There was diversity in the level of support for this ideology. While many employees 
were strong supporters, others were less supportive of implementing such ideology. 
Many of the respondents believed that this ideology was the major reason for 
targeting and bombing IUG by the Israeli forces. The observations and informal 
meetings with leadership and different levels of staff revealed that most of them 
believed that IUG is an academic institution that serves the Palestinian community 
and the targeting and bombing of IUG was always a revenge by the occupation on a 
successful Islamic institution.  
 
In summary, the culture and ideology of IUG stems from Sunni Islamic concepts and 
regulations. This ideology played an important role in raising the affiliation, 
commitment and following orders, opposing the occupation, and creating unity among 
followers. In the meantime, the different political ideologies in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip cast deep shadows of conflict on universities. The ideology of IUG created 
a political competition among different political parties at the university which turned 
into occasional conflict and clashes among them. However, the positive role of 
ideology was more prominent in IUG as compared to its perceived negative effects. 
Thus, ideology played an important role in helping IUG to survive and in keeping the 
educational process in spite of all hardships and disturbances. 
 
As discussed earlier, Islamic belief has its own impacts upon transformational 
leadership at IUG. Combining the usual characteristics of transformational style with 
consultation and obedience to leaders shaped a unique Islamic form of 
transformational leaders. 
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6.6. The Strategic Value of Resilience in Surviving Turbulence                                            
Resilience, the ability to withstand shocks and disturbances (Horne and Orr, 1998; 
Balu, 2001; Gittell, et al., 2006; Netuveli, 2010), has become a subject to investigate 
in institutions as a key organisational requirement for prosperity and progress. This 
concept has been discussed in many organisations and in different contexts. However, 
it has been under-explored, particularly in HEIs operating in turbulent environments 
and war conditions.  
 
The current research suggests the following definition of resilience in turbulent times: 
resilience is the ability of an organisation to capitalise on hardships, absorb shocks, 
recover and thrive where possible. Resilience gave the IUG leadership high reliability 
in confronting both predicted and unpredicted adversity (McManus, et al., 2008; 
Auerswald, et al., 2009) that might otherwise have had catastrophic consequences. 
Resilience provides leaders with alternatives in order to survive, adapt and exploit 
opportunities to thrive (Hollnagel, 2007, 2009; Lengnick-Hall, et al., 2011; Martin-
Breen and Andries, 2011) and develop where possible. The study confirmed the 
approach of Ungar (2011) that resilience might enable an organisation to achieve 
good results despite war conditions and after adverse events (Dinh, et al., 2012). 
 
Different strategies were deployed by the leadership. This research characterised the 
responses of IUG to a variety of hardships. These labels reflect the extent of resilience 
that exists at IUG. The findings of the study confirm that IUG succeeded in deploying 
both of the strategic approaches to resilience discussed by Lengnick-Hall, et al. 
(2011). The first strategy is the coping strategy in order to survive (Horne and Orr, 
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1998; Balu, 2001; Gittell, et al., 2006; Lengnick-Hall, et al., 2011). The second 
strategy was achieving the survival and growth (Weick, 1998; Coutu, 2002; 
Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; Hollnagel, 2007; Hollnagel, et al., 2011; Lengnick-
Hall, et al., 2011) which sees resilience as a strategy for thriving. IUG was able not 
only to bounce back from adverse circumstances and regain its original shape, but 
also was able to capitalise on events and exploit opportunities to move forward and 
prosper under the continuation of such events. 
 
A strong example of turning threats to opportunities was that the oppression of the 
occupation united support for IUG within Gaza, and activated donors. Another 
example was during tightening the siege and closure after 2000, the leadership 
capitalised on this situation by continuing the educational process, and they 
succeeded, at the same time, in gaining support from donors to create a new branch in 
the isolated area. Another example was after the bombing of IUG, the leadership was 
able to capitalise on this catastrophe and was soon back to the educational process. At 
the same time, they worked on two levels: the one was to cooperate with local 
universities; and the other was to communicate with donors to rebuild what the 
occupation destroyed. The study considers resilience as a process (Masten, et al., 
1990; Rutter, 2007; Auerswald and van Opstal, 2009) that interacts at the level of 
individuals, leadership and system, rather than a single response (Pianta and Walsh, 
1998).  
 
This study looks at resilience as a way of describing, or labelling, behaviours or 
actions at different levels. The categories are not discrete, but they might be 
hierarchical. The research found examples of resilience at the levels of individuals 
(Lyons, et al., 1998; Werner and Smith, 2001; Maddi and Khoshaba, 2005), 
leadership (Yukl, 2008, 2010; Warrilow, 2010; Craig, 2011) and system (Hollnagel, 
2009; Ouyang, et al., 2012). This was clearly demonstrated when the leadership, staff 
and the system responded positively to working underground during the shutting 
down of IUG in the first uprising in 1987. Also, when opening decentralised classes in 
the isolated areas during the tightening of the siege and closure in the second uprising 
in 2000, which required: relocating the accommodation of some of the staff members; 
circulating lectures via videos and emails; and providing additional facilities to 
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students such as flexibility of examination timetables. In such tough conditions, a 
university does not have to have a place, rather, a university is a set of activities which 
happen, even when a place as a unifying concept is absent. 
 
To achieve the survival and thriving of the organisation, the leadership deployed 
resiliently both the anticipation or proactive strategy (Reason, 1997; Dyson, 2004; 
Dinh, et al., 2012), and the reactive strategy (Marcus and Nichols, 1999). On some 
occasions, the leadership took proactive decisions such as opening new faculties and 
increasing the number of enrolled students without the permission of the occupation 
authorities. On other occasions, the leadership tried to minimize the damage and 
recover but with a high price. One example of this which reflects flexibility and open 
mindedness of the leadership (Yukl, 2008, 2010) is freezing the establishment of the 
faculty of Nursing in 1985 to absorb the anger of the occupation and to stop the 
expelling of 36 academics abroad. Another example was the response to the Israeli 
ban on either permanent or temporary buildings. The IUG administration challenged 
this prohibition and built temporary buildings. These costly buildings were removed 
after a few years when IUG was able to construct modern buildings in 1995 when the 
Palestinian Authority took responsibility over the Gaza Strip, and the university had 
no need to ask for Israeli permission for anything. 
 
Furthermore, there were unpredictable events (McManus, et al., 2008) and IUG had to 
deal with the consequences, such as bombing and destroying the engineering and 
science building and laboratories during the war of December 2012. The response of 
the leadership was aligned with the approach of Ouyang, et al. (2012) as it occurred 
through three stages: minimise the initial damage; absorb the impacts of the event; 
and recover on time and at low cost. The decision of the leadership was to return to 
the educational process after one week. The cooperation with Gazan universities (Al-
Azhar and Al-Aqsa) helped a lot in overcoming this dilemma as they opened their 
laboratories for IUG students. This diversity of coping strategies and responses 
reflects the extent of resilience at IUG and how it was able to exploit the emerging 
opportunities to move forward and prosper. The case of IUG reflects a strong 
evidence of some important attributes of resilience as it provide employees and 
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leaders with a sense of commitment, control and challenge (Maddi and Khoshaba, 
2005). 
 
The 23 markers of resilience which characterise the responses of IUG leadership 
comprise seven cognitive factors that were discovered, ten behavioural factors that 
enhance resilience and six contextual factors that lend support to resilience. Different 
descriptions appearing in the literature review were combined in these cognitive, 
behavioural and contextual categories. Some of these labels and markers were noted 
in resilience literature such as flexibility, awareness, commitment and learning 
(Hollnagel, 2007; Costella, et al., 2009; and Hollnagel, et al., 2011), access to 
resources, and facilitative structure (Ungar, et al., 2007; Dinh, et al., 2012; Wood 
Ntaote, and Theron, 2012). Also, there were markers that applied to the responses of 
the leadership such as open mindedness, acting quickly, problem solving (Werner and 
Smith, 2001), communication, building trust and sharing knowledge and 
accountability (Collins and Smith, 2006). Therefore, resilience covers the one set of 
behaviours and leadership covers the other. However, there are behaviours which 
were not described by either the leadership literature or the resilience literature and 
they appeared in a unique way in the context of of IUG which are: cognitive factors  -  
partnership and creativity; behavioural factors - sharing culture, the spirit of faith, 
obedience, sacrifice and struggle, and the exercise of power; contextual factors - 
strong social cohesion and robust responses. 
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Chapter Seven 
  
7. Findings and Conclusions  
This study sought to derive both theoretical and operational insights pertaining to 
institutional survival and growth in turbulent and obstructive environments, and used  
a Palestinian University,  the Islamic University of Gaza (IUG)  to derive these 
insights. This required the researcher to understand the responses produced by the 
university leadership to the challenges and hardship the university faced from 1987 to 
2012, and the interaction between organisational leadership and culture in building 
resilience. The role of IUG beyond the production and transfer of knowledge was also 
examined, as well as the mutually shaping influences of university and society.  
7.1 Discussion of the Findings: Actors and Processes 
The Islamic University of Gaza grew from 25 men studying in tents in 1978 to 20 168 
students in 2012, 63% of them women. The IUG leadership never employed the 
narrow vision of a small institution. Rather, a sophisticated and modern university 
was their aim. The leadership was able to transform IUG from a small institution 
teaching Arabic language and Sharia subjects to a modern university teaching a 
diversity of science and arts subjects. By 2012, the permanent modern buildings on 
IUG campus housed 11 faculties teaching 112 specialisations appropriate to a modern 
state. Any university, whether in a developed or a developing country, would face 
difficulties on such a rapid growth path over a short period of time. The story of IUG 
is a story of growth and stabilisation, rather than the sad tale of a victim of the Israeli 
oppression.  
Because of the diversity of the challenges experienced by IUG, the researcher has 
divided the development of the university into four phases. The first phase has been 
labelled: Launching IUG among Rubble with Challenges, Ambitions and Dreams 
(1978-1987). The name given to the second phase	  was: Threatening the Survival of 
IUG during the First Uprising (1987-1993). The third phase has been called:	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Launching a Consolidation Process (1993-2000). The label applied to the fourth phase 
was: Thriving despite Siege and Wars (2000- 2012). Each phase had its own 
difficulties and challenges as well as its own strategies and leadership styles to 
overcome them. Some themes run across all four stages. The outcomes of this 
organising process helped the researcher, and should help readers, to understand the 
external and internal challenges of each stage and the responses of the leadership in 
addressing them. 
The study described the environment of conflict, post-conflict and ongoing turbulence  
which posed additional challenges for IUG alongside the general challenges facing 
HEIs. Over time, the Palestinian community has been exposed to different violent and 
shocking events, including the destruction of the social world; manipulation of 
history; disruption of education; theft of identity and culture; and destruction of values 
(Giacaman, et al., 2007). The study discussed the ways in which Israeli measures 
shaped the political, economic, cultural and educational life of the individuals, groups 
and the Palestinian community as a whole (de Santisteban, 2002; Smith, 2011). These 
measures range from loss of land, identity, dignity, authority and resources, to death. 
These factors affected the academics and the students and the functioning of 
universities.  
This study shows that very specific issues and challenges affected IUG and made its 
development more difficult, from the non-recognition of IUG degrees and graduates 
for 15 years, leaving students with no hope of job opportunities, to storming and 
shutting down the university, destruction and bombing of buildings, restrictions of 
mobility and travelling of staff and students. This is in addition to the attempts to 
impose authority and control over every aspect of the day-to-day running and the 
growth and development of IUG. 
The study found that besides the occupation oppression against HEIs (Sullivan, 1994; 
Nicolai, 2007), internal issues have strongly affected IUG since the early years of its 
inception. A political conflict to determine the ideological identity of IUG raged 
between the two big parties, the Secular trend (Fatah) and the Islamic trend (Hamas). 
This led to the creation of Al-Azhar University in 1991, supported and controlled by 
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Fatah, who enticed sometimes and sometimes forced their supporters at IUG to join 
the new university. The conflict also resulted in occasional violent clashes between 
students and staff members. Therefore, since its inception in 1978, IUG has been 
faced with external and internal threats and expectations of failure.. In the midst of 
ongoing disruptions at every level of the university’s functioning, IUG did not just 
survive, it blossomed and grew. However, the survival and thriving of IUG was not 
easy to achieve, rather it comes at a steep price. 
IUG is a resilient Islamic university with high academic standards in a developing 
country. It is a scientific institution with a network of connections in the academic 
world, locally and globally. IUG offers a pattern of scientific and cultural resistance 
of a university operating in turbulent times. It is a national symbol of opposing the 
occupation with the weapon of science and knowledge. The occupation succeeded in 
besieging the university and imposing severe restrictions on its path of growth and 
development. They were able to bomb and destroy its buildings and laboratories many 
times. They succeeded in destroying stones, but  the university turned out to be 
something beyond buildings: an educational community that continued to function, 
and even function well, after infrastructure was destroyed. IUG became a national 
project and one of the cornerstones of teaching new generations both science and 
nation-building. It is now established as an important player in maintaining the 
Palestinian cultural and religious identity in the face of the Israeli dominance over all 
aspects of Palestinian life.  The university came to embody a particular idea of Islam: 
that strict traditions could be preserved, in a way that was entirely comaptible with 
teaching scientific subjects to both men and women. 
This research describes varying types of responses and strategies implemented by 
different styles of leadership throughout the four stages of IUG. Five strategies 
employed are: to absorb potential conflict by closing the university, to challenge by 
continuing to build and opening new faculties and departments, to concede by not 
opening the Nursing faculty, to bypass by gaining recognition from abroad. The fifth 
strategy  manifests itself in the nature of the university which was created, and this 
nature was shaped in two steps. The first step was to employ people with similar 
ideology. So, step one was homogeneity rather than meritocracy, but step two was to 
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increase the qualifications, both administrative and academic of the homogeneous 
cadre. This led to a homogeneous and highly skilled staff complement. Both those 
steps are very important. Loyal staff strengthened commitment, but in a very strong 
way IUG uplifted their qualifications and skills.  
An important decision was to retain and build political and religious ties right from 
the beginning by recruiting people with a particular religious/political affiliation, and 
commitment, which increased their ability to cope with stressful situations (Punamäki, 
1996; Shamai, 2002; Punamäki, et al., 2008). The cost of this was substantial, as this 
specific choice elicited opposition and enmity externally from the Israelis, and 
internally increased the political conflict with Fatah, as well as initially affecting the 
quality of education offered. It also had benefits; it enabled the university to use the 
loyalty of staff and students, and the solid links with local and international 
communities community (Harris and Chapman, 2002) as a major tool for survival.  
At the inception stage, the IUG lacked qualified staff, suffered financial constraints 
and staff and students worked in tents, however, the leadership had a strategic vision 
for the future. They opened new faculties and departments, and at the same time they 
sent members of the staff abroad to conduct their post-graduate studies. This growth 
in administrative and academic excellence kept pace with the growth and 
diversification of the university. The diversified skills of employees grew at the same 
time that the university itself was growing and diversifying.  
A second important decision was to keep the teaching and learning going no matter 
what. So classes continued in mosques, sport clubs and homes because individual 
citizens, the teachers and students, were prepared to take the risk of  hosting, teaching 
and attending these classes.. Lecturers continued without pay because they felt that 
IUG was a national project which should  be served, even at a high cost. Teachers 
empowered their students and were inspired by their leaders who were in the forefront 
of the struggle. The case of IUG confirmed that teachers sense of power and 
belongingness increased their self-sacrifice (Hoogervorst, et al., 2012), and 
empowered their feeling about the future in order to accomplish their mission of 
creating a new generation of leaders. The head of the council worked every day 
 232  
although he was never paid. This meant when the university reopened in late 1992, 
after four years of being shut down, it did not start from scratch. The important thing 
that was maintained through the period of closure was a rhythm of academic 
application which remained unbroken.  
Although the university has grown to this size, the research and my current 
observations indicate that the university is now in a fifth stage which will require a 
different set of strategies, although many of the internal and external problems which 
initially beset the young university still face the mature university. 
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7.1.1 Documenting the History of IUG 
Documentation is particularly useful for investigating social questions (Creswell, 
2003), and reflects information from real life environments (Jack and Baxter, 2008). 
The researcher found that the university's history and experience has not been 
appropriately registered and documented. The only such attempt was that of AL-
Sinwar, and Mouteer (2009). Their report assembled portions of the university's 
chronicle and things published about it through documents and university decisions, 
without discussing the factors and strategies used by the leadership in responding to 
these challenges and how they succeeded in moving beyond survival to thriving. 
One of the important outcomes of this study is its contribution in documenting the 
university's chronology by reporting and classifying IUG history and experience over 
the past 34 years. This documentation will be translated into the Arabic language, to 
make these ideas of leadership and resilience available beyond the English-language 
academic world. This thesis could provide other Palestinian universities and HE 
planners with replicable lessons from IUG. It draws lessons from the Palestinian 
context of occupation and ongoing chronic conflict in order to support other HEIs 
working in similar conditions. This documentation could be useful for academics and 
scholars who are interested in examining the role of the leadership and the 
contribution of resilience in HE in turbulent times. 
 
 
7.1.2 The Role of IUG Leadership in Turbulent Times  
The study found that one of the characteristics of IUG leadership was that they 
combined long term planning strategies (Kahveci and Taskin, 2013) with short term 
crisis management. Taskov and Mitreva (2015) stress the importance of establishing 
crisis management teams at HEIs in order to embrace the changes and challenges the 
institution encounter. The leadership of IUG had the fortitude to pursue a better 
tomorrow against the odds. To accomplish the long term objectives of survival and 
thriving, additional short term strategies were used. To deal with successive and 
diverse challenges, occasionally, IUG established a small crisis team to tackle the 
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major crises and to act decisively in order to overcome certain situations such as the 
closure of the university during the first uprising or when the laboratories and other 
buildings were destroyed in the war of December, 2008. The leadership did not allow 
the crisis of today to deflect them from the ideal of a complex,, multi-faculty 
university in the future. Although they knew that the Nursing faculty would draw 
down particularly hostile opposition from the occupation they nevertheless forged 
ahead with a nursing department under the Science faculty. 
  
The way in which the leadership resolved short term crises often contributed to the 
long term development of the university. For example, a short term crisis was a total 
absence of lecture theatres. Using the community to solve this problem meant that 
they had the support of the community later when they needed it in the closure of IUG 
in 1988 and during the tightening of the siege and closure in 2000. So, it was not just 
that they solved the short term crisis, it was the manner in which they solved the 
severe short term crisis such as the bombing of the university during the war of 
December 2008 which provided them with the resources, funding and support for 
achieving long term goals. 
 
A divergence of opinions opens the horizon and provides organisational leadership 
with a portfolio of alternatives (McManus, et al., 2008; Aven, 2011; Azadeh, et al., 
2014) which can be utilised in a specific situation. The leadership could not afford to 
have only one response to a situation, they always had to develop a variety of 
responses because the response to their strategies would be unpredictable. Therefore, 
when dealing with an unpredictable situation, leaders need to have several short term 
strategies that always feed into a long term strategy, so it was plan A and plan B for 
short term, and always plan C moving into the long term. By doing so, the leadership 
was able to overcome the challenges of the occupation over registration and 
accreditation, finance, invasions and national and cultural identity. 
 
A transformational style of leadership has managed to adapt to different events, 
encounter challenges IUG faced, and lead the changing and challenging process 
toward the new emerging objectives within the framework of conformity and 
integration between leadership and employees (Burns, 1978; Bass and Avolio, 1990; 
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Hamdhaidari, et al., 2008; Vega-Vazques, et al., 2012). Transformational leadership 
of IUG was able, in different occasions, to convey a clear vision of followers' goals, 
build their awareness and motivate them to struggle and sacrifice for the sake of the 
university. 
 
The researcher argues in the literature review that what works in a Western 
environment may or may not work well in an Islamic contexts, and that the main 
difference between the leadership styles in these environments is the close attachment 
to religion (Faris and Parry, 2011). This attachment to religion has an important 
influence in the way that transformational leadership is expressed at IUG. Although 
obedience is not a feature of transformational style as described in Western literature, 
the case of IUG showed a transformational style combined with the obedience of 
followers.  
  
On some occasions, such as the opening of decentralised classes in 2000 and after 
bombing IUG in 2009, IUG deployed a transactional style which was characterised by 
rewards and the exchange of benefits between leaders and their followers (Burns, 
1978; Siewiorek, et al., 2012).  
 
The case of IUG suggests that organisations faced with different challenges and 
shocks have the choice to deploy an appropriate leadership style to fit the situation. 
This study confirmed the approach of Burke, et al. (2012) who suggests that in 
turbulent environments, it is not easy to rely on one style. They suggest that a mixture 
of transformational with transactional styles might be appropriate to cope with the 
challenges HE might be exposed to. The study found that IUG deployed other styles 
of leadership - heroic, post-heroic and  sometimes authoritarian, (Siewiorek, et al., 
2012) -  besides transformational and transactional style depending on the specific 
situations.  
 
The leadership demonstrated authority and control and took forceful actions 
(Siewiorek, et al., 2012), so that they could respond swiftly and capitalise on specific 
shocks before things became catastrophic. For example, in the first stage, the 
leadership defied the military orders and increased the number of enrolled students. 
 236  
Also, they refused to hand students' names to the Israeli security forces or to deliver 
monthly reports about their meetings and decisions. Constructing buildings under 
risks and in spite of the Israeli rejection and threats was another example of deploying 
the heroic style of leadership. In the second stage, leaders were responsible for 
ensuring that institutions simply kept operating, albeit on a slow timescale. The 
leadership of IUG demonstrated flexibility and creativity in decision making when 
they went teaching underground reflecting both transformational and heroic styles of 
leadership. This was a strong example of the struggle, insistence and creativity of the 
leadership. Here, the defiance strategy of IUG leadership was aimed at maintaining 
the educational process under all circumstances.  
In the third stage, exploiting opportunities for thriving (Weick, 1998; Coutu, 2002; 
Hollnagel, 2007; Lengnick-Hall, et al., 2011) was the main strategy. In the fourth 
stage, the insistence on holding examinations one week after the bombing of IUG and 
holding graduation ceremonies two weeks after the war demonstrates the post-heroic 
style of IUG leadership. What was common between the different styles IUG 
deployed is combining some religious aspects such as consultation (Shurah) and 
obedience (Altaaea) which consolidated the sense of commitment and affiliation  as  
followers were encouraged to obey their leaders as long as there is no disobedience 
towards God and the Prophet (Khamis, 2000; Faris and Parry, 2011). 
 
7.1.2.1 Leading in both a Conflict and a Post-Conflict Zone 
 
Conflict and post-conflict patterns occur simultaneously at IUG.	   To	   distinguish the 
situation between conflict and post-conflict is to move from destruction to recovery 
and development and from insecurity to stability and lasting peace (Heleta, 2014). 
The university has operated under occupation, oppressive measures, siege, closure 
and different wars. The study found that these measures have affected IUG directly 
and indirectly. All these measures are characteristics of a conflict zone (Amusan, 
1992; Rahim, 2002; Heleta, 2014). In contrast to this, after signing the Oslo Accord in 
1993 (Ramahi, and Davies, 2002; EPACBI, 2015), a new situation was created by 
transferring the authority on the ground from the occupation to the Palestinian 
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Authority. IUG exploited the opportunity and launched a consolidation stage of 
constructing permanent buildings, new faculties and a network of communication and 
relationships. All these reflected a post-conflict situation (Berdal, 2009; Heleta, 2014). 
Therefore, the university leadership is required to play two almost conflicting roles. It 
must play the role of leading a university in a conflict zone at the same time as it plays 
a nation-building role in a post-conflict situation. 
 
After 1993, the leadership thought for a while that the Gaza Strip and IUG had moved 
from conflict to post-conflict situation. But a few years later they realised that conflict 
is still there and the Gaza Strip and the IUG were still under the attack and oppression 
of the occupation. The leadership therefore had to balance a complex situation., 
Sometimes the responses to conflict and post-conflict seemed to cancel each other 
out. When it was conflict, people did not mind in teaching in tents, they did not take 
salaries, they worked in risky conditions and taught underground. In post-conflict, 
IUG has modern faculties and buildings, then people ask for their salaries and 
rewards. This beautiful university looks like a post-conflict university, but it is 
operating in a conflict situation. 
 
The study found that the first stage from 1978 to 1987, exhibited characteristics of a 
conflict area and IUG deployed transformational, transactional and heroic styles of 
leadership. The second stage 1988-1993, was characterised by a conflict situation as 
IUG was closed for four years by an Israeli military order and IUG deployed heroic 
and transformational styles of leadership. In the third stage of consolidation, 1993-
2000, through the conflict situation, signing the Oslo agreement was one of the 
contributing factors in helping IUG to survive and thrive. Oslo changed the Israeli 
opposition as the PNA took responsibility inside the cities of the Gaza Strip. This 
stage exhibited a post-conflict situation with some characteristics of conflict such as 
restriction of travelling and importing equipment and materials in addition to some 
internal conflict. At this stage IUG deployed post-heroic, transformational styles of 
leadership. 
 
The fourth stage, 2000-2012, exhibited clearly both conflict and post-conflict 
situation. Some conflict indicators are imposing siege and closure, wars of 2008 and 
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2012 with thousands of martyrs and injuries. However, because the Israeli troops 
relocated their position on the borders of the Gaza Strip, some indicators exhibited a 
post-conflict situation. The leadership was able to carry on as there was a space for 
IUG to open the faculty of Medicine and the Medical City. Additional new buildings 
were constructed and new partnership agreements were signed. At this stage IUG 
deployed different styles of leadership; heroic, post-heroic alongside transformational 
style of leadership. 
 
In conclusion, trying to clearly categorise this particular situation was difficult 
because features	  of conflict and post-conflict overlap, and appear simultaneously. The 
case of IUG  exhibits both conflict and post-conflict characteristics. The leadership 
dealt with conflict and post-conflict issues. Sometimes they played the role of 
leadership in a conflict situation and deployed a certain type of leadership, while 
sometimes they played the role in post-conflict situation with different types of 
organisational leadership. Interestingly, sometimes the leadership played a dual role 
of both conflict and post-conflict situation at the same time and deployed different 
and/ or a mixed style of leadership (transformational, transactional, heroic and post-
heroic). The situation is simultaneously conflict and post-conflict and requires 
resilient leadership to shift and deploy a suitable type of leadership that fits with the 
situation. 
 
 
 
 
7.1.2.2	  The Exercise of Power 
 
One of the important reasons behind the success of IUG leadership was adopting a 
national strategy of opposing the occupation and participating in the Palestinian 
struggle for freedom and dignity. This in turn gained the support of the staff and 
students and the protection of the community.  
 
One of the tools the leadership utilised was sharing knowledge with the different 
levels at IUG and involving them in the decision-making process. The leadership tried 
to push things forward by creating new realities on the ground which made it more 
 239  
difficult for the occupation to stop all these measures and confront IUG students, staff 
and the community. By doing so, the strategy of the leadership succeeded in 
minimising the Israeli attempts to impose dominance and control over IUG. However, 
the exercise of power and the attempts of IUG did not always succeed, and some 
actions and interventions  ended in favor of the occupation.  
 
The study confirmed the findings of Leonidou, et al.  (2008) that internal exercise of 
power between political parties reduces confidence and increases conflict. Although 
the conflict to control IUG was resolved in favour of the Islamic trend, IUG paid a 
high price for this conflict. 
 
7.1.3 The Contribution of Culture and Ideology to the Survival and Growth of 
IUG 
In the context of HEIs, culture can play an important role in the progress of societies 
(Zamini, et al., 2011). The existence of the occupation created different views and a 
strong diversity of political affiliation among the Palestinian community and their 
universities ranging from Islamic, secular to leftist bodies. Many different reasons 
stand behind the ability of Palestinian universities in coping with the Israeli 
occupation and invasions and they managed to survive. Resisting the occupation and 
opposing their oppression, the national duty of sustaining the national and cultural 
identity and the national aspiration of freedom and the right of education are common 
factors that helped universities to survive under devastating circumstances. However, 
in addition to these common factors, in the context of IUG and due to the additional 
challenges IUG faced, ideological culture provided IUG leadership and members of 
the staff with a further important factor which consolidated the spirit of faith and 
sacrifice for the sake of the university. 
 
IUG was formally established as an extension of Al-Azhar Institute for Religious 
Studies. The study findings provided strong evidence to support the approach of 
Altbach (1987) who found that HEIs have a widespread impact on culture, politics 
and ideology. The Islamic ideology differentiated IUG from other Palestinian 
universities. The curriculum IUG offers to undergraduate students, which comprises 
about 140 independent hours during the four years of study, includes 36 hours 
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covering a diversity of Islamic subjects (Al-Sinwar and Mouteer, 2009). IUG has 
developed from a small institution teaching only religion and Arabic language, to a 
university teaching a wide range of science subjects alongside Islamic subjects. 
  
The literature review of chapter 3 clarifies that many universities have been created in 
different regions of the world with ideological roots whether these are Christian, 
Islamic or Jewish. The study found that Islamic ideological culture has played a dual 
and paradoxical role at IUG. Also, the feature of obedience as part of the dominant 
culture at IUG is open to factionalism.  
  
One of the important effects of the ideology and political affiliation of IUG was that it 
enabled the university to gain support from different sectors of the community as well 
as different groups, organisations and countries abroad. At the same time it was the 
reason behind losing support from others. 
 
 
7.1.4 Mutual Shaping of the University and the Society 
Although the researcher started this research looking only at the behaviour of the top 
leadership at IUG, as the research progressed it became necessary to describe some 
behaviour at other levels, as this behaviour is both a consequence and a cause of 
leadership behaviours. In particular, because an early decision of leadership was to 
promote social cohesion, the community supported and shaped the university, and the 
university supported and shaped the community as well. Harris and Chapman (2002) 
describe the need for educational institutions to have solid links with the community 
and how these contribute to gain the community's support and affiliation, particularly 
in times of disturbances. This is what the leadership of IUG sought to achieve. 
 
These solid links with the society were disrupted sometimes by political conflict and 
division among Palestinians. Palestinian political conflict cast deep shadows and 
negative effects over the whole Palestinian social, political, cultural life in general and 
HEIs in particular which still exist to the present. Political conflict has created strong 
supporters as well as opponents for the case of IUG. The approach of Bush and 
Saltarelli (2000) about the potential two faces of education in decreasing and or/ 
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increasing conflict found a fertile environment in IUG which reflected the case of 
other Palestinian HEIs. This is in spite of the continuous efforts of the leadership to 
isolate universities from the negative side-effects of the political conflict and division.  
 
One of the essential characteristics of the IUG leadership which played a crucial role 
in shaping the university and the society is the powerful social cohesion networks 
between the university and the community. The strategy of maintaining social 
cohesion played an important role in the survival of the university. Through visits, 
meetings, conferences, graduation ceremonies and other cultural activities, IUG 
leadership established a strong network of relationships with community dignitaries 
and institutions. The university leadership kept them all informed about the realities 
of IUG and the difficulties it encountered. These helped in obtaining the 
understanding and the support of the community in the face of the crises to which the 
organisation was exposed. This, in addition to directly serving the community, 
strengthened the support and commitment to IUG. Ungar, Brown, Liebenberg, 
Cheung, and Levine (2008) stress the support of the community in providing 
resources to the organisation. Also, Staw, et al. (1981) believe that the availability of 
community resources may provide strength and encourage employees to confront 
threats. The case of IUG showed how the support of the community protected the 
university and provided resources and thus helped IUG to survive. Moreover, the 
international community, particularly the Islamic community, contributed to keep 
IUG not only surviving but also thriving. Both religious beliefs and political 
affiliations of the staff and students formed an important resource enabling IUG to 
survive despite hardships.  
 
Another indicator of shaping the community was that IUG has a very positive attitude 
to women receiving higher education. IUG contributed in clarifying the fact that Islam 
does not prohibit women from education, rather, Islam encourages the education and 
achievements of women. The holy Quran stresses the importance of knowledge and 
learning: 
 ُْلق" َْلھھھه ييَِوتَْسیي  َنیيِذَّلاا  َننوَُملَْعیي  َنیيِذَّلااَوو  َلا  َننوَُملَْعیي اَمَِّنإإ  ُرَّكََذَتیي ُولُووأأ  ِببَابَْلْلأاا:رمزلاا) "9(  
 242  
"Say, Are those who know equal to those who do not know? Only they 
will remember [who are] people of understanding" (Aa-Zummar :9). 
  
Also, the prophet Mohamed says that:  
"Seeking knowledge is obligatory for every Muslim, male and female" 
(Hadith Sharief).  
In spite of the provisions that bind societies, governments and individuals to the right 
of education for all, men and women, the reality in many countries in the world, 
including many Arab and Islamic countries, reflects facts that contradict this inherent 
right of education. 
UNESCO statistics (2011) indicate that 16% of the world's population are suffering 
from illiteracy and that 67.7% of those who are illiterate  are women. Confirming this, 
the Arab League Educational Cultural and Scientific Organisation (ALESCO), 
clarified that, in 2011, the illiteracy rate in the world was 16% while in the Arab 
world it was 27.1%, 60% of those who are illiterate were female. This figure changed 
to 35% in 2013, 45% of those are females (ALESCO, 2013). The average ratio of 
illiteracy reaches to 66.6% in Mali, 63.7% in Afghanistan, 61% in Iraq, 55% in Sierra 
Leone, 42% in Egypt and 39% in Yemen. These high proportions are correlated with 
poverty, ignorance and the negative approach to women and their basic right of 
education. 
In spite of these high proportions in different countries of the world, Palestine is 
considered by both UNESCO and ALESCO to be among the worlds' lowest illiteracy 
rates.	   The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS, 2013) confirms this and 
reveals that the illiteracy rate of Palestinian individuals, 15 years and over, declined 
from 15.7% in 1995 to 4.1% in 2012. The proportion of female education at schools 
increased from 77% in 1995 to 93.6% in 2012 and that the average ratio of educating 
women in the Gaza Strip is beter than women in the West Bank as it reached to 
96.6%.  
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In this regard, the average rate of teaching women to men in Palestinian HEIs was 
50% -50% in the academic year 2003/2004, but in 201l/2012 it increased to58% 
women to 42% men (PCBS, 2013). This increase was clearly demonstrated in many 
universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. For example, as a secular university 
in the West Bank, the total number of Birzeit students in 2016 was 13 003, and  
63.3% of them are female (Birzeit website, 2016). Another example of a secular 
university is An-Najah university in the West Bank with a total number of 20 452 
students, 60.6% of them are female (An-Najah website, 2016). In the Gaza Strip in 
2012, AL-Azhar university which is a secular university hosted a total number of 17 
862 students, 46% of them are female (AL-Azhar website, 2012). In the context of 
IUG, the Islamic ideology of the university did not hinder teaching women. As the 
first and the only university in the Gaza Strip until 1991, IUG took the lead, and did 
not allow any opposition to teaching women from those with a narrow religious 
prospective. Furthermore, IUG gave some women a good academic position: The 
Dean of the Education faculty, for males and females, is a woman; and also the Dean 
of Quality and Development is a woman. Both of them participate fully in the 
meetings of the University Council. 
The study found that IUG ideology encouraged the academic achievement of women, 
and that IUG led the people of Gaza in the view of the role of educating women in the 
Gaza Strip in an Islamic university, and the nation supported the university.	  While in 
the first year of IUG in 1978, there were no women registered, the number of women 
enrolled at IUG started to increase gradually year after year until it reached in 2012 to 
12 874 female (63.8%) and 7294 male (36.2%). This development was part of shaping 
the national view in favour of the education of women and the importance of 
preparing woman for careers outside of the home. However, due to the Israeli 
restrictions (siege and closure), the decline of the Palestinian economy and financial 
problems of the PNA, job opportunities are limited not only for women but also for 
men. But in spite of the limitation of employment, Palestinian women insist to 
achieve their university's degrees.  
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IUG educates women, but does so on segregated campuses close to each other with 
the same teaching staff members. Although the majority of universities in the Muslim 
and Arab countries are socially mixed, the idea of teaching in segregated campuses is 
not new in the Islamic context. Some universities or institutions in Muslim countries 
(Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey) adopted the approach of 
teaching in segregated campuses. For example, in Egypt the biggest institution in the 
Muslim world (Al-Azhar University in Cairo) teaches female students in many 
segregated colleges and campuses. Another example is the International Islamic 
University in Islamabad (IIUI), which was founded in  Pakistan in 1980 as a mixed 
university, but in 2000 created a separate campus for 11 500 (38.8%) female students 
(IIUI website, 2016). 
In Palestine, although IUG was the first university in Palestine to educate women in 
segregated campuses, in the 1990s and thereafter, some other universities and 
institutions in the Gaza Strip began to teach students in separate campuses or separate 
classes. Al-Aqsa University in Gaza (a government university) teaches 16 885 female 
students in segregated campuses and classes (AL-Aqsa website, 2015). Although 
students of AL-Azhar university in Gaza, male and female, study on the same 
campus, the university teaches students in separate classes. Some other institutions in 
the West Bank and East Jerusalem such as Hind Al-Husseini College for Girls/ Al-
Quds University in Jerusalem, and Palestine Technical Colleges –Ramallah/Girls 
(PTCR website, 2015) offer separate classes for men and women. 
Many parents and students, on the one hand, support the idea of segregation as they 
believe that educating women in segregated campuses is safer, more comfortable and 
gives more privacy to their daughters (Wajih Khan, 2014). They support their claims 
by arguing that the Prophet Mohamed used to teach men every week, and women 
asked him to make a separate day for teaching women. On the other hand many others 
believe that studying in a mixed campus is better for the integrity of the community, 
dialogue and competition between male and female (Gulzar, 2014). These views 
reflect the diversity of the political, ideological and cultural approaches of teaching 
women in separate campus. Hence, the issue here is creating an educational 
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environment that maintains dignity, freedom, privacy and achievement of students. 
The case of IUG clarifies that while Islamic rules regarding segregation were 
accepted, this did not hinder women from education, rather they were supported. 
Islam was used to enable these women not to suppress them.  
The leadership succeeded in combining religion with nationalism and a modern state 
university. They have religious faculties besides modern science ones. This, in turn, 
shaped a wider Palestinian religious tolerance and view particularly in the Gaza Strip. 
So that, the citizens came to value science alongside religion as a worthwhile 
academic achievement.  
The case of IUG confirmed the role of universities in participating actively in nation-
building (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Douglass, 2010; Baramki, 2010) and serving the 
greater public good (Wass, et al., 2010), and can be a great motivator to advance 
citizenship and social justice (Harkavy, 2006). 
 
IUG creates a wide diversity of specialisations and faculties to serve the community 
needs. The leadership succeeded in serving the community by creating different 
centres, projects and colleges. For example, IUG created the University College for 
Applied Science (UCAS) which offers a wide variety of Diploma and Bachelor 
programmes. Another example is the Community Service and Continuing Education 
Deanship (CSCED) which offers a range of one year diplomas and training 
programmes. In addition, IUG created the Irada project which aims to improve the 
capacities of 400 Palestinians with war injuries. The study found that the strong 
external and internal networks and the services they offer the community helped IUG 
to survive. Because of social cohesion, those activities undertaken by the Israelis to 
undermine the university, in fact strengthened it.  
 
 
7.1.5 The Role of External Players 
Because the Palestinian people have been living under the persecution of the Israeli 
occupation (Chenoweth, et al., 2007; Smith, 2011) for more than six decades, they 
have gained the support and the sympathy of many countries, groups and individuals 
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from the free world. The HE sector is one of the fields that gains support and funding 
from donors. IUG as HEI gained support and endorsement from external players.  
 
Financial support came from Gulf countries and other Islamic sources (Sullivan, 
1994), particularly from Sunni countries. While some players from Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, Malaysia and Qatar gave support and money to construct buildings, provided 
scholarships and helped needy students at IUG, others rejected the idea. The identity 
and the Islamic ideology of IUG has played a role in fund-raising. Those who have 
the same ideology were good supporters, while those with different political 
perspectives were not supportive. Some different countries and groups from Europe, 
Japan and USA gave support to this academic project regardless of political or 
religious affiliation. However, the fund often comes with golden handcuffs as the 
donors have their own interests. Therefore, the strategy of relying on donors is a 
doubtful strategy because of the strings attached or because of the changing of 
priorities such as stopping the Turkish support to 8000 needy students in order to 
support Syrian refugees. 
 
One of the key players, the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA), 
refused to recognise IUG degrees or hire its graduates for more than 15 years. This 
might have been done under the influence of the occupation. It was contradictory that 
while the main mission of UNRWA is to provide Palestinians with appropriate 
services and work in health, education and relief sectors, they refused to hire IUG 
graduates claiming that they needed recognition from the occupation authorities first.  
 
Signing the Oslo accord played a dual role at IUG. On the one hand, it created a deep 
rift in the Palestinian community which negatively affected the political conflict. On 
the other hand, this accord played a positive role in opening a window for the 
consolidation stage of constructing permanent buildings, new faculties and 
recognition of IUG degrees and graduates. Oslo changed the Israeli opposition, and 
new relationships, and partnerships were forged with many different universities and 
institutions across the globe. Soon after signing the agreement, the UNRWA took a 
different strategy and recognized IUG degrees and started to hire its graduates. Now 
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hundreds of IUG graduates are working in teaching, health and other different sectors 
of the UNRWA. Some IUG graduates have good positions in these sectors.  
  
The study showed that, in spite of the great damage the wars of 2009 and 2012 left, 
the leadership exploited them to consolidate relationships with many external players. 
By doing so, they succeeded in gaining funds to rebuild what the wars destroyed. In 
conclusion, all those external players, donors and international community have 
played, despite deficiencies or the high price, an important role in the survival and 
growth of IUG. 
 
7.1.6 The Role of SHRM at IUG 
The literature review stresses the importance of Strategic Human Resource 
Management, particularly in turbulent times (Lepak and Snell, 1998; Skaggs and 
Youndt, 2004; Fernandez, 2009; Grimsley, 2010). SHRM is the provider of employee 
capacities to achieve organisational goals (Jackson and Schuler, 1995; Huselid, 
Jackson, and Schuler, 1997; Wright, 1998; Dessler, 2008). IUG has experienced 
successive crises since its inception and up to the present moment. Although the 
researcher argued in the literature review that the label of SHRM approach was not 
officially dealt with by IUG leadership as a coherent concept, nevertheless, many 
responses of the leadership to hazardous conditions showed that the fit and alignment, 
the contingency approach (Delery, 1998; Werbel and DeMarie, 2005; Demirbag, et 
al., 2010) of HR functions appears on some occasions at IUG. The way the leadership 
responded to some events indicated that in the IUG environment of turmoil and 
conflict, the contingency SHRM approach is more appropriate compared to the 
configurational or the universalistic approaches. This is aligned with the findings of 
many scholars (Youndt, Snell, Dean, and lepak, 1996; Fernandez, 2009; Demirbag, et 
al., 2010).   
 
This was clearly demonstrated, although not within a formal SHRM approach, 
through many big events such as: shutting down IUG; when the occupation expelled 
36 academics and the leadership had to freeze the creation of a Nursing faculty in 
1985; when shutting down IUG in 1988; when more than 60 qualified academics, 
comprising 34% of the staff, left IUG to join Al-Azhar in 1991-1993; and when the 
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military occupation bombed IUG in the wars of 2012 and 2014. In these events, some 
functions and policies of HR worked in integrity, synergy and alignment toward 
keeping IUG surviving and the educational process moving forward.  
  
These responses in the first three stages of IUG did not reflect a formal strategy of 
SHRM, rather, it was intrinsic abilities and experiences of the leadership in dealing 
with hardships. But in the fourth stage, IUG started to deal officially with SHRM. 
This required a different and a coherent approach for the future of IUG in order to 
improve the ability of IUG to overcome the future challenges. 
 
7.1.7 The Interaction between Leadership and Culture in Building Resilience 
The concepts and regulations of the Islamic culture have a direct impact on the 
thoughts, actions and behaviours of the leadership and staff of IUG. The study 
showed that the national duty of opposing the occupation and maintaining the 
Palestinian traditional culture was an important dimension which was added to the 
Islamic culture of IUG to strengthen the trust, commitment and the support of the staff 
and the community. The commitment, struggle and the sacrifice of the leadership 
inspired, motivated and empowered the staff to comply with instructions which, in 
turn, enhanced the coping capacities of the university and improved  outcomes for 
individuals and the organisation (Boyd, Lewin, and Sager, 2009). 
  
Deploying cadres with cultural and political affiliation affected the mutual interface 
between leadership and culture. The strength of IUG culture and the context of the 
occupation affected the responses of the leadership to different harsh events. At the 
same time, it gave more power to the leadership to gain the commitment and trust of 
followers which, in turn, improved resilience capacities in dealing with difficult 
events. 
 
Some scholars give importance to the relationship and the mutual influence between 
leadership and culture (Ali, 2006; Faris and Parry, 2011). Schein, 1992; Tsui, et al. 
(2006) give more weight to the effect of leadership upon culture, arguing that the 
leadership is the main shaper and builder of organisational culture. Teixeirra and 
Werther (2013) argue that the leadership reshapes the culture and can lead to a more 
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resilient organisation In contrast, O’Reilly, et al. (1991) and Yun Seok (2007) believe 
that culture can affect and shape the organisation. Haveman and Khaire (2004) found 
that ideological zeal positively affects the whole organisational life. It puts both the 
leaders and the followers in the right direction to influence the behaviours and 
performance of the organisation which helps the organisation to cope with shocks and 
events in a resilient manner. 
Seery (2011) found that positive religious beliefs and commitment of employees may 
contribute to resilience in the face of stressful situations, whereas negative religious 
beliefs contribute to vulnerability. The study confirmed that IUG is a resilient Islamic 
organisation at the level of individuals, leadership and system. Both culture and 
leadership lead IUG to overcome severe challenges in a rational and resilient manner. 
 
In this process, communications and relationships have played an important role in 
activating the influence between leadership and culture by raising the awareness and 
understanding of followers of what they need to do and how. This contributes to 
coping with and recovering from disturbances (Bartholomew, et al., 2000; Phillpot, et 
al., 2011) and can create the potential for profound growth and transformation 
(Prince-Paul and Exline, 2010). This enhanced the commitment and kept the IUG 
staff informed of what they need to do, how and why. The importance of this 
increased particularly in times of conflict and wars. This is because it helps in taking 
the right decision and providing a space for more consultation and gaining the trust 
and confidence of members.  
 
7.1.8 The Value of a Degree in the Community: The Internal and External Value 
of IUG Graduates in Gaza 
In spite of the severe Israeli political, economic and human restrictions, Palestinian 
universities have achieved a good academic record (Sullivan, 1995). The study 
showed that the first stage of development of IUG was characterised by a low ratio of 
PhDs and high loyalty by cadre deployment which means loyal political connections. 
In the second stage, IUG ameliorated the effects of cadre deployment by training their 
loyalists and by bringing in other qualified people. In the third stage, the leadership 
succeeded in overcoming the crisis of losing 40% of the academic staff to Al-Azhar 
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university by recruiting new qualified staff, and by motivating the local staff to work 
under stress with additional load of teaching hours. In the fourth stage, the 
qualifications and the capacities of the staff improved gradually until IUG became in 
2012 one of the leading and the biggest Palestinian universities with 292 staff 
members holding PhD degrees, and 99 holding Masters degrees as shown in Table 5 
(p. 48) in chapter two. IUG has developed to become a modern university offering a 
diversity of Bachelor, Masters and PhD programmes.  
IUG graduates who are deployed in Gaza are doing well. Hundreds of them are 
working now in the public sector, and in the UNRWA. The interview with the 
previous Chancellor and the discussion with the focus groups highlighted that some 
IUG graduates are in senior positions in both of these sectors. In addition, some IUG 
graduates were elected into the Palestinian National Council in 2006 and 17 of them 
became Ministers in the tenth government. The Prime Minister of the tenth 
government Ismaiel Haniah was an IUG graduate. Many IUG graduates worked at the 
university and 32 of them became deans of faculties throughout the four stages of 
IUG history. The graduates who are now working overseas are also doing well. 
However, due to economic decline and the continuous siege and closure, many 
graduates are unemployed, some of them travelled abroad to conduct their 
postgraduate studies hoping to find job opportunities, and others have tried to manage 
their own businesses regardless of their qualifications. 
Crises and turbulent environments have a negative impact on employment 
opportunities for graduates (Xiaohao and Changiun, 2013). The fluctuating economic 
and political climate in Palestine poses a tough question about a university that 
graduates thousands of qualified persons with very limited job vacancies. The 
importance of teaching new generations is nevertheless a high priority for the 
Palestinian community (Alzaroo, 1989; Baramki, 2010). IUG did not lock itself in a 
narrow vision, rather, looking beyond survival to thriving was a long term objective. 
IUG provides a pool of skilled graduates who will be ready and waiting to take up 
their places when freedom is achieved and when the wheel of the economy moves 
forward. 
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7.2 The Main Conclusions of the Study and its Theoretical Implications 
The environments in which HEIs operate across different regions of the world are 
frequently turbulent, changing and challenging (Muthanna and Karaman, 2014; 
Dobre, 2015) because of political conflicts and war conditions. In these turbulent 
countries, the educational process has been suspended or seriously damaged (Seitz, 
2004; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008). Many universities around the globe, 
particularly in the Middle East region have stopped their services to the community 
because of the inability to work and deal properly with hazardous conditions 
(Muthanna and Karaman, 2014). In such ongoing conflict and turbulence that faces 
many HEIs, the expectations are high while the resources are low and the hardships 
seem to be unbearable, and if the leadership cannot respond resiliently, then they 
might jeopardise the functioning of these institutions (Camillzts and Datta,1991)  ) 
and threaten their survival (Rutter, 2007; Furniss, et al., 2011). 
   
HEIs are important in the social construction and development of societies (Bernardo 
and Baranovich, 2014; Massyrova, et al., 2015). They teach the new generation and 
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train the leaders of tomorrow (Alzaroo, 1989; Stephens and Graham, 2010; Hicks and 
Gidley, 2012). In addition, HEIs play an important role in consolidating the chances 
of peace (Baramki, 2010; Bernardo and Baranovich, 2014) and spreading an 
atmosphere of democracy (Betts and Lee, 2005; Marginson, 2010; Marriot, et al., 
2011). Because wars and ongoing conflict have devastating consequences for 
communities and institutions, the reconstruction and development of HE becomes a 
high priority (Maclure and Denov, 2009) and needs to be reformed to meet the 
objectives of development of communities (Massyrova, et al., 2015). Hence the 
importance of enabling this sector to deliver the best services to students and the 
community in spite of the restrictions the external and internal environment presents. 
 
The most important implication of studying the case of IUG is that it reflects the 
general difficulties and challenges facing all Palestinian universities and the HE sector 
as a whole. Closing the political horizon for achieving justice and freedom, and the 
complexity of the difficult political and economic situation has its own negative 
impacts upon all Palestinian universities. The situation has become more complicated 
after the political division in 2007 which has led to the imposition of the siege, closure 
and left high rates of poverty which made the life of Palestinians even harder. This is 
in addition to the political and economic difficulties facing the Palestinian Authority. 
All these factors in addition to internal management problems have increased the 
challenges and suffering of the Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. 
 
Therefore, the main problem behind researching this case study was the Palestinian 
turbulent environment within which IUG must exist and operate. The study examined 
the role of the leadership in HEIs through turbulent times. The main question of this 
project was about the role of the leadership in promoting resilience through the four 
stages of IUG history since its inception in 1978 to the end of 2012., It was important 
to gather information from different sources because it provides diversity of data and 
different points of view.. Members of these interviews have different political 
affiliation ranged from Hamas, to Independents to Fatah. This gave the results more 
credibility and trustworthiness. Through the discussion, points of agreement have 
been clarified, nevertheless, points of disagreement have also been raised.  
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The study confirmed the approach of Sporn (2010) that managing HEIs requires a set 
of actors and processes to achieve the desired goals and objectives. The case of IUG 
showed that management of HEIs integrate concepts such as strategy, quality and 
process in order to cope with hardship (Kahveci and Taskin, 2013). This underlines 
the importance of classifying and categorizing the enabling factors and strategies used 
by IUG leadership. The findings of the study provide insight on how organisational 
leadership managed the situation and responded to the challenges of conflict, post 
conflict and ongoing turbulence throughout the four stages of IUG history. It shows 
how IUG contributed to addressing the challenges facing the community. 
 
The main findings of this study indicate that the chosen strategy, policies and 
practices in accordance with organisational culture (Aktas, et al., 2011) actively 
contributed and helped the leadership to reach the desired organisational goals despite 
the condition of instability or variability of the internal and external environments. 
The study found that IUG leadership deployed different strategies to keep IUG 
surviving and thriving.	  In relation to the occupation: compliance, partial compliance, 
bypassing, absorbing and defiance/challenge strategies were deployed to overcome 
the occupation obstacles and restrictions. In relation to the students: enabling (keeping 
classes going), challenging and moving forward (graduating 969 students during the 
closure of the university in the first uprising, and setting exams right after a 
bombardment), encouraging (graduation right after a bombardment) protecting 
(closing the university to prevent violence) are different strategies utilized in response 
to the challenges of the four stages of IUG history. In relation to the Palestinian 
community: service, development and challenge strategies were used in order to 
thrive. The strategy of challenge cuts across all the four stages, though in different 
ways. Also, the strategy of co-operation applies to community, external community 
and with local universities such as Al-Azhar and Al-Aqsa university in different 
occasions.  
 
The leadership has evolved and their resilience was the strategic key to adapt to the 
challenging and changing circumstances (Senior, et al., 2012; Mohammadi and 
Youzbashi, 2012). Therefore, new ways of leading were deployed and characterised 
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the behaviours of IUG leadership in coping with the situations of conflict, post-
conflict and ongoing turbulence. To ensure the survival and growth under these 
fluctuating conditions and turbulent times, diversity or a mixture of styles of 
leadership was of great importance to adapt and respond properly to different 
expected and unexpected challenges. The case of IUG confirmed what has been 
reported in the literature review: that transformational leadership style was the most 
used in management (Burns, 1978; Bass, 1990; Yukl, 2008) and an appropriate style 
in conflict and war conditions (Yukl, 2008, 2010; Warrilow, 2010). Nevertheless, 
transactional, heroic, post-heroic and sometimes authoritarian characteristics of 
leaders demonstrated the behaviours of IUG leadership in many different occasions. 
Sometimes, the leadership used a mixed of transformational with transactional style. 
Sometimes they mixed transformational with heroic, or post-heroic styles. Some other 
times they deployed one of these styles to respond to specific situation. 
The study identifies 23 different cognitive, behavioural and contextual factors of 
resilience some of which specifically pertain to the circumstances of Gaza and the 
case of IUG such as sharing culture and ideology, opportunism, faith, struggle and 
sacrifice. Some of these factors are derived from the literature as presented in Table 7 
(p. 100) while other factors are derived from the case of IUG. All the 23 factors might 
be contextually appropriate in conditions of serious conflict and war conditions. 
 
The evidence of the interface and engagement between leadership and Islamic culture 
through the four stages of IUG revealed that the concepts of followers’ faith, 
consultation and obedience were added to the leadership styles, especially 
transformational style, and raised the sense of sacrifice and commitment of both 
leaders and followers. These factors clarified the apparent paradox of the traditional 
formulation of transformational leadership, and the different way it was enacted at 
IUG. In the context of IUG, the Islamic culture shaped leadership and the leadership 
gained the obedience and commitment of followers. This shed a new light on 
leadership theories, particularly transformational leadership theories, as more Western 
(Dimmock and Walker, 2000; Kabasakal, et al., 2012; Wang, et al., 2012) than has 
been previously acknowledged. Leadership is based on different cultures. In the case 
of IUG, leadership manifests in a particular way in an explicitly Islamic setting.  
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In spite of the success leadership has achieved in leading IUG and responding to 
many different challenges, they failed to respond properly to specific problems. For 
example, the insistence of opening the faculty of Nursing resulted in a serious lack of 
qualified staff as the occupation authorities deported 36 academics. Recruitment 
standards at the first stage lacked transparency and quality. The leadership was unable 
to fix the problem of absenteeism of the staff during the second uprising because of 
the checkpoints regime in the third stage. The dilemma of financial crisis remains 
unsolved and casts deep concerns over the university. Paralleling this, the personal 
interests of employees in terms of salaries and promotion rose to the surface in 2012 
because IUG was unable to pay more than 60% of the salary of employees. This 
affected the morale, commitment and performance of some members of the staff. 
Leading a university amid a complexity of the environment and through a devastating 
of circumstances and risky conditions was never easy or without a price. The debates 
among some of the staff members whether or not to teach underground; whether or 
not to build Baraksat reflects the risky conditions and the dangers of being arrested, 
injured or killed. Hence comes the importance of raising the sense of struggle, 
sacrifice and affiliation and commitment for the sake of the community and for this 
national project. The leadership succeeded in this.   
 
The leadership realised that some events and shocks are beyond control and cannot be 
prevented (Rutter, 2007; Auerswald and van Opstal, 2009; Furniss, 2011; Saurin, et 
al., 2012) such as siege and closure, wars and bombing of IUG, but leaders can 
change the way they react to them and contain their consequences by absorbing the 
damage and trying to recover and return to normal operation rapidly.  
 
Sometimes  challenges and threats are the key to new opportunities (Weick, 1988; 
Andrews, 1995; Coutu, 2002; Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; Hollnagel, 2007; 
Hollnagel, et al., 2011; Lengnick-Hall, et al., 2011; Furniss, et al., 2011; Strunz, 
2012) and open a new horizon for development and prosperity. This represents 
resilience at its utmost, where resilience should be a strategic approach and agreed 
upon by the organisation, leadership and employees. The leadership succeeded to turn 
the conflict with AL-Azhar university, which continued for years, to a good co-
operation and relationship between the two neighboring universities. 
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Keeping control in spite of the complexity of the situation at IUG was an important 
indicator of resilience and long term objectives of survival and thriving. The 
leadership deployed several short term strategies that fed into long term strategies. 
The short term strategies ranged from engage, bypass and concede, to defy and 
challenge. Some of these strategies were proactive (Reason, 1997; Hollnagel, 2007; 
Fernandez, 2009) while others were reactive (Reason, 1997; Marcus and Nichols, 
1999; Masten and Reed, 2005). These strategies served both long term strategies of 
resilience in order to achieve not only the survival, but also the thriving objectives 
(Hollnagel, 2007; Lengnick-Hall, et al., 2011). It is not sufficient for big organisations 
to survive, rather, they need to thrive (Max-Neef, et al., 1991). By moving forward 
and exploiting any opportunity to thrive, IUG leadership was able to work as an a 
creative endeavour rather than just adopting  survival goals.  
 
One of the important forces that played a dual role at IUG was the Islamic culture 
based ideology. The literature review provides contradictory results about the role of 
ideology at institutions. Ideology has a positive impact on the survival (Punamäki, 
1996; Khamis, 2000; Shamai, 2002; Haveman and Khaire, 2004; Punamäki, et al., 
2008) and the success of universities (Glass and Jacobs, 2005). It gives a sense of 
purpose and works as a protective function in the face of hardships (Punamäki, 1996; 
Shamai, 2002; Laor, et al., 2006; Punamäki, et al., 2008). In contrast, ideology has a 
negative impact, it is a risk factor (Jones, 2002; Kanagaratnam, et al., 2005). Ideology 
can be a source of discrimination and fertile ground for developing it (Marriott, et al., 
2011), and may often mar the decision-making process (Aljardali, et al., 2012). 
Despite the disagreement among scholars about the positive or negative effects of 
cultural ideology on leadership, employees and the organisation, the case of IUG 
showed that the Islamic culture based ideology was one of the important factors in 
promoting the survival of IUG and improving its ability to thrive. It provided 
followers with a feeling of commitment, partnership and a sense of enthusiasm toward 
achieving organisational goals and objectives especially in conditions of external 
threats. This ideological culture places a significant obligation on followers and 
believers to obey their leaders as long as leaders follow the rules of Islam (Faris and 
Parry, 2011).  
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As was discussed in the literature review, resilience can be configured in different 
ways. The Islamic culture of IUG influenced the way the leadership and staff behaved 
and acted by raising their faith, commitment, struggle and sacrifice which, in turn, 
improved their ability to cope with challenges and difficulties in a resilient manner.  
 
Also, the interaction between the different actors and processes provided additional 
important findings. Some findings of this research were new in the context of HE in 
turbulent times. Firstly, the leadership has to play different roles in different 
situations, sometimes in conflict situations and sometimes in post-conflict situations. 
While other times they have to play their role in both conflict and post-conflict at the 
same time. 
 
Secondly, the leadership succeeded in combining authenticity and modernity in terms 
of building a modern university under occupation while maintaining traditional 
culture and identity. 
 
Thirdly, the leadership succeeded in exploiting the Islamic culture in a positive way 
that increased the sense of affiliation and loyalty, obedience and commitment, and 
raising the spirit of struggle and sacrifice for the sake of the university.  
 
Fourthly, in spite of working in dangerous and risky conditions, and in spite of 
internal conflict and division, the level of social cohesion within the university, and 
between the university and the community, remained high. This cohesion has played 
an important role in supporting and protecting the university against Israeli oppression 
many times, and the community encouraged their youth to enroll at IUG despite risky 
conditions. 
 
Fifthly, the case of IUG indicates that Palestinian universities are likely to reflect the 
traits of their dominant culture, whether it is Islamic or secular, and also reflects an 
exercise of power which should always be implemented with responsibly through 
ethical principles. 
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7.3 Recommendations 
The environment in which many HEIs, including IUG, operate is still turbulent and 
full of challenges. This thesis was an attempt to identify the role of leadership in 
addressing these challenges to ensure the survival of these institutions and the best 
delivery of education amid these hazardous conditions. Therefore, the lessons and the 
experiences of IUG were worth searching and recording for the benefit of the future 
of IUG as well as for HEIs which operate in similar conditions. The recommendations 
of this study can be briefly presented in two sections: one is for IUG in particular, and 
the other for HEIs in general. 
 
7.3.1 A Future Approach for IUG 
Some of the past challenges which IUG experienced are still facing the new 
university. At the present stage, the university has developed to be one of the biggest 
universites in number of students with diversity of specialisations, and it is 
functioning as a predominantly modern university, that has combined science with 
religion. Now it requires the adoption of a more traditional human resources 
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management approach. The new generation of leaders with new relationships to the 
board and the community, new demands of employees and management structures 
should be appropriate to a more modern university. It is also no longer sufficient to 
rely only on religious dedication and cohesion.  
 
This research suggests that in turbulent environments, building capacity for 
organisational resilience can be achieved through strategically managing HR to fit and 
align all the functions and practices of HR with the organisation strategy (Delery and 
Doty, 1996; Demirbag, et al., 2010) which supports the contingency SHRM approach 
in order to achieve urgent and emerging goals. Aligning leadership and employees 
with the organisation’s strategy and objectives is important (Boswell, 2006) to 
overcome hardships. By doing so, skilled leadership will be able to capitalise on the 
disturbances, absorb the initial damage, recover and even thrive. 
 
IUG needs to increase and maintain the sense of sacrifice and the struggle capital of 
both new leaders and the staff in order to improve their ability to cope with hazardous 
circumstances. Within a SHRM approach (Chadwick, 2005), using the tools of 
training programmes, workshops, and brainstorming meetings, the leadership needs to 
demonstrate the ability to lead and direct the discussion. This will allow a deeper 
understanding of the potential events and threats that the organisation may be exposed 
to in the future and the consequences of these. This will clarify the different possible 
scenarios of events and the possible alternatives and solutions to deal with them 
resiliently with more confidence and with no panic, and thus have an edge over others 
who are unable to do so (Walsh, 2012).  
 
Leading a big university with financial crisis, political conflict and Israeli constraint 
and siege is a difficult and complex mission.  In recent years after 2012, due to these 
problems, staff solidarity with the leadership has declined. This implies the need to 
improve the communication networks between the leadership and employees and 
between IUG and the community to increase their sense of commitment, sacrifice and 
solidarity.  
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The importance of social cohesion was crucial for IUG to survive. IUG has not moved 
to  managerialism – universities run as a business, and students treated as customers, 
as this ethos might not lead to the social cohesion, trust and loyalty on which IUG 
depends to survive. Where the managerialist universities rely on a combination of 
high fees and government subsidies to survive, IUG must rely heavily on donors and 
investment. Due to economic decline and poverty in the Gaza Strip, IUG was not able 
to increase tuition fees. Students are part of the social fabric of the university. They 
protest against the occupation, not against the university. But with the current 
financial crisis, IUG will have to find alternatives to this dilemma and contain the 
objection of the Employees' Union  of the university to reduce salaries.  
 
It is important to keep IUG as a learning (Stephen and Graham, 2010) and adaptive 
organisation (Allen, Fontaine, Pope, Garmestani, 2011). Documenting the history and 
experience of IUG could help new leaders and the staff to benefit from this long 
experience in managing the institution and confronting hazardous conditions with 
more confidence and experience. 
 
 
7.3.2 Reflections on HEIs in Turbulent Times 
In a turbulent environment, the responsibilities and tasks of leaders, and the 
challenges HEIs encounter, increase. Leaders are responsible for policies and 
strategies; they reap the results as well as pay the price. Particular attention needs to 
be paid to the context when the leadership executes and implements decisions or 
strategies in the organisation (Brews and Purohit, 2007).  
 
For deep understanding, and for more clarification about the influence of culture, 
particularly Islamic culture, we need a conversation round the concepts of both 
leadership and resilience.  
 
The 23 markers of resilience might be a key starting point and useful for HEIs as they 
present a complex concept of resilience in a relatively simple structure. The suggested 
model can be used to identify the components of resilience, strengths and weaknesses, 
and to evaluate whether their policies and strategies are able to address hardships they 
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face resiliently. To be resilient at times of disturbances, organisations need to navigate 
through a set of diverse strategies that juxtapose effective planning with adaptability 
to changing and challenging circumstances, as IUG leadership demonstrated. 
Lengnick-Hall, et al. (2011) propose that "Firm's capacity for developing 
organisational resilience is achieved through strategically managing human resources 
to create individual competencies among core employees, that when aggregated at the 
organisational level, make it possible for organisations to effectively absorb 
uncertainty, develop situation-specific responses to threats, and ultimately engage in 
transformational activities so that they can capitalize on disruptive surprises that 
potentially threaten their survival". 
 
 
Achieving these objectives might involve a plan of knowledge sharing, capacity and 
awareness building of who has what knowledge and who will perform if required in 
order to cope quickly and properly with hardships. This implies the integration of the 
SHRM with organisation strategy in order to concentrate on the emerging goals and to 
achieve the objectives of the institution. In such conditions, the importance of SHRM 
is increased (Boxall and Purcell, 2000) and could play an important role in the process 
of preparing those leaders with adequate knowledge and experience to improve their 
capacities in coping with disturbances and achieving the objectives of their 
organisation.  
 
Tertiary education can be an agent of change (Hansen and Lehmann, 2006; Stephens, 
et al., 2008) and an engine of national growth, particularly in conflict-ridden societies.  
 
7.4 Further Research 
This thesis discussed the role of the leadership at the Palestinian Islamic University of 
Gaza (IUG) in the turbulent period from 1978 to 2012. Although IUG represents 
many of the difficulties and the challenges Palestinian universities are exposed to, 
using IUG as a qualitative case study might limit the generalisability of the results of 
the study. Therefore, it is important to conduct further studies to examine and confirm 
the results of this study. 
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Further studies need to be conducted to confirm the appropriateness of 
transformational style in turbulent times, and to explore if there is a real need for 
additional or mixed leadership styles which could be deployed in responding to 
different kinds of challenges and difficulties. These avenues of research should seek 
to specify how leadership styles might help organisations in general and HEIs in 
particular to bounce back and flourish after experiencing hazardous circumstances.  
 
The study found that the Islamic culture of IUG has played an important role in the 
survival and growth of the university by increasing the sense of faith ,struggle and 
sacrifice of leaders and folowers for the sake of the university. Nevertheless, it also 
found that this culture has created tention, some violent clashes and supporter as well 
as opponnents for funding IUG. Therefore, additional studies should be conducted to 
clarify the positive/negative role of Islamic culture and ideology within the context of 
HEIs. Also, specific attention needs to be paid to see if it is possible to avoid the 
negative side effects of this culture and ideology.    
 
Importantly, the interaction and mutual influence between leadership and culture 
needs to be investigated in different cultures and settings to clarify the extent to which 
leadership styles are culture–specific. Faris and Parry (2011) shed some light on this 
concluding that the leadership cannot be studied fruitfully out of context, and that 
context invariably is problematic for understanding leadership. 
 
The interaction between leadership and culture in building resilience needs more 
research. The 23 factors which were presented as good markers of resilience in 
turbulent times need further interrogation to isolate the most important factors that 
contribute to institutional resilience. Also, these factors need to be investigated to see 
whether they have wider applicability or not, and if there are additional markers of 
resilience which can add value to the existing ones. These further studies might aim to 
create a hierarchy of factors that promote resilient leadership and organisation in 
conflict and post-conflict contexts. 
 
This thesis discussed the concept of resilience at the individual, leadership and 
systems level, arguing that building capacity for organisational resilience strategy in a 
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turbulent environment requires a contingency SHRM approach. This approach needs 
more applications and tests in different turbulent environments of HEIs to amplify the 
results of this study.  
 
Investigating these areas might enable the development of a coherent approach that 
allows HEIs in turbulent environments of uncertainty and turmoil to move beyond 
survival to thriving in spite of such extreme adverse conditions.  
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Appendix A: The Acceptance of IUG Chancellor to Conduct Interviews 
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Mr. Said A. Al Namrouti, 
Ph.D. Candidate at University of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg/S.A 
Upon your request, it is my pleasure to accept your call for questioning some of our 
academic and administrative staff, as part of your research titled: 
 
"The Strategic Role of Organisational Resilience at the Islamic University of Gaza, 
1978-2012" 
Wishing you a successful mission and an enriching experience. 
Dr. Kamalain Shaath 
IUG President  
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Appendix B: message sent to the interviewees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam……………………………………………….. 
Subject: Individual interviews and focus group discussion for the 
requirements of PhD degree 
With great pleasure I would like to inform you that I need to conduct 
interviews with you and many other academics and administrators as 
part of my qualitative research approach for the requirements of a 
PhD degree from the University of the Witwatersrand/ South Africa. 
Research title:	  The Strategic Role of Organisational Resilience at the Islamic 
University of Gaza, 1978-2012. 
Your acceptance to conduct the interview will be highly appreciated. 
If you have any queries, please feel free to contact me,  
Said ELNamrouti, Mobile: +970592666354   
Email: snamrouti@gmail.com 
Or contact either of my supervisors 
Dr. Gillian Godsel, Mobile: +27832658829 
Email:	  gillian@godsell.za.com 
Dr. Manamela Matshabaphala, Tel. +27	  (011) 717 3508   
Email: Manamela.Matshabaphala@wits.ac.za   
Researcher: Said Ahmed El-Namrouti 
 
Wits School of Governance “WSG” 
The University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg/SA	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Appendix D: ةلئسأأ تتلاباقملاا  
1 .ام يھھھه مھھھهأأ تتایيدحتلاا يتلاا اھهتھهجااوو ةعماجلاا  
2 .فیيك تلماعت ةةددایيق ةعماجلاا عم ههذھھھه ؟تتایيدحتلاا ببرضأأ ةلثماا  
3 .فص فیيك تعاطتساا ةعماجلاا رراارمتسلااا مغرر ففوورظلاا ةبعصلاا ةسكاعملااوو  
4 .لھھھه تمدختساا ةةددایيقلاا ةیيأأ تتایيجیيتاارتساا يف لماعتلاا عم ثثاادحلأاا  
5 .مغرر لمعلاا يف ففوورظظ طغضلاا رططاخملااوو ,دددع لیيلق نم نیيلماعلاا ككرت ةعماجلاا ,؟ااذذامل ام ييذلاا مھھھهزفح ىلع 
ءاقبلاا 
6 .ام يھھھه مھھھهأأ تتاحاجنلاا يتلاا اھهتققح ؟ةةددایيقلاا ممدق ةلثمأأ  
7 .يھھھهام تتایيدحتلاا تتابقعلااوو يتلاا مل عطتست ةةددایيقلاا بلغتلاا اھهیيلع ؟ااذذاملوو ممدق ةلثمأأ  
8 ؟ةةرروطتموو ةةرمتسم ةعماجلاا ىقبتل ھهلمع بجیي يلااام .  
Appendix D: Interview Questions 
1. What are the main challenges which IUG has experienced over the years? 
2. How has the IUG leadership dealt with these challenges? Give examples. 
3. Describe how IUG manages to keep going despite extreme adverse circumstances. 
4. Does the leadership utilize any strategies in dealing with these challenges? Give 
examples. 
5. Despite working under stress and risk conditions, few number of employees have 
left IUG. Why do you think this is so? What has induced staff to stay? 
6. What are the most important successes IUG leadership have achieved? Give 
evidences. 
7. What are the main challenges and barriers the leadership found themselves unable 
to overcome? Why? Give examples. 
8. What remains to be done to keep IUG surviving and thriving? 
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Appendix E: Specializations and Degrees Offered by IUG 
No. Faculties Program Name (Specialization) Certificate 
1.  
Usoul Eldeen 
(Religion Foundation) 
 Usoul Eldeen (General) Bachelor 
2.  Islamic Studies Higher Diploma 
3.  Explanation and Quran’s Sciences Master 
4.  Hadith and its Sciences Master 
5.  Islamic Belief Master 
6.  Hadith and its Sciences PHD 
7.  
Sharea & Law 
Sharia and Law Bachelor 
8.  Islamic Sharia Bachelor 
9.  Comparative Jurisprudence Master 
10.  Public law Master 
 300  
No. Faculties Program Name (Specialization) Certificate 
11.  
Arts 
Arabic Bachelor 
12.  Arabic language branch Journalism Bachelor 
13.  English Bachelor 
14.  Social Studies Bachelor 
15.  History  Bachelor 
16.  Geography branch GIS Bachelor 
17.  Journalism & Media  Bachelor 
18.  History and Archeology Bachelor 
19.  Geography  Bachelor 
20.  Geography  Master 
21.  History  Master 
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No. Faculties Program Name (Specialization) Certificate 
22.  Arabic Master 
23.  Journalism Master 
24.  
Education 
Psychology Bachelor 
25.  Psychological counselling and educational 
guidance 
Bachelor 
26.  Education branch Basic education Bachelor 
27.  Education branch Religion Bachelor 
28.  Education branch Studies Social Bachelor 
29.  Education branch Science Bachelor 
30.   Education branch Mathematics  Bachelor 
31.   Education branch Arabic Bachelor 
32.   Education branch English Bachelor 
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No. Faculties Program Name (Specialization) Certificate 
33.   Education branch Science and Technology Bachelor 
34.   Education branch Arabic and teaching methods Bachelor 
35.  Education branch English and teaching methods Bachelor 
36.  Education branch Physics and teaching methods Bachelor 
37.  Education branch Chemistry and teaching methods Bachelor 
38.  Education branch Biology  and teaching methods Bachelor 
39.  Education branch Mathematics and teaching 
methods 
Bachelor 
40.  Education branch Computer and teaching methods Bachelor 
41.  Education branch History and teaching methods Bachelor 
42.  Education branch Geography and teaching 
methods 
Bachelor 
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43.  Psychological Counseling Higher Diploma 
44.  Mental and Social health  Higher Diploma 
45.  Educational  management Higher Diploma 
46.  Educational Rehabilitation (General) Educational qualification 
47.  Mental and Social health Master 
48.  Curricula and teaching methods Master 
49.  Foundations of Education Master 
50.  Psychology Master 
51.  
Commerce 
Economics Bachelor 
52.  Economics & Political Science Bachelor 
53.  Economics and Applied Statistics Bachelor 
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54.  Business Administration Bachelor 
55.  Accounting Bachelor 
56.  Banking Bachelor 
57.  Politics and Media Bachelor 
58.  Finance and Banking Master 
59.  Development Economics Master 
60.  Business Administration Master 
61.  
Nursing 
Nursing Bachelor 
62.  Midwifery Bachelor 
63.  Physiotherapy(1) Bachelor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
(1) This program is a part of programs within the Faculty of Health Sciences (submitted for adoption by the Commission) 
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No. Faculties Program Name (Specialization) Certificate 
64.  Community mental health nursing Master 
65.  
Information 
Technology 
Computer Science Bachelor 
66.  Information Technology Bachelor 
67.  Software Development Bachelor 
68.  Multimedia Technology and Web Development Bachelor 
69.  Information Technology Master 
70.  
Science 
Mathematics Bachelor 
71.  Medical Laboratory Sciences(  )2  Bachelor 
72.  Mathematics branch Statistics  Bachelor 
73.  Mathematics branch computer   Bachelor 
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74.  Applied Statistics Bachelor 
75.  Chemistry Bachelor 
76.  Chemistry branch Biochemistry Bachelor 
77.  Biotechnology Bachelor 
78.  Life sciences branch Medical analysis  Bachelor 
79.  Biology Life branch sciences Bachelor 
80.  Life sciences branch Biochemistry  Bachelor 
81.  Physics Bachelor 
82.  Geology Bachelor 
83.  Environment and Earth Sciences Bachelor 
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84.  Medical optics technology(3) Bachelor 
85.  Vegetarian production Bachelor 
86.  Physics Master 
87.  Biology Master 
88.  Environmental Science Master 
89.  Biotechnology Master 
90.  Mathematics Master 
91.  Chemistry Master 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
(3) This program is a part of programs within the Faculty of Health Sciences (submitted for adoption by the Commission) 
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Appendix F: A Table of the Documents used in this Research 
   No. Name of Document Date 
1 Minutes of the Inception Meeting 08/09/1978 
2 AL-Azhar’s Approval on Establishing IUG 07/08/1979 
3 Association of Arab Universities 24/11/1980 
4 Message to Israeli PM and International Community about 
Acknowledging IUG 
01/05/1981 
5 Israeli Civil Administration’s Approval of Commencing 
the Third Year in IUG 
17/07/1981 
6 Message to the Israeli Military Governor on Permitting 
Two Floors at IUG 
03/02/1982 
7 Israeli Military Order of Rejection of Building Two Floors 
at IUG 
08/02/1980 
8 The Israeli Response to Issues raised by IUG 08/10/1982 
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9 Egyptian Supreme Council of Universities 
Acknowledgement of IUG 
14/12/1982 
10 Egypt’s Approval of the IUG Students Conducting their 
Postgraduate Studies in Egypt 
16/01/1983 
11 Statement of the IUG Board of Trustees about the Internal 
Conflict 
17/05/1983 
12 Statement of IUG Presidency about the Internal Conflict 12/06/1983 
13 Message from the Israeli Civil Administration about 
Residency of 7 lecturers of IUG.  
14/09/1983 
14 Message from the Board of Trustees to the Military 
governor about Lecturers Residence. 
18/09/1983 
15 Message of IUG Chancellor, Prof. Saqer about Hiring IUG 
Graduates 
01/10/1983 
16 The IUG Board of Trustees and the University Council 
Meeting on the Israeli intervention and the Rejection of 
Order 380 
19/10/1983 
17 The IUG Memorandum of Rejection of Order 380 19/10/1983 
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18 Response of Board of Trustees, University Council and 
Staff Committee about the Objection of Expelling, and 
Confiscating of Funds, and Non-Recognition 
19/10/1983 
19 Message from the Israeli Military Governor about 
Expelling the IUG Lecturers, and Confiscating of Funds 
19/10/1983 
20 IUG message to the Israeli Ministry of Defense about 
Order 380, and Expelling of Academics 
19/10/1983 
21 IUG Message to the Israeli Coordinator about the 
Occupation Restrictions 
05/12/1983 
22 The Israeli Civil Administration Message Requesting 
Agendas’ of IUG meetings 
05/12/1983 
23 IUG Message to the Israeli Civil Administration about 
Confiscating IUG Funds 
12/12/1983 
24 IUG Message to the Israeli Coordinator about Confiscating 
IUG Funds and Salaries 
13/12/1983 
25 The Israeli Coordinator Response about IUG Difficulties 17/12/1983 
26 The Egyptian General Governor Message of 31/01/1983 
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Acknowledgement of IUG Certificates 
27 Message to the Israeli Governor about Permitting IUG 
Board of Trustees to Travel Abroad for Fund Raising 
22/02/1984 
28 Message to the Israeli Coordinator about different Issues 
(Buildings, Recognition, Residence and Confiscating IUG 
Funds 
22/02/1984 
29 IUG Message Requesting  Freezing the Israeli decision of 
Expelling Lectures 
26/02/1984 
30 Message from IUG Chancellor to General Manager of HE 
about Recruiting IUG Graduates 
14/03/1984 
31 IUG Message to the Military Governor Asking Permission 
to Open the Faculty of Nursing  
01/08/1984 
32 IUG Message to the Military Governor Requesting  
Permission to Construct Temporary Buildings 
01/08/1984 
33 The Military Response Rejecting Constructing any 
Buildings at IUG 
05/08/1984 
34 The Israeli Chief of HE Response about rejecting opening 
the Faculty of Nursing, Building permissions and 
Eliminating the Number of Students  
05/09/1984 
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35 IUG Message to the Israeli Authorities bout recognizing it 23/09/1984 
36 A Message to the Civil Administration about the Rejection 
of the order 380 
23/09/1984 
37 IUG Message about Meeting the Israeli Defense Minister 31/10/1984 
38 IUG Board of Trustees Response to The Israeli Authorities 
about their Intervention in IUG Academic Issues Including 
Opening the Faculty of Nursing  
05/11/1984 
39 A message from the Chairman Yaser Arafat about the 
violent accents at IUG  
17/05/1985 
40 A Statement of the Board of Trustees about the Internal 
Conflict 
05/11/1984 
41 The Acceptance of the Israeli Civil Administration of 
Releasing some of IUG Money 
17/01/1985 
42 The Acceptance of the Israeli Civil Administration of 
Transferring Money to IUG  
14/12/1985 
43 A Message to the Israeli Civil Administration Asking 
Recognition  of IUG 
06/01/1987 
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44 A Message to the Israeli Military Governor Requesting  
New Permissions to some Lecturers 
17/03/1987 
45 A Military Order of Rejecting opening a New Gate for 
IUG 
03/12/1987 
46 Another Message to the Israeli Military Governor 
Requesting  New Permissions to some Lecturers 
14/02/1988 
47 A Military Order of Shutting Down IUG 07/06/1988 
48 A Meeting between the Board of Trustees and the 
University Council about Improving the relationship 
between IUG and the Egyptian Universities 
29/12/1988 
49 A Message from the UNRWA of not Recognising IUG 01/11/1990 
50 The Acknowledgement of the Jordanian University of IUG 12/12/1982 
51 The Acknowledgement of the UNRWA of IUG Certificate 
and Graduates 
31/10/1993 
52 A Message from PNA about recognizing IUG and its 
Graduates 
19/06/1994 
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53 The Final Accreditation of IUG Certificates by the 
Egyptian Supreme Council of Universities  
08/07/1996 
54 Congrats of the Minister of HE Dr. Ashrawi to IUG in the 
25th Anniversary of IUG  
16/07/1996 
 
55 Impressions of the American Ambassador in Tel-Aviv 
during his Visit to IUG  
28/05/1998 
56 A Cooperation Agreement with Illinois University, USA 20/10/1998 
57 A Cooperation Agreement with the Russian University 20/10/1998 
58 Impression of the Ambassador of Qatar during his visit to 
IUG 
29/07/1999 
59 A Cooperation Agreement with Nottingham University, 
UK 
01/11/1999 
60 Congrats of the Egyptian Ambassador during his visit to 
IUG 
20/01/2002 
61 A Cooperation Agreement with Durham University 08/11/2002 
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62 Congrats of Dr. Ramy Alhamd Allah, the Chancellor of 
Annajah University in Palestine 
26/05/2003 
63 Congrats of Dr. Gabi Baramki, the Chancellor of Bierziet 
University 
10/06/2003 
64 A Statement of the University Council about the Political 
Division 
12/06/2007 
65 IUG Leaflet about Bombing IUG in the War of Dec. 2008 02/01/2009 
66 A Cooperation Agreement with TUM University, 
Germany 
10/02/2009 
67 Agreement with Islamic Bank of the Reconstruction of 
IUG laboratories 
09/03/2010 
68 A Cooperation Agreement with Al-Yarmouk University, 
Jordan 
06/01/2011 
69 A Cooperation Agreement with Dicle, Turkey 07/02/2012 
70 Accreditation of the Ministry of HE of the PhD Degree 
Offered by IUG 
05/09/2012 
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Appendix G: Requesting Statistics about IUG Development 
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